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Abstract: 
“Last Acts” examines the intersection between early modern understandings 
of proper deathbed behavior and dramatic representations of death. Dying is 
understood in homiletic texts as a set of postures and actions that can be performed 
well or badly. Dying is something to do as much as something to suffer. There are, 
however, widespread disagreements about the eschatological significance of 
deathbed behavior, and also about the specific form it should take. These 
controversies ensure that representations of the deathbed are rich places in which 
to investigate shifting understandings of the nature of, and the interactions between, 
the individual, the social and the supernatural. To demonstrate the importance of 
this tradition, I draw out the theoretical assumptions of the artes moriendi and 
show how they influence representations of dying in plays from mid-Tudor morality 
interludes and Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, through Shakespeare’s Richard II and Ben 
Jonson’s Volpone, to Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy. I highlight playwrights’ 
use of dramatic deathbeds underpinned by Christian understandings of the good 
death to theorize different forms of agency and so to reflect changing ways of 
thinking about the self, about shifting political and economic power, and about the 
disputed nature and purpose of the theatre. 
Drama’s particular ability to trouble distinctions between activity and 
passivity, or seeming and being, makes it especially suited to think about what it 
means to die actively. Moreover, the perplexing notion of an active practice of dying 
also provides playwrights with analogies for thinking about the similarly perplexing 
notion of dramatic performance. Arguing for a continuous and productive (if 
 ii 
sometimes contentious) exchange of ideas and rhetorical strategies between 
homiletic and dramatic writing, I intervene in debates about the role of the theater 
in the rise of the secular public sphere. By situating my authors’ understandings of 
dying within a line of thought that considers how individual and collective identities 
are shaped and defined by orientation toward death from Paul and Augustine 
through to Roberto Esposito, I demonstrate that the ars moriendi tradition has 
responded to and influenced wider discussions about how death is understood 
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What will we do when we die? Imagine a man suddenly falls sick. His friends 
visit him two days later and find him prostrate, tormented by pain and cursing the 
day he was born. By reminding him of the inevitability of mortality and of his 
religious duty to be patient, they bring him to accept that he is dying. The man 
makes a will and gathers his family around him to say goodbye. Next, he recites his 
articles of faith and he and his friends pray together for his salvation. He expresses 
fear that his sinful life will result in his damnation, but as his body fails him, he puts 
his trust in Christ as his redeemer and savior. After he dies, his friends evaluate his 
end, agreeing that his good death implies that he will be saved, and hoping that they 
themselves will be given the grace to die similarly. 
This narrative is drawn from Thomas Becon’s 1561 The Sicke Mans Salve, a 
dialogue modeling the proper Christian approach to death.1 Becon’s tract 
exemplifies the artes moriendi, a homiletic genre of texts teaching the art of dying 
well that flourished between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries.2 Though Becon 
represents a specific reformist Protestant doctrinal position and speaks to a 
particular puritan community, the account he gives of what a good death should 
look like is not vastly different from those found across a range of Catholic and 
Protestant homiletic texts spanning almost three hundred years.3 In each case, a 
moriens is expected to resist a distinct and recurring set of deathbed temptations – 
 1 
 
impatience, despair and excessive worldliness – and instead express repentance and 
affirm his faith.4 Ideally, neighbors, friends and family members will be gathered 
around him to offer support, guidance and prayer and to evaluate his actions.  
The arts of dying assume that death is not only suffered. It is also an act that 
can be executed well or badly. My dissertation explores what the mode of action 
proper to the deathbed is, and how it relates to other ways of acting in the world. 
Dying, I show, becomes a productive site for theorizing the nature and limits of 
human agency. Because of the severe practical limitations on what can be expected 
from a moriens, the deathbed spurs writers to think about the minimal requirements 
for willed action, and to ponder what it is that separates it from simply being. In 
striving to explain how somebody wracked by pain, exhibiting diminished mental 
capacity or unable to speak can nevertheless be understood to have achieved a good 
Christian death, the writers of artes moriendi develop sophisticated models of 
action, which blur distinctions between activity and passivity or between the words 
and motions of the moriens and of those around him acting on his behalf.5 For 
Protestant writers in particular, the deathbed is also an important site for 
confronting the limitations placed on human action by predestinarian theologies.6 
As I will show, the understandings these texts develop of what is being done on the 
deathbed can be used to theorize action more widely. The postures advocated in the 
artes moriendi become especially attractive to dramatic authors, who draw on 
homiletic models to explore the nature of human agency in different theological, 
political, social and economic contexts. In particular, playwrights find powerful 
stimuli within the tradition for thinking about the social and performance 
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conditions in the theater, as a space that raises analogous questions about the 
agency enabling embodied performance.  
In arguing for the sophistication of the ars moriendi tradition and its 
continued relevance to the secular theater, I depart from most critics who have 
previously considered the staging of dying. Michael Neill’s Issues of Death, for 
example, surveys the relationship between Renaissance death culture and literature, 
and dismisses dying well as a dull business and the ars moriendi tradition as a 
medieval hangover. Neill emphasizes the passivity of the conventional moriens, and 
contrasts the orthodox interests and presuppositions of ars moriendi authors 
unfavorably with a subversive, classically inspired impulse to reclaim the mors 
improvisa as a liberatory or aesthetic experience.7 Even critics who are willing to 
acknowledge the artes moriendi as influences on the depiction of mortality onstage 
generally reduce them to a series of conventional expressions and poses that mark 
residual medieval influence, or that quickly become duplicitous impostures, 
evacuated of religious content in a manner that exemplifies the secularizing 
tendencies of the theater.8 
Discounting devotional practices and intent appears less justifiable in light of 
the work of a number of scholars who, over recent years, have emphasized the 
importance of religious life and thought to early modern culture and literature. The 
so-called religious turn reacts against varieties of New Historicism that valorize 
radicalism or subversion in literature and dismiss orthodox cultures of religious 
belief as monologic expressions of the dominant ideology. By encouraging a 
reassessment of mainstream religious thought, critics such as Debora Shugar have 
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revealed that the dominant religious culture was “In some respects… more radical, 
probing, and self-critical than has often been assumed, in others… more primitive, 
more alien from our own habits of thought, closer perhaps to those of traditional 
societies.”9 This line of thinking has uncovered the extent to which historical shifts 
commonly understood as external challenges to the established church (for 
instance, the increasing desacralization of social life and the political sphere) are 
also the subject of internal debates within the Church.10 Most relevantly to my 
project, a number of critics have been inspired to reconsider the relationship 
between divinity and the stage, and to challenge the earlier critical orthodoxy that 
this is characterized by mutual antagonism.11 
I aim to show that the artes moriendi constitute an important part of this 
devotional context. To say, as Neill does, that the art of dying is a residual practice is 
simply untrue. The genre is late medieval in origin but has a long, vital subsequent 
existence. Though it is possible to identify some antecedents among the writings of 
the early fathers and in the devotional works of the thirteenth century, the text 
generally understood to have created the genre is the Tractatus Artis Bene Moriendi, 
written some time in the first half of the fifteenth century and then translated into 
English around 1490 as the Crafte and Knowledge For to Dye Well.12 In Europe as a 
whole, artes moriendi circulated most widely between 1470 and 1520.13 However, 
in England more various and original examples were produced in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries than had been previously.14 Jeremy Taylor’s Holy Dying, today 
the most famous of the texts, was published in 1651 and new arts of dying were still 
being produced in England at least as late as 1711.15  
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Additionally, artes moriendi do not represent a static theological attitude or 
doctrinal position. Though the fundamental scenario they treat remains unchanged, 
and though strong family resemblances exist between all texts in their advice on 
how to combat deathbed temptations, the basic model is easily adapted to take 
account of shifting theological ideas and contexts. Rather than constituting a 
holdover that thinkers interested in the reformation of medieval Catholicism 
necessarily reacted against, the genre often became a medium for debate and 
innovation. Protestant thinkers from Luther onwards adapt the basic formula of the 
Tractatus to accommodate changed understandings of grace and free will, and in the 
hands of writers including William Perkins and Jeremy Taylor, arts of dying can 
become occasions for polemic against rejected Catholic deathbed practices such as 
Confession, the anointing of the sick, appeals to saintly intercessors and prayers for 
the dead.16 Counterreformation authors such as Petrus Luccensis and Robert 
Bellarmine respond in kind, reaffirming the necessity of Catholic ritual practices at 
the deathbed.17 Theological debate is carried out within the arts of dying rather than 
in reaction to them. 
Artes moriendi, moreover, also accommodate and contend with social 
pressures as they attempt to define the boundaries between living and dying and 
between worldly and holy approaches to death. The deathbed is a place where 
divines and other spiritual advisors have to compete for the moriens with 
representatives of his worldly interests and attachments. And as many ars moriendi 
authors recognize, the moment of death can have significant economic, social, 
philosophical and political repercussions as well as religious ones. How we 
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understand what morientes are doing when they are dying may affect how we 
understand constructions of intergenerational relationships and assertions of social 
bonds both inside and outside the family; links between mind, body and spirit; and 
transfers of worldly authority or economic substance either automatically or 
through documents such as wills. Though turning away from the world is always the 
ultimate goal of a dying Christian, many texts offer their readers advice on how to 
negotiate between alternative modes of sacred and secular discourse and respond 
to immediate social and material conditions.  
Three different sets of examples can illustrate the wide range of contexts in 
which artes moriendi situate religious approaches to death. First, several European 
Protestant texts addressed to audiences living under Catholic control are keenly 
interested in the relative claims of political and faith communities. They modify 
features of the tradition to provide advice on negotiating anti-Protestant legal and 
ecclesiastical institutions. One example of how to do this can be seen in the 
Evangelish lere und vermanung eines sterbenden menschen, an anonymous guide 
written for German Lutherans living in a Catholic state.18 The Evangelish lere adapts 
a standard piece of advice that a moriens should avoid disputing with the devil on 
doctrinal matters. The valorization of a posture of non-engagement is found in the 
writings of Erasmus among others. Erasmus imagines a confrontation in which the 
devil is confounded by a moriens who answers every question on doctrine “with a 
compendious way as the church believeth. Agayne, whan [the devil] obiected, howe 
dothe the churche beleue? Marye, quod he, as I beleue. How dost thou beleue? As the 
church beleueth.”19 The Evangelish lere advocates analogous postures of 
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equivocation for Protestants who are catechized on their deathbeds by Catholic 
clergy and whose property would be at risk of seizure if their beliefs were 
revealed.20 By contrast, another set of texts organized around the monitory bad 
death of the Italian apostate Francesco Spiera, emphatically rejects such 
temporizing and uses the occasion of the deathbed to explain how to hold out 
against the temptation of apostasy.21 Artes moriendi and related texts are an 
appropriate medium for evaluating the social consequences of the emergence of 
Protestant sects. 
Second, arts of dying may take into account alternative philosophical or 
scientific understandings of death. Thomas Lupset’s 1538 text The Waye of Dyenge 
Well represents an attempt to rework the genre for an educated humanist audience 
with an interest in Classical thought. The text advocates a Christian practice of dying 
but supplements it with descriptions of exemplary Roman Stoic approaches to death 
and quotations from Epicurus as Lupset attempts to integrate Pagan philosophy into 
a Christian worldview.22 At the latter end of the century, William Perkins in the 
Salve for a Sicke Man attempts to adjudicate between the proper roles of religious 
and medical care, and between theological and natural philosophical 
understandings of dying. Perkins insists that spiritual matters must come first, and 
that “it is a thing much to be disliked that in all places almost the phisition is first 
sent for, and comes in the beginning of the sicknesse, and the minister comes when 
a man is halfe dead, and is then sent for often times when the sicke party lyes 
drawing on and gasping for breath.”23 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that doctors 
have an important place at the sickbed, and treats their practice seriously by 
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distinguishing between forms of medicine that should be avoided as 
counterproductive or superstitious and those “grounded vpon some good naturall 
reason.”24  His rejection of a given medical practice is as likely to be based on its 
scientific inadequacy as on its religious implications.25 
Third, ars moriendi can be used to ground political polemic since a moriens is 
expected to put his earthly affairs in order, evaluate his past conduct, make 
provision for his dependents and dispose of his property and offices. This potential 
was realized particularly effectively by Charles I in the run up to his execution. The 
Eikon Basilike bears a close relation to the ars moriendi tradition, and takes the 
religious preparation for death as an occasion to articulate a defense of Charles’s 
absolutist monarchy. The format of the deathbed confession of sins and declaration 
of articles of faith becomes an expedient opportunity for the King to justify his 
political actions.26 However, political polemic can also motivate the reclassification 
of a given approach to death as bad. Milton’s Eikonoclases is an attempt to 
undermine the effectiveness of the Eikon Basilike in part by recasting it as a bad or 
blasphemous approach to death.27  
As these examples indicate, the type of behavior proper to the deathbed 
conditions, and is conditioned by, a broader field of human thought and action in the 
world. And this integration within the world makes the artes moriendi especially 
valuable for studying the role of devotional traditions in the process of 
secularization. They help us to track shifts in the boundaries between the sacred and 
the secular and to see the extent to which religious and worldly modes of thought 
influence and learn from one another. When, how and why England moved from 
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being a state that enforced a theological-political totality to one dominated by non-
religious institutions has been widely and vigorously debated.28 Most commentators 
agree that the intellectual and social upheaval of the Reformation played a 
significant role in the process, but disagree about which factors were most 
significant and about whether social change was driven by intellectual change or 
vice versa. One thing that the artes moriendi reveal is that shifts in popular belief 
systems and religious behavior, and changes in the balance of power between 
sacred and secular institutions, occur unevenly. To account for this, I draw on 
Charles Taylor’s understanding of secularization as “a move from a society where 
belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is 
understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to 
embrace.”29 Rather than emphasizing the shift from belief to unbelief, or the 
migration of ideas of the transcendent from a sacred to a political sphere, it might be 
worth focusing on the increasing dialogue and exchange between different religious 
and non-religious modes of discourse. Within the secularity Taylor envisages, 
devotional practices and the aspirations they encode no longer form part of a 
master narrative, but do persist and continue to interact with other ways of being in 
the world.30 
As will become evident over the course of my dissertation, the arts of dying 
and the theatrical representations they inspire are particularly rich sites for 
considering how such a form of secularity—along with other aspects of modernity—
might emerge in early modern culture and literature. The deathbed is a space where 
religious understandings of the approach to death have to negotiate with legal, 
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political, social, economic and medical ones. Additionally, the practice of dying 
necessarily draws attention to the body of the moriens, as the recalcitrant 
instrument through which he is required to perform his death, and as the outward 
signifier that onlookers scrutinize to evaluate and classify his end. In consequence, it 
becomes an important site for identifying early forms of biopolitical thinking.  
The writers of mid-Tudor morality plays, along with Christopher Marlowe, 
William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson and Cyril Tourneur, draw upon conventions and 
assumptions embedded in the artes moriendi in order to explore the possibilities for 
human action in different theological, political, social and economic contexts. 
Playwrights notice the deathbed resembles the stage, another mixed space where 
attention is drawn to embodied performance, and which inspires similar debates 
about appropriate boundaries between the sacred and the profane. At least initially, 
this influence travels in two directions. Ars moriendi authors such as Erasmus and 
Becon adopt dialogic modes of presentation that appear to owe much to drama in 
order to represent spiritual conflicts and appropriate interactions between 
morientes and onlookers. Furthermore, early morality plays are sometimes 
envisioned as presentations of prose artes moriendi in another form. Everyman, a 
play entirely focused on the proper approach to death is described in one printed 
edition as a “treatyse how ye hye fader of heuen sendeth dethe to somon euery 
creature to come and gyue a counte of theyr lyues in this worlde… in maner of a 
morall playe.”31 Over time, devotional writers express increasing hostility towards 
the theater, while playwrights become more likely to emphasize the limitations of 
purely devotional postures and of the persons who most strongly advocate them.32 
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Yet even when dramatists’ relationships to homiletic authors become more oblique 
or antagonistic, they still remain strongly attuned to homiletic understandings of the 
approach to death, and to the modes of action it entails.  
Plays such as Doctor Faustus, Volpone and The Atheist’s Tragedy can in fact be 
read as metatheatrical meditations on whether dramatic modes of presentation and 
homiletic ideas are compatible, and on the factors might lead them to diverge from 
one another. In one sense, the dramatic impersonation of a moriens risks reducing 
the cultivation of the postures of the good death to mere performance. In religious 
ritual, the repetition of a given sets of postures by different performers over an 
extended period of time tends to reinforce the efficacy of the ritual and strengthen 
bonds between members of the religious community carrying out the ritual. By 
dying well in line with an established pattern, Christians assert their participation in 
the death of Christ upon which the Church is founded and unite with one another as 
“partners in mortality.”33 In drama, by contrast, iterating sincere religious postures 
often seems to evacuate them of meaning, either by rendering them comic or by 
exposing them as impostures that can easily and repeatedly be assumed by actors 
who have no sincere attachment to them. Furthermore, the dramatic imitation of the 
death stands as an emphatic reminder of the limitations of theatrical practices. 
Nobody actually dies onstage. It is not only possible for actors to imitate dying well 
in bad faith; it is in fact impossible for them to do so in good faith. In consequence, it 
is easy to read stage deaths as always, in some way, bad. And certainly, the plays I 
look at acknowledge these kinds of anti-theatrical critiques when they present 
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parodic, cynical or despairing approaches to the death frequently performed by 
characters who possess particularly actorly or metatheatrical sensibilities. 
However, it is also possible to reverse the significance of this analogy. 
Theatrical death becomes an opportunity to theorize dramatic performance as 
something other than the empty habitation of forms. The perplexing notion that 
dying might be something that you act as well as something you merely undergo, 
and the minimal forms of action that are contained within this notion, become 
powerful analogies for thinking about what actors are doing onstage beyond simply 
existing and outside of particular instances of representation or presentation. 
Though resemblances between acting and dying might justify skepticism of 
performative models of the good death, they might alternatively reveal energies 
involved in actorly performance that are really like those supposed to be channeled 
on the Christian deathbed. Certainly, characters in the plays I discuss adopt actorly 
postures in imitation of the artes moriendi not just to deceive those around them as 
to their true intentions or dispositions or to render the behavior of the godly comic, 
but also in order to identify the nature and limitations of the agency belonging to the 
dying and then to attempt to apply this agency to achieve theological, political, social 
or economic goals. The fraud in Volpone, for example, is grounded in the assumption 
that when the titular character is lying prone on his couch, pointedly avoiding 
action, he is doing something that can earn him profit. By paying attention to these 
postures, we can start to develop models of actorly identity and agency based less 
on the social construction of identity through performative self-fashioning than on 
the assertion through performance of an underlying identity that is able to perform. 
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Moreover, though these forms of performance most obviously function as 
metatheatrical commentary, the uses to which characters put them imply they also 
might have relevance and potency outside the theater. By tracking interactions 
between the artes moriendi and drama, I aim to show how many postures commonly 
associated with supposedly secular modernity against a residual theological 
worldview—including the humanist self-sufficiency exhibited by Faustus, the 
different models of kingship canvassed in Richard II, Volpone’s assertion of personal 
and economic autonomy, and the materialist philosophies imagined within The 
Atheist’s Tragedy—are in fact strongly conditioned by the conventions of devotional 
writings. Looking at the influence of the artes moriendi on the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean commercial theater becomes a way to uncover some of the religious roots 
underlying modern representations of human action and agency in a variety of 
political, social and economic contexts. 
The four chapters of my dissertation each explore how the presentation of 
characterological action and agency in a different early modern dramatic work 
reflects a particular aspect of the ars moriendi tradition. In the opening half, I focus 
primarily on the impact of the Reformation on deathbed culture and its theatrical 
representation. My first chapter, “Doctor Faustus and the Calvinist Art of Dying 
Badly” asks why Marlowe’s Faustus might wish to cultivate a bad death. Contrary to 
critical traditions that see the play as a monitory drama in an orthodox vein, or as an 
iconoclastic celebration of humanist ambition, I read Doctor Faustus as an 
investigative response to Calvinist understandings of grace. In a theological system 
where good action distinct from God is impossible, the bad death becomes an 
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important site for thinking about human agency and for trying to reconcile belief in 
irresistible providence with the experience of living in the world. I show how 
Marlowe adapts conventions from earlier Protestant homiletic tracts and plays to 
represent Faustus. These works depict dying men who simultaneously recall the 
particular figure of the reprobate and the universal one of the everyman in order to 
evoke an absolute prior distinction between the saved and the damned, while also 
acknowledging the difficulty of recognizing that distinction at work in experience. 
But the occasion of death reveals a difference between Marlowe and his models. 
Where earlier plays assert the power of providence as their protagonists die, 
Marlowe’s drama extends uncertainty about the meaning of Faustus’s bad end 
beyond the moment when the devils take him away. Dying badly is both a unique 
event Faustus suffers when he is dragged to hell on the stroke of midnight, and an 
indefinitely extended process that he tries to control by obsessively rehearsing 
different religious and philosophical practices of dying. I show that by refusing to 
make either perspective primary, Marlowe in a sense strives harder than his 
homiletic antecedents to imagine what it would mean to integrate Calvinism with 
the world. Consequently, my reading qualifies accounts of Marlowe as a secular 
ironist with an interest in debunking religious pieties, and instead uncovers a figure 
engaged in a serious investigation of how the theological could be reconciled with 
lived experience.  
My second chapter, “Mourner, Moriens or Martyr? Mimetic Death as Political 
Strategy in Richard II,” attends to differences between Catholic and Protestant artes 
moriendi by focusing on understandings of embodied imitation on the deathbed and 
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in drama. I begin by analyzing the paradoxical place of saintly martyrs within 
Catholic understandings of the good death. Martyrs are at once ideal examples of 
deathbed Imitatio Christi and dangerous perversions of it who risk aggrandizing 
themselves beyond their model or giving way to masochistic and exhibitionist 
desires that are at odds with orthodox belief. Though their devotees find saints to be 
helpful mediators (as models and as intercessors) in their quest to die well, they can 
also appear entirely opposed to the normative framework of ars moriendi. Yet 
avoiding or discounting martyrs does not make imitative dying easier. When 
martyrs and other saints are theoretically banished from the Protestant deathbed, 
their absence only means that morientes have no choice but to confront directly the 
problem of how to appropriately imitate the Passion.  
Shakespeare’s Richard II evokes Catholic and Protestant traditions of 
mimetic dying, embodying the postures of Christ, Judas, martyred saint and suicidal 
reprobate during his approach to death. By imitating exempla, Richard attempts to 
manage his political and spiritual existence in such a way as will ensure him a 
personal, good, Christian end, and will also imply future providential intervention to 
punish Bullingbrook’s usurpation. However, Richard’s postures also recall 
exemplary bad endings, and so hint at his transgressive desire for the wrong sort of 
death and his failures as a political leader. Within the play, the figure of 
anamorphosis becomes emblematic of the contradictory positions Richard adopts 
inside of and awry to his models of dying. These contradictions do not merely reveal 
Richard’s character; they also uncover fundamental tensions between spiritual and 
worldly understandings of imitation. Moreover, by evoking historically and 
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doctrinally distinct understandings of the good and bad death, and making use of 
productive anachronism, Shakespeare also requires the theater audience to occupy 
divergent, anamorphic perspectives on the action and implicates them in the 
recreation of politically and spiritually dubious martyr narratives and the adoption 
of potentially transgressive mimetic practices. Looking at the clashes the play stages 
between different mimetic models of the good death should encourage us to rethink 
a line of criticism that, from Walter Pater and E.M. Tillyard onwards, has read 
Richard II as a mournful record of the passing of a medieval or Catholic sensibility. 
Instead, interactions between past and present are shown to be unstable, 
characterized as much by unspeakable persistence or unwelcome haunting as by 
regretful nostalgia. Dying imitatively is sometimes a practice of mourning a lost 
object of desire, and sometimes an accidental resurrection of what might better stay 
buried. And Shakespeare implies that the mimetic and mournful relationships we 
have with the dead help structure our understanding of the past and the political 
constitution of the present. 
 In the second half of the dissertation, I turn to Jacobean texts that are less 
attuned to doctrinal debates than to the relationship between sacred and profane 
engagements with mortality. In the third chapter, “‘This is Called Mortifying of a 
Fox:’ Volpone, Community Theater, and How to Get Rich Quick by Dying Slowly,” I 
read Jonson’s comedy about a man who pretends to be terminally ill in order to 
defraud legacy-hunters. I ask why, of all possible commodities, Volpone chooses to 
sell his own death and suggest that the answer lies in the ways in which social and 
economic communities assemble around the deathbed. Gatherings of onlookers at 
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Volpone’s couch superficially resemble the traditional deathbed communities 
supposed to offer comfort and spiritual support to the dying. But in fact, divergent 
economic interests separate Volpone and his visitors from one another. The fraud 
exploits confusion about whether naming an heir constitutes the perpetuation of a 
dynastic identity or merely the transfer of property; Volpone and the legacy hunters 
all pretend to be interested in the former while actually seeking the latter. Through 
drawing attention to this ambiguity, the play investigates how natural, biological 
processes and traditional understandings of interpersonal relations can be refigured 
as willed actions that entitle their performers to profit. In the process, it uncovers 
affinities between dying and theatrical playing—less because the artes moriendi 
should be understood as mere performance than because the perplexing notion of a 
practice of dying offers suggestive analogies for the scarcely observable minimal 
level of activity that distinguishes acting from being. The court’s punishment of 
Volpone at the end of the play is an acknowledgement of the failure of traditional 
communities and an attempt to replace them with centralized forms of institutional 
control that might allow the state to respond to the challenge posed by Volpone’s 
actions, or even to expropriate the profits and forms of power generated by his 
fraud for its own use. By examining how economic interests affect the communal 
deathbed, the play reflects the ongoing shift from stable, local communities to 
larger, impersonal marketplaces as the primary spheres of commercial activity, and 
explores the social and ethical consequences of this change.  
The final chapter, “The Atheist’s Tragedy and when Good Deaths come to a 
Bad End” investigates the impact that secular and theatrical appropriations of the 
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postures of the artes moriendi have on the original homiletic texts and their readers’ 
ability to take them seriously. On the level of plot, Tourneur’s Atheist’s Tragedy 
strives to render the good Christian orientation towards death heroic in a more 
orthodox fashion than the other texts I have considered. The play stages a direct 
conflict between the atheist D’Amville, whose disbelief in divine justice and embrace 
of a purely material philosophy leads him to murder his brother, and his nephew 
Charlemont, who responds to D’Amville’s crimes by doing nothing and waiting for 
providence to intervene. The superiority of the Christian perspective is strongly 
affirmed at the end of the play when D’Amville fatally brains himself with his own 
axe out of shock at the calmness with which Charlemont can confront his own 
mortality. Viewed in formal terms, then, the play closely resembles the morality 
plays I discuss in the context of Faustus. However, the extremely citational style of 
The Atheist’s Tragedy complicates this assessment. The play is stuffed with pastiches 
of dramatic scenarios, characters and language from other contemporary tragedies, 
and the overarching moral vision sounds uneasily against echoes of far more 
ambiguous plays. At the same time, Tourneur consistently highlights temporal and 
conceptual breaks between onstage deaths that resist narration and the methods of 
interpretation surviving characters employ to understand and evaluate them. 
Consequently, the opposition between atheistic and Christian dying becomes 
embedded in a far more relativistic rhetorical patterning. I see the play as an 
exploration of what it means to represent dying as an action within a mature 
dramatic genre. Dying well, for Tourneur risks becoming so contaminated by 
theatrical conventions that it can scarcely be separated from the staged death scene. 
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In this way, The Atheist’s Tragedy completes a circle. It evokes the earliest homiletic 
dramas of Christian death, but also represents the final stage of a process through 
which the very portability of arts of dying for understanding political relations, 
economic activity and the nature of dramatic mimesis threatens to destroy the 
notion of the good death by rendering it hopelessly theatricalized, self-referential 
and over-determined. 
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York: Peter Lang, 1992), 87-126. 
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“Faustus is gone, regard his hellish fall,” the Chorus advises the audience in 
the epilogue to Doctor Faustus.1 The words imply that this “hellish fall” sums up the 
action of the play as a whole, that Faustus’s end constitutes a definitive statement of, 
or an extractable moral commentary on, what has gone before. In part, this speech 
simply reflects the centrality to the Faust legend of the magician’s death at the hands 
of the devils as a deserved punishment for his misdeeds. The Chorus, in keeping 
with established homiletic conventions, insists on the inevitability of an 
appropriately miserable finish to Faustus’s wicked life, and simultaneously stresses 
the monitory value of his example. I suggest, though, that the emphasis the Chorus 
places on Faustus’s end also reflects ways in which exemplary deaths of this sort 
had come to represent artistic and theological problems for Marlowe and his 
contemporaries, and that it is as an attempt to wrestle with these problems that 
Faustus’s death is particularly worth regarding. There are reasons why Faustus may 
have to die badly, but there are also important questions about the proper form his 
death should take and about how it should be assessed. 
In depicting Faustus’s end, Marlowe is drawing upon a literary tradition of 
representing and evaluating deaths that was well established, yet also increasingly 
under attack. From the late fifteenth century onwards, numerous ars moriendi 
guides modeling appropriate Christian deathbed behavior were published across 
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Europe. The ars moriendi genre found a dramatic analogue in morality plays that 
represented onstage either good deaths to be emulated or bad deaths to be avoided. 
However, dramatic exemplars of this sort had become difficult to sustain by the time 
of Faustus’s composition. Although Protestant arts of dying certainly did exist, 
Calvinist accounts of predestination threatened to undermine the whole tradition of 
ars moriendi by implying that a meaningful art of dying was impossible, since an 
individual could have no relation to his or her death that was not purely passive.2 
Additionally, by the 1580’s, the theater in particular was starting to look like a poor 
medium for exploring questions of this nature, as Protestant thinkers increasingly 
characterized the stage as inherently immoral. In this context, there were reasons to 
be suspicious of any claim that an onstage death could be made to serve a homiletic 
purpose. 
There is consequently something anachronistic about Marlowe’s creation of a 
homiletic drama of dying. He appropriates a mode of writing that had already been 
largely abandoned by its practitioners as unsuccessful. Perhaps as a result, the 
exploration of dying badly in Doctor Faustus is accompanied by an exploration of 
what it means to represent dying badly, and of whether a representation of a bad 
death must itself also be somehow ethically or aesthetically bad. Attempts in the 
play to characterize Faustus’s death are frequently accompanied by images of failure 
and of impasse. Yet to say that Faustus’s death is associated with artistic and 
theological failure is not necessarily to say that it is, simply, failed. Since most 
Calvinist interpretations of grace focus particularly on denying any active human 
participation in good behavior, the bad death becomes an important site for 
 24 
   
understanding human action.3 If human activity distinct from God is irredeemably 
vicious, then the best place to explore the scope of that activity will be vicious 
action. In investigating how a Calvinist art of dying could proceed, Marlowe suggests 
it might only be viable, perversely, as a Calvinist art of dying badly. Faustus asks 
what value there might be in failed performances of dying. 
To characterize what is at stake in Marlowe’s artistic project, I first look at 
some of the Homiletic Tragedies of the 1570’s and 80’s, which adapt the conventions 
of earlier morality plays to create overtly Calvinist dramas of reprobation. I argue 
that the authors of these works exploit seeming incompatibilities between the 
established morality drama of the everyman and an emergent view of an essential 
distinction between the elect and the damned. They use the problematic coincidence 
of the figures of the everyman and the reprobate as a means simultaneously to 
represent an embedded, human perspective and an incomprehensible, metaphysical 
one. In doing this, they affirm a fundamentally orthodox Protestant theology in 
which damnation is predetermined, while also acknowledging the immanent 
experience of a human subject from whose vantage point this metaphysical 
structure is invisible.  
I then turn to Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus and suggest that the play inherits 
many of the Homiletic Tragedies’ most interesting structural features, but that it 
pays more attention to the, admittedly limited, possibilities for human action in a 
Calvinist context, and so makes any hierarchical overwriting of human experience 
by a religious order at the end of the play difficult. Dramatizations of the deathbed in 
the Homiletic Tragedies mark human perspectives as inferior to a transcendent 
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heavenly order. By contrast, Marlowe defers and de-emphasizes any such resolution 
in Faustus by dramatically extending Faustus’s experience of death. Prolonging the 
experience of dying complicates the model of the Homiletic Tragedies. Instead of 
conclusively affirming a divinely sanctioned economy that has always governed 
Faustus’s actions and experiences, the play offers up a succession of inconclusive, 
competing revelations. Even when Faustus’s “hellish fall” finally arrives, Marlowe’s 
play strives to do justice to the reprobate’s experience, and to identify strategies 
through which Faustus can act even as he suffers death and damnation. The most 
significant of these are extended performances of dying badly, during which Faustus 
acts in and through his own failure.  
Bad endings pervade Faustus in a way that figures Faustus’s problem of 
practicing an art of dying in a Protestant context, where the only scope for human 
action apart from God is viciousness, as having a more general import. Faustus’s bad 
spiritual end is only the most obvious sense in which the play ends badly. His 
vacillating, despairing behavior in the final scene also fails to live up to any model 
identifiable from the orthodox ars moriendi tradition – or, indeed, to any non-
Christian practice of dying. This, though, is not presented solely as Faustus’s failure. 
The social, spiritual and theatrical institutions that might be expected to support 
him in achieving a good death are shown to be notably weak and ineffective. At the 
same time, an aesthetic of bad endings becomes increasingly noticeable in the final 
act, as Faustus’s own sense of the inadequacy of different ways of approaching his 
own end is increasingly mirrored in the structure of the play. 
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In Doctor Faustus, Marlowe engages with the ars moriendi tradition, not to 
write an orthodox or an iconoclastic play as such, but to take orthodoxy seriously by 
dramatizing the difficulty inherent in sustaining Protestant models of the art of 
dying. Faustus’s fate conforms to inherited patterns by pointing to a transcendent 
theological worldview. But Marlowe does not let this worldview subsume the 
reprobate’s experience in any uncomplicated way, as the Homiletic Tragedies 
typically did. Marlowe stops short of endorsing Faustus’s pact with the devil and his 
performance of damnation, but he does give it its due as a symptom of the 
intractable problem of creating an art of dying in a Calvinist context. The importance 
that bad endings assume in Faustus suggests that the problem is a systemic one, 
inherent both to Calvinist artes moriendi and to dramatic forms that developed 
alongside them. Ultimately, a substantive, sustainable Protestant art of dying that is 
not bound up with failure exists only as an impossible aspiration to be gestured 
toward beyond the performance of the play. 
By focusing on the affinities between Doctor Faustus and Protestant 
understandings of ars moriendi, with particular reference to bad deaths, I hope, first, 
to encourage greater appreciation of the sophistication of the Homiletic Tragedies in 
repurposing older dramatic forms to reflect representational problems occasioned 
by Calvinism. Second, in my reading of Doctor Faustus, I show that one way to move 
beyond debates about whether Marlowe’s play is orthodox or heterodox is to see it 
as a play about Calvinist orthodoxy, which does not itself take an easily definable 
theological stance.4 Finally, I suggest that considering approaches to dying derived 
from ars moriendi texts in relation to Elizabethan theater could generate new ways 
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to theorize performance. If Faustus’s performance of dying badly implies a need for 
criteria other than moral efficacy or aesthetic execution for assessing action, this 
could have implications for how we understand dramatic activity more generally. 
I. 
In From Mankind to Marlowe, David Bevington suggests that morality plays 
of the 1560’s, 70’s and 80’s develop away from their medieval antecedents to depict 
more individuated figures, but remain structurally and thematically similar to 
earlier plays. Alongside this development, he identifies an emerging class of plays he 
labels “Homiletic Tragedies.” While medieval moralities uniformly ended hopefully, 
with the central figure newly convinced of the importance of Christian virtue, the 
influence of predestinarian doctrine on the Tudor theater resulted in “a shift in the 
balance from forgiveness to retribution” and “made possible a drama of an amusing 
and yet devastating spiritual degeneration.”5 Bevington stresses continuity between 
earlier and later moralities, arguing that episodes of moral degeneracy common in 
the earlier Psychomachia tradition supply “the materials for a tragic resolution,” so 
that all that is necessary to turn a comedy into a tragedy is “terminating its usual 
progression of spiritual downfall and recovery before the final phase.”6 I claim 
instead that a Calvinist context fundamentally changes the relationship between the 
protagonist’s character and a tragic dénouement in a way that sits very oddly with 
inherited dramatic forms. Consequently, even when earlier and later plays share 
formal features, the significance these features have can be very different. In 
particular, the later plays bring together the tradition of a morally malleable 
everyman, whose spiritual postures are determined by encounters he makes in the 
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world, and the emergent notion of the morally powerless reprobate, whose only 
important spiritual relation (or lack thereof) is with God. Although the protagonists 
of the plays are shown as deservedly and inevitably suffering damnation, their 
behavior at times also approaches strikingly close to appropriate godly behavior. 
This dimension of their presentation enables a more complex examination of the 
pulls towards godliness and wickedness, which are shown as difficult to distinguish. 
Additionally, the very poorness of the fit between the models of the reprobate and 
the everyman generates a sense of characters being simultaneously acted upon at 
different levels, in different manners and by different agents, and a more explicit 
theorization of what it means for characters to act themselves.  
William Wager’s Enough is as Good as a Feast (1571) dramatizes the history 
of Worldly Man, whose fate is contested by a group of virtuous characters, led by 
Heavenly Man and Enough and urging moderation, and a group of vices, led by 
Covetousness and urging the pursuit of wealth.7 Although briefly attracted to 
moderation near the beginning of the play, Worldly Man ultimately throws his lot in 
with Covetousness, and with his help is shown squeezing a tenant and cheating a 
hireling. As Worldly Man conspires to turn out the tenant so that he can turn his 
house into a buttery, a Prophet enters to warn him of the fate of hypocrites. Almost 
immediately, Worldly Man falls sick, and God’s Plague enters to confirm that he is 
the cause of the sickness. Worldly Man is ministered to by Covetousness, along with 
an ineffective priest called Ignorance, and a Physician who confirms to him that he is 
dying. On his deathbed, he makes verbal orders for the provision for his wife and 
goods, and attempts to dictate a will, but falls down dead unable to finish speaking 
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the opening sentence “In the name…” (1401). The play ends with Satan entering to 
claim him. 
What interests me about Enough is the extent to which it takes the 
dramatization of Worldly Man’s motions towards repentance seriously. Worldly 
Man may well always have been a reprobate, but he doesn’t always look as though 
he is. When he is first brought under the influence of Enough, there is evidence that 
his embrace of moderation is sincere: 
But thanks be to God the father of all might, 
Which will not the death of sinners as Scripture doth say, 
It hath pleased him to open unto me the true light 
Whereby I perceive the right path from the broad way; 
Therefore, I am content myself for to stay 
With Enough which bringeth me to quiet in body and mind; 
Yea, and all other commodities therewith I do find. (658-64) 
Worldly Man’s theology sounds orthodox here. He correctly apprehends his 
situation and what his behavior should be. Moreover, he states he is “content” – that 
is, that he has an internal, affective acceptance – with what Enough brings him. His 
claim that God has “open[ed] unto me the true light” stresses grace rather than 
human agency, and also implies a real, felt change in position and perspective. There 
are, admittedly, ironies in Wager’s presentation of Worldly Man as virtuous. 
Heavenly Man persuades Worldly Man to be content with enough by talking about 
the “treasures most excellent” of heaven (263), raising the possibility that he never 
understands Godly rewards except by analogy to material ones;8 Enough and 
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Worldly Man’s discussion of the fate of the covetous prefigures his eventual fall; and 
the speed with which Worldly Man is corrupted by Covetousness argues against the 
sincerity of his conversion. But the point that I wish to stress is that in the moment 
of a virtuous impulse, there is nothing in appearance or language to distinguish an 
ultimately reprobate character such as Worldly Man from a genuinely virtuous 
character. 
 Worldly Man’s appearance on his deathbed represents an importantly 
contrasting way in which the reprobate and the elect can converge. To show his lack 
of repentance, Wager has Worldly Man exhibit perverted and parodic forms of 
correct godly behavior. Like any moriens in the art of dying tradition, he is 
surrounded by a community of friends and advisors. However, most of them are 
vices; only the Physician shows even a formulaic concern for his spiritual well being. 
Also like any moriens, Worldly Man in the final scenes is concerned with setting his 
affairs in order before death. However, he conceives of these affairs in an entirely 
worldly sense, understanding his poor health as a medical rather than a spiritual 
fact, and spending his last moments dictating a will rather than caring for his soul. 
 Worldly Man’s will is a particularly striking marker of the dynamic that I 
am interested in because it signifies his continued concern for his worldly 
possessions, but also demonstrates how close his position necessarily approaches to 
a godly one. Early modern wills generally had dual religious and economic functions, 
and wills containing surprisingly specific economic stipulations show up even in 
spiritual ars moriendi texts.9 Worldly Man, of course, is concerned solely with the 
economic dimension of his will and with helping his wife to “(as near as she can) 
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forgo nought,” to the detriment of his creditors (1392). There is no indication that 
he sees the opening formula “in the name of God” as anything more than a 
conventional preamble. Yet the fact that Worldly Man needs to say God’s name, if 
only formulaically, shows how closely godly and ungodly behavior converge on the 
deathbed. Conversely, Epaphroditus the moriens in Thomas Becon’s homiletic “A 
Sick Man’s Salve,” if only for the sake of giving his will some content, has to specify 
the particular amount of money (forty pounds) he is bequeathing for the upkeep of 
public highways.10 The godly and the reprobate invest different elements of the 
process of making a will with real, and with purely conventional or accidental, 
significance. Deathbed postures and practices become overdetermined so that there 
is a residuum of the world at the godliest deathbed and a residuum of religion at the 
most spiritually bankrupt. 
 Enough is as Good as a Feast ultimately swerves away from the apparent 
convergence of godly and reprobate behavior in will making to affirm a clear 
hierarchy between them. Worldly Man is prevented from using a spiritual formula 
simply as a formula when he is physically unable to name God. This failure is an 
explicit sign of his reprobate status, shortly confirmed by the appearance of Satan. 
The worldly deathbed is conclusively marked as a failed, derivative performance of 
the godly death; the apparent similarity is significant only because it reveals a far 
more real divergence.  
 This second type of convergence, where the worldly bears a parodic relation 
to the godly, overwrites the first type, where the reprobate momentarily displays 
sincere godly impulses. Elements that are separated sequentially in the earlier part 
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of the play (so that Worldly Man is wicked, then good, then wicked again) are here 
compressed (so that wickedness and goodness simultaneously attach to the same 
postures and become available to the audience together) in a way that increases the 
dramatic charge of this scene in comparison to the earlier ones. That Worldly Man’s 
death, in particular, becomes a site of this second type of convergence is significant 
in marking this moment, and the hierarchical relationship between heaven and 
earth it implies, as definitive. The experience of death ruptures the episodic 
chronology of the earlier part of the play, which had been characterized by 
sequential alteration of good and bad behavior, and replaces it with a totalizing 
assessment of Worldly Man’s life as a whole. Wager associates the hierarchical 
arrangement of godly and worldly with an eschatological perspective against an 
embedded, earthly one. This shift in how the final scenes of the play evoke godly 
behavior can also be seen in dramatic terms as a move from a form of drama that 
owes a lot to the earlier morality plays in its presentation of a highly suggestible and 
changeable protagonist, to a drama drawing on a more obviously Protestant 
understanding of character, in which both godly and reprobate statuses are 
essentially ingrained. The play in a sense dramatizes the supersession of the old 
everyman figure. But the fact that Wager overwrites the earlier appearances of good 
impulses in Worldly Man in such an emphatic way suggests anxiety about the 
existence of virtuous impulses in a reprobate character, and about the ways in 
which they complicate a Calvinist drama.  
 Nathaniel Woodes’ Conflict of Conscience (1581) dramatizes a similar 
reprobate central figure, who again approaches strikingly close to godliness, initially 
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inhabiting a godly role sincerely before ending in a parody of godliness.11 Woodes’ 
protagonist Philologus is a Protestant who is convinced to convert to Catholicism by 
a vision of worldly joys. After a brief period of pleasure, during which he rejects 
Conscience’s calls to renew his faith, he is abruptly arrested by Horror, and 
informed that he has “extinguished the holy Spirit of God” (1977), so that grace is no 
longer available to him. Immediately, he falls into despair. Friends and family 
members gather round him and attempt to console him, in particular by urging him 
to pray with them. He speaks the words of prayers, but insists that they are 
ineffective because they are not matched by any inner feeling since “all grace [is] 
gone” (2220). Philologus leaves his friends, still unconsoled, and in the final scene a 
messenger appears to announce that he has hanged himself. 
 Conflict is similar to Enough in its use of a psychomachic structure to depict 
a reprobate character, and in its retention of aspects of the everyman figure to make 
evident the resemblances between the behavior of the potentially saved and of the 
inevitably damned. In fact, it goes further than Enough in dramatizing this 
closeness.12 The godly Philologus of the first half of the play performs his part more 
successfully, for longer, and with less prompting than the briefly reformed Worldly 
Man does. And while Worldly Man could not name God on his deathbed, Philologus 
names him repeatedly, and can perform acts of prayer well enough to convince his 
auditors that he is actually praying. As in Enough, though, Philologus’ near approach 
to godliness in his final scene is always distinct enough from actual godliness for the 
audience to remain certain of his Philologus’ ultimate fate; Philologus makes the 
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point that he is without grace repeatedly, and his assessment is ratified by the 
pronouncements of Horror. 
 Woodes and Wager both create protagonists resembling everyman figures 
and then place them in Calvinist contexts, even though the notion of a Calvinist 
everyman is, strictly, impossible. I think, though, that this is not a naïve dramatic 
decision. The very poorness of the fit between inherited dramatic models and 
Calvinism can be dramatically advantageous, for several reasons. First, the ability of 
characters like Worldly Man and Philologus to mimic a godly perspective perfectly, 
and apparently sincerely, points to an important epistemological difficulty inherent 
to Calvinism. The plays dramatize how similar godly and vicious individuals can 
appear, even to themselves. In doing so, they capture the way in which the absolute 
difference between the saved and the damned is obscured by the difficulty of 
knowing who is what, and the experience of uncertainty that results from this 
obscurity. Second, the shift I have noted in the two plays, between episodes where 
the protagonists more nearly approach the morally malleable nature of a medieval 
everyman, and episodes where their reprobate status is enforced by a hierarchical 
relationship in which the worldly is shown to be trumped by the godly, reflects a felt 
disjunction between the experience of living in the world, and a metaphysical 
perspective in which human action is determined – a disjunction that shows up 
most starkly at death.  
II. 
 One difference in emphasis between the Homiletic Tragedies I have just 
discussed and Doctor Faustus is the much greater extent to which Marlowe’s play 
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consistently and explicitly flags Faustus’s reprobate status from the beginning. 
Characters occupying positions across the entire moral continuum of the play, from 
the Old Man through to the devils, repeatedly observe that Faustus deserves to go to 
hell. The most emphatic articulation of a theology that necessitates this damnation 
comes from the Chorus. In the prologue, religious, classical and material registers of 
expression and understandings of causation are made to work in tandem to 
reinforce the necessity of Faustus’s fall and the religious framework that determines 
it, so that there is no discursive position from which another interpretation of the 
action can be articulated. The Chorus introduces Faustus by telling the audience that 
he delighted in theology: 
 Till swollen with cunning of a self-conceit, 
 His waxen wings did mount above his reach 
 And melting heavens conspir’d his overthrow. (Prologue, 20-23)  
The homiletic principle that Faustus must be punished for pride in his own abilities 
is expressed through the classical image of Icarus’ fall, and Icarus’ fate is itself 
accounted for in scientific terms. The word “conspir’d” carries a secondary meaning 
of breathed together, and consequently suggests a mechanistic description of the 
action of the sun on wax as well as deterministic heavenly plotting to bring about 
Faustus’s destruction. Classical example and the observable properties of the 
material universe align with the Christian interpretation of Faustus’s fate in which 
heavenly power determines his overthrow. In this moment, the Chorus offers no 
perspective that does not necessitate damnation.  
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 The Chorus’s epilogue reaffirms the bad death of Faustus, and, like the 
prologue, uses classical and natural imagery in order to do so: 
 Cut is the branch that might have grown full straight, 
 And burned is Apollo’s laurel bough 
 That sometime grew within this learned man: 
 Faustus is gone, regard his hellish fall, 
 Whose fiendful fortune may exhort the wise 
 Only to wonder at unlawful things, 
 Whose deepness doth entice such forward wits  
 To practice more than heavenly power permits. (Epilogue 1-8) 
Even more than the prologue, the epilogue insists on the absolute fact of Faustus’s 
bad end, here emphasized by repetition. Again, the Chorus evokes a natural world 
order (represented by the organic propensity of a branch to grow straight) and a 
classical one (under the supervision of Apollo) to confirm Faustus’s damnation. The 
configuration, though, is different from that seen in the prologue; instead of being 
aligned and leading to the same conclusion as a theological worldview, here non-
religious discourses are placed in a hierarchically inferior position and superseded 
by religious ones, reflecting an association that has developed between scientific 
inquiry, classical literature and the demonic over the course of the play.13 The bough 
is cut and Apollo’s branch is burned, both made subordinate to heavenly power in a 
manner that evokes the institution of a divine hierarchy at the end of Enough and 
Conflict.  
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 Yet while the inevitability and justice of Faustus’s damnation is asserted 
with force, there is a significant lacuna in the religious framework of Faustus, which 
separates it from the Homiletic Tragedies. The play renders Satan and hell explicitly 
and immediately, while God and heaven are largely absent. The audience sees 
Lucifer, and the B-text even contains stage directions calling for the discovery of 
hell. By contrast, the actions and influence of God, Christ and other heavenly powers 
are only ever reported as emblematic visions that the audience does not share.14 
The most sustained of these appeals to the heavenly are found in the Old Man’s 
speeches to Faustus, and in Faustus’s evocation of Christ during his final soliloquy. 
These are both clear allusions to grace, and therefore both present heaven where it 
directly influences human experience. We might consequently expect this to be 
where heaven would be at its most accessible to representation. But in various 
ways, the two speeches put God and His mercy at a distance.  
 The Old Man tries to call Faustus to repentance by saying: 
  I see an angel hovers o’er thy head,  
 And with a vial full of precious grace  
 Offers to pour the same into thy soul: 
 Then call for mercy and avoid despair. (5.1.53-56)  
The Old Man’s declaration that he “sees” the angel emphasizes that we do not see it, 
in stark contrast to staged diabolical emblems such as the pageant of the seven 
deadly sins. Moreover, even on its own terms, the image asserts no more than a 
potential contact with the divine, since the claim that the angel “offers to pour” puts 
emphasis on the distance between the theoretical availability of grace and its actual 
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manifestation. It is not clear whether what the Old Man is seeing is an interrupted, 
but realizable, ministration of grace, or whether a gesture of offering is the most that 
Faustus can hope for. A representational problem and a theological problem are 
made to coincide, since another way to phrase the difficulty raised by the Old Man’s 
angel would be to see it as a question of the extent to which a performance of the 
offering of grace correlates to an actual, efficacious dispensation of grace.  
 The same distancing can be seen in Faustus’s final references to Christ, 
where he asks the audience to  
 See, see where Christ’s blood streams in the firmament: 
 One drop would save my soul, half a drop! Ah, my Christ,  
 Ah rend not my heart for naming of my Christ, 
 Yet will I call on him, oh spare me Lucifer! (5.2.71-4) 
Again, there is a call to “see” an unstaged emblem, and again the mechanism of grace 
is arrested. Faustus’s image reconfigures the Old Man’s by replacing an offered 
pouring with a stream of blood that never reaches the earth. It suggests that even if 
the Old Man’s vision were fulfilled in its own terms it would still be insufficient to 
reach Faustus. Faustus’s demand the audience “see” Christ is swiftly recharacterized 
as an act of “naming” so that, again, a theological problem merges with a 
representational one, as Fasutus’ inability to achieve salvation is reconfigured as an 
inability to sustain an image of salvation as more than a purely linguistic evocation. 
And Christ disappears completely when Faustus’s apostrophe to him changes into 
an apostrophe to Lucifer. 
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 More generally, sacramental imagery functions in Faustus to distance God 
and grace as real possibilities in the play. As C. L. Barber observes, allusions to the 
sacramental are everywhere.15 In particular, Faustus’s signing of his soul over to 
Lucifer functions as a parody of Christ’s sacrifice and of the sacrament as a symbol 
of that sacrifice. As noted above, the Homiletic Tragedies provide a precedent for a 
reprobate protagonist parodically inhabiting godly postures. Unlike the Homiletic 
Tragedies, though, Faustus introduces a parodic sacrament long before orthodox 
versions appear. This means that watching Faustus, the audience encounters 
Faustus’s offer of blood as part of his pact with the devil as original and immediate, 
and later, more conventional, images of the sacrament as parodic revisions. Death 
and damnation are uncontestable inevitabilities, affirmed by the very structure of 
the play; the devil is on stage; but God is at a distance, viewable only at a secondary 
remove in derivative terms, and spoken about in language emphasizing the 
distorting effects of human perception. 
 Considering this situation, it is unsurprising that responding to Faustus’s 
anticipated death, and finding a way to reconcile it with Faustus’s experience of life 
from an embedded perspective, assumes so much importance in the play. In the 
homiletic tradition, a protagonist’s bad death functions as a conclusive assertion of 
the relation between heaven, hell and the world, in which a human perspective is 
revealed as subordinate to a heavenly one. Because the heavenly is almost invisible 
in Faustus, however, questions about what exactly Faustus’s death means, and who 
can determine its meaning, become particularly urgent.  
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    A concern with understanding and controlling Faustus’s end is evident 
from the opening soliloquy. As Edward A. Snow demonstrates, Faustus’s survey and 
rejection of a succession of academic fields of study is organized around shifting 
understandings of endings, and is marked in particular by Faustus’s tendency to 
equate other senses of ending with “an eschatological, self-alienating sense of ‘end-
point’ or ‘termination.’”16 Faustus wants a professional identity that will provide 
him with a defined and recognizable way of living. At the same time, his fixation on 
termini also figures each possible identity as a means of dying. Faustus’s turn to 
magic and pact with the devil arise from this vein of inquiry and continue the same 
pattern. In a notable departure from Marlowe’s source, the English Faustbook, 
Faustus suggests a limited term of twenty-four years for the bargain without any 
prompting from Mephastophilis, so implying that a stipulated endpoint might be 
part of what he wants, rather than merely an unfortunate consequence of dealing 
with the devil.17  
 The precise form that Faustus’s agreement takes – the Deed of Gift – has a 
particularly close association with death, and analyzing it helps to articulate how 
exactly Faustus might be inhabiting conventional notions of dying. Early modern 
English gift-law followed Roman law in distinguishing between gifts inter vivos and 
gifts mortis causa (on account of death).  Gifts inter vivos were enforceable only if 
they took effect immediately. If I give you my soul in the instant, I will not legally be 
allowed to reclaim it if I change my mind, but a promise to give you my soul next 
Monday will have no legal force. By contrast, gifts mortis causa could be made 
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prospectively. Justinian, to whom Faustus has already referred explicitly in his 
opening soliloquy, defines gifts of this second type by saying: 
A gift in contemplation of death is one where the donor anticipates dying. 
He gives the thing on the understanding that if he passes away the donee 
shall keep it, but if he survives, and equally if he changes his mind or the 
donee dies first, he shall have it back. (Mortis causa donatio est, quae 
propter mortis fit suspicionem, cum quis ita donat, ut si quid humanitus ei 
contigisset, haberet is qui accepit: sin autem supervixisset qui donavit, 
reciperet, vel si eum donationis paenituisset aut prior decesserit is cui 
donatum sit).18  
In this case, though property may be handed over, the gift only takes full effect in the 
future – when the giver dies. Gifts mortis causa are understood as a special 
subsection of testamentary law. Though the paradigmatic situation when this kind 
of gift is appropriate is one of imminent physical danger (the example Justinius 
gives is of Telemachus’ gift to Piraeus before returning to his father’s palace in the 
Odyssey), there is no evidence that the “prospect of death” needs to be immediate for 
the gift to be valid. 
 How enforceable Faustus’s gift is, what it says about his subjective 
understanding of his actions, and what consequences it has for his ability to repent, 
therefore, all depend somewhat on whether it counts as a gift inter vivos or mortis 
causa. If Faustus is trying to make a gift inter vivos that only takes effect at the end of 
twenty-four years upon the fulfillment of the listed conditions, it is almost certainly 
legally invalid because of the delay.19 However, it may be effective in a theological 
 42 
   
rather than a strictly legalistic sense if Faustus here is in fact affirming his 
predestinate reprobate status, committing an unpardonable act confirming his 
damnation, or becoming a “spirit.” In this case, the deed functions as a self-executing 
document, but one that works by a mechanism other than the one it purports to 
stand for, much in the same way as Mephastophilis claims that he was summoned by 
Faustus’s incantations “per accidens” rather than by any compelling power in 
Faustus’s words (1.3.46). 
 The other option is to read Faustus’s deed as effecting a gift mortis causa. 
As I note above, there are good reasons to interpret Faustus’s decision to seek a pact 
with the devil as conditioned by his concern with death and his desire to control his 
relation to his own personal end. The gift is certainly made on account of death in a 
generalized sense. However, death is not mentioned explicitly in the deed, and 
indeed, Faustus’s description of what he will be giving Lucifer – “full power to fetch 
or carry the said John Faustus, body and soul, flesh, blood, or goods into their 
habitation wheresoever” (2.1.109-11) – euphemistically avoids direct reference to 
death by keeping “body and soul” together, and by talking about Faustus as a chattel 
to be fetched or carried to a habitation, rather than as a reprobate to be taken into 
hell. Yet, even if it does not ultimately fulfill the criteria needed for this type of gift in 
Justinian’s Institutes, the deed will still function as a gift mortis causa in an extra-
legal sense, since it takes effect on death, and indeed creates the conditions of death 
necessary for its completion. We have both a donatio mortis causa and a mors 
donatis causa; a gift on account of death and a death on account of a gift. 
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 Why the treatment of Faustus’s deed, and the way it holds up to analysis 
under different legal interpretations and theological understandings, matters 
becomes clear when we compare it with the treatment of Worldly Man’s will in 
Enough is as Good as a Feast. As discussed above, Wager uses the necessary 
coincidence between worldly and godly behavior on the death bed (so that a godly 
will still needs to have some worldly content, while a worldly will still has to respect 
religious formalities) to present Worldly Man’s behavior as derivative and parodic, 
and hence to affirm a hierarchical relationship between the sacred and the secular. 
In Marlowe’s depiction of Faustus’s pact, there is a similar coincidence of different 
possible registers in an overdetermined theologico-legal document. As in Wager, 
this coincidence has dramatic utility, since it simultaneously captures the 
experiential position of the individual with a necessarily limited, largely secular, 
outlook, and a religious framework in which he is embedded. However, Faustus 
differs from Enough in that the relationship between these different registers is 
unresolved both in the scene and in the play as a whole, and they lie against one 
another much less smoothly. It is unclear who is making instrumental use of what, 
and whether the sacred is governing the secular or vice versa. The devils’ use of a 
specific legal instrument, and their investment in formalities such as obtaining 
Faustus’s signature, suggests that they place some value in the mechanisms of the 
law to confirm their right to Faustus’s soul.  Yet, as I have shown above, the 
problems with the drafting of a deed of prospective gift are sufficiently serious for it 
to be unlikely that it could have any direct legal force. Instead, it could only have a 
hold over Faustus because of the theological significance of what it reveals about 
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Faustus’s intent. Moreover, in the depiction of Faustus’s deed of gift with its 
inconclusive legal significance, Marlowe also generates fissures within the worldly, 
legalistic understanding of what is going on. The binary Wager exploits between the 
worldly and the godly can itself be subdivided into further incompatible, yet 
coincident, governing frameworks. 
 What holds these different legal and religious frameworks together is the 
anticipated event of Faustus’s death. The deed refers to this only in obscure, 
euphemistic terms.  Fasutus’ promise to the devils of his “body and soul, flesh, blood, 
or goods” (2.1.110) is confusing. There is no conclusive way to parse the clause so 
that it is clear what parts of this gift are cumulative and which parts are alternative, 
and so no clear exposition of what exactly death involves the loss or separation of. 
Death, we might say, is making itself felt as something undefined and 
unrepresentable, which the deed anticipates and needs, but which it also gets 
repressed. However, the very hesitation and ambiguity about how death is 
functioning with relation to the deed – the question of whether it is inter vivos or 
mortis causa – also allows Faustus to have a relation and a degree of agency with 
regard to it. Specifically, the question of exactly what the deed means and how it 
conditions Faustus’s death depends on whether he has the subjective intention to 
sign it on account of death or not. Here is where we might see Faustus’s practice of 
an idiosyncratic art of dying, which doesn’t successfully challenge a religious 
understanding of the practice of death from a secular or legalistic perspective, but 
does find a certain autonomy for itself in the slippage between sacred and secular 
and in its refusal to explicate the basis on which it functions. In this context, the 
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deed as legal instrument also becomes a deed as action, since its completion marks 
one of the only times in the play where Faustus appears to have a degree of agency 
with regard to his death. 
 It would be a mistake to claim too much theatrical significance for the 
ambiguity surrounding the nature of Faustus’s deed of gift. The legal problem is 
both technical and deeply submerged, and so not something that would be likely to 
occur to more than a very small subsection of any theater audience. Its importance 
lies more in its potential as a means of figuring a way of being towards death than in 
its dramatic impact in Faustus. I do want to suggest, though, that the enabling role of 
opacity in this moment has a more visible partial analogue in Faustus’s conjurations 
of the dead Alexander and Helen, where silent figures, to some degree under 
Faustus’s control, and bearing intimate but unclear relations to death, are made the 
focus of onstage attention. This attention is characterized by repetitions that 
advertise an inability on the part of onlookers to comprehend the sprits 
representing the dead figures in any satisfactory way. The overall impression is of 
incommensurability between living and the dead – but incommensurability that 
does not preclude the attempt to form relations.  
 When the Emperor first asks Faustus to show him Alexander and his 
paramour, Faustus emphasizes that the “true substantial bodies of those two 
deceased princes… long since are consumed to dust” (4.1.46-7). Instead, the 
Emperor is told he will be shown “such spirits as can lively resemble” the couple 
(4.1.50). The spirits, when they enter, do not speak, and Faustus does not provide 
any commentary on their appearance, but the Emperor reacts to them by repeating 
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Faustus’s earlier comments back almost verbatim: “Sure these are no spirits, but the 
true substantial bodies of these two deceased princes” (4.1.68-9). The structure of 
Helen’s first appearance is very similar. The first scholar asks Faustus to show “that 
peerless dame of Greece, whom all the world admires for majesty” (5.1.13-14), and 
when Helen appears, the second scholar responds with an echo: “Too simple is my 
wit to tell her praise, /Whom all the world admires for majesty” (5.1.25-26).20  
 Faustus does, famously, provide a far more articulate lyrical meditation on 
Helen when she appears to him again. But here too he expresses redundancy, stasis 
and disbelief through the circular fantasies of Helen sucking forth his soul and 
returning it to him. His conclusion “And none but thou shalt be my paramour” 
(5.1.109) echoes back the request he earlier made to Mephastophilis “That I might 
have [Helen] unto my paramour” (5.1.83), which triggered her entrance.  Most 
significantly, Faustus’s question—“Was this the face that launched a thousand ships 
/And burnt the topless towers of Ilium?—relates these repeated expressions of 
wonder to awareness of mortality (5.1.90-91). The lines are a free translation from 
Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead, where Lucian depicts a conversation between 
Hermes and the recently deceased Menippus, who has arrived in the underworld 
and wishes to be shown “all the beauties of old.” Hermes helps Menippus to 
distinguish the skull of Helen from a collection of “bones and bare skulls, most of 
them looking the same,” and on seeing it he asks “Was it then for this that the 
thousand ships were manned from all Greece, for this that so many Greeks and 
barbarians fell, and so many cities were devastated?”21 As much as disbelief in the 
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presence of indescribable beauty, Faustus’s question expresses a sense of 
incommensurability between the living and the dead.22 
 The conjured spirits are simultaneously figured as occasions for wonder 
and as only very imperfectly captured by the wonder they generate, since little that 
observers can say in response to them is different from what they said before they 
arrived. Repetition serves to draw attention to specific formulations and render 
them strange in ways that raise questions about the ontological status of Alexander 
and Helen.  How seriously should we take the Emperor’s insistence that these must 
be “true substantial bodies?” In part, I suggest, these spirits represent the dead 
viewed as a problem. Consequently, though they are not explicitly linked to 
Faustus’s death, and it would be hard to interpret the responses that Faustus and 
other characters have to them as performances of dying, they do create an 
association between death and opacity, and explore the extent to which opacity can 
generate a viable representative strategy for death.  
III.  
I have suggested that attempts to anticipate and understand death (and in 
particular bad death) saturate Doctor Faustus. An anticipation of death inspires 
Faustus’s turn to magic and agreement with Lucifer, and questions about what 
death means and how it should be approached continue to be raised even during the 
comic action that fills most of the middle acts.23 It is only in the final act of the play, 
however, that the focus turns specifically and consistently to the questions about 
how Faustus might approach his own death. Beginning with Wagner’s observation 
that his “master means to die shortly” (5.1.1), and ending with the Chorus’ 
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summation of Faustus’s life and the drawing of a moral, Act Five deals explicitly with 
the practice of dying, and brings the play closest formally and thematically to the 
models of the artes moriendi and the Homiletic Tragedies. Like Wager and Woodes, 
Marlowe illustrates the protagonist’s damnation in part through his near approach 
to, and parody of, appropriate deathbed postures. However, Marlowe resists 
creating a clearly hierarchical relationship between godly and vicious behavior, and 
presents so many different understandings of how to die that it becomes difficult to 
tell what is the model and what the parody. The play repeatedly shows apparently 
sincere and orthodox attempts to assist Faustus in dying well falling short as 
practices, and the accumulation of these successive failed efforts only emphasizes 
their inadequacy. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that the repeated enactment 
of unsuccessful performances of dying constitutes a rejection of ars moriendi as a 
genre. I argue instead, though, that the final act’s almost obsessive focus on the 
staging of dying, and on ways of being towards dying, shows there is something 
about the arts of dying that Marlowe does not wish to abandon. Rather than 
implying that ars moriendi is a failure, the final act of Faustus asks whether it is 
possible to create a performable ars moriendi in and through failure.  
 The fifth act opens with Wagner describing Faustus back in Wittenberg 
after an extended period of travel. He is embedded in the close-knit sociality of the 
university, and indulging in behavior that seems inappropriate to a dying man: 
 I think my master means to die shortly, 
 For he hath given me all his goods; 
 And yet me thinkes if that death were near 
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 He would not banquet and carouse and swill 
 Amongst the students, as even now he doth, 
 Who are at supper with such belly-cheer 
 As Wagner ne’er beheld in all his life. (5.1.1-8) 
In Wagner’s account, Faustus’s relation to his imminent death is muddled in a way 
that reflects the peculiarities of his position. Faustus is both cognizant of his 
impending end and in denial. On the one hand, he prepares for his death by 
charitably giving away his possessions. On the other, his banqueting recalls the 
behavior of reprobates in commonplace anecdotes warning against mors 
improvisa.24 However, Wagner says nothing about how Faustus’s inconsistent 
actions should be evaluated, articulating two contradictory thoughts about whether 
Faustus is close to death and then disappearing from the play for good, without 
determining which thought is more accurate, or even which he would prefer. This is 
not so much a failure of ars moriendi as it is a refusal even to engage in ars moriendi 
in any prescriptive or evaluative sense.  
 Following Wagner’s introductory speech, Faustus’s encounters with the 
Old Man and with Helen stand out as set pieces of heightened rhetoric organized in 
part around notions of death and dying. Helen and the Old Man represent very 
different worldviews, and the manner in which their appearances reconfigure one 
another evokes the parodic dynamic I have identified in reprobate deaths in the 
Homiletic Tragedies. In Faustus, though, it is hard to separate the good death from 
the bad, as no reconfiguration appears conclusive.  
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 The Old Man calls on Faustus to repent, using strategies that closely follow 
recommendations to onlookers at the deathbed in the ars moriendi tradition.25 He 
strives to bring Faustus to recognize his spiritual condition by making him aware of 
his “most vile and loathsome filthiness” (5.1.41). And when Faustus takes this too 
much to heart and almost succumbs to despair, the Old Man reminds him of the 
possibility of grace through the emblem of the hovering angel. The extent to which 
the Old Man recasts language and metaphors used by reprobate characters at earlier 
points in the play in orthodox terms is striking. His first speech is an orthodox 
version of Faustus’s first soliloquy. Faustus had attempted to reconcile incompatible 
understandings of endings, as defined in various academic disciplines, with different 
understandings of the proper goals and aspirations of human life. By exhorting 
Faustus to “guide thy steps unto the way of life, /By which sweet path thy may’st 
attain the goal /That shall conduct thee to celestial rest” (5.1.36-8), the Old Man 
envisions life both as a linear movement along a path and as a teleological striving 
towards “the goal,” and then asserts that these two understandings can coincide. 
Similarly, the Old Man echoes and repurposes some of the imagery of Faustus’s pact 
when he says “Break heart, drop blood, and mingle it with tears” (5.1.39). The line 
harks back to another instance when body and the soul seem to behave 
independently: Faustus’s blood congeals when he tries to sign the deed, and can 
only be made to flow again when it is heated. The free-flowing blood the Old Man 
envisions would redeem the artificially reliquified blood representing Faustus’s 
diabolical deal. Since the Old Man omits any personal pronoun, the command 
sounds as though it is addressed to Faustus’s heart conceived as an actual physical 
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organ rather than to Faustus as an autonomous consciousness. This rendering of 
repentance as bodily would both figure its location in human, embodied experience, 
and demonstrate the degree to which it cannot be willed but must come through 
grace.  
 Given his echoes of earlier Faustian conceits in orthodox terms, it makes 
sense to align the Old Man with the resolution of parodic deathbed behavior into 
hierarchical assertions of a metaphysical order at the end of the Homiletic 
Tragedies. Faustus’s search for a telos compatible with a life lived sequentially, and 
his blood-signed pact with the devil, are both refigured as debased and perverted 
derivatives of orthodox ideas. I suggest, though, that what follows complicates this 
reading and makes the hierarchy it sets up difficult to sustain. After the Old Man 
leaves the stage, Faustus is quickly brought back to the devil’s side and it is in the 
context of his again confirming his vow to Lucifer that he makes a request 
 To glut the longing of my heart’s desire: 
 That I might have unto my paramour 
 That heavenly Helen which I saw of late 
 Whose sweet embracings may extinguish clean 
 These thoughts that do dissuade me from my vow, 
 And keep mine oath I made to Lucifer. (5.1.81-7) 
By suggesting the desired vision of Helen will extinguish his thoughts of repentance, 
Faustus explicitly frames it as a counter to the Old Man’s exhortations. He reworks 
some of the Old Man’s imagery to emphasize this. Faustus’s use of the word 
“extinguish” implies that both this speech and the anticipated encounter with Helen 
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should be understood as explorations of death, and rejects the Old Man’s emphasis 
on paths and processes in favor of sudden, “clean” endings. The claim that Helen will 
“glut the longing of my heart’s desire” echoes the manner in which the Old Man’s 
address to Faustus separates Faustus’s heart from Faustus. But here the heart is 
aligned with lust rather than with repentance. Though there is no reason to take 
Faustus’s image of the heart, or his vision of how endings work, as more 
authoritative than the Old Man’s, this speech does show that the tactic of recasting 
an opponent’s postures and imagery in an attempt to position them as derivative or 
parodic instances of one’s own postures is equally available to the orthodox and the 
unorthodox.  
 Helen’s actual appearance, which functions as a moment of genuine 
aesthetic revelation for Faustus, provides an interesting contrast with the Old Man’s 
behavior immediately following. The Old Man’s ultimate fate is unclear. 
Mephastophilis promises that “what I may afflict his body with /I will attempt” 
(5.1.79-80), and the Old Man’s final words, “hence I fly unto my God” (5.1.118), 
could be taken as a sign that, at the least, he is imagining his possible death. What 
we are looking at here, then, is potentially a death scene – the good death to balance 
Faustus’s wretched one and to exemplify the model of dying implied in the Old 
Man’s exhortations. Given this, it is worth thinking about how attractive the Old 
Man’s vision of his death actually is:  
 Satan begins to sift me with his pride; 
 As in this furnace God shall try my faith, 
 My faith, vile hell, shall triumph over thee! 
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 Ambitious fiends, see how the heaven smiles 
 At your repulse, and laughs your state to scorn: 
 Hence, hell, for hence I fly unto my God. (5.1.113-18) 
The Old Man’s eager anticipation of death as a test of faith at the devils’ hands is 
juxtaposed with Faustus’s fantasy of Helen. Parallels between the two characters’ 
visions of triumph (over Menelaus or over hell) and of flying souls, and between the 
ways in which both speeches are addressed to unspeaking, demonic figures (since 
“Helen” is, in fact, a spirit), encourage particularly close comparison. These parallels 
produce divergent effects. The Old Man is always emphatically orthodox, and there 
is ample religious justification and precedent for everything he does and says. 
Because of this, his words here partly recapitulate the dynamic I have been tracing 
in his earlier speeches. Insofar as Faustus’s language and behavior brings him close 
to the Old Man, he represents a bad alternative that emphasizes the Old Man’s 
goodness and indicates ways in which Faustus’s sin is a debased, inferior derivative 
of virtue. This tactic, however, becomes less effective the more it appears, since it 
starts to look inconclusive; rather than a fundamental recasting of Faustus’s actions 
as parodic, what emerges is an indefinitely iterable sequence in which images 
recirculate with different significances. Orthodoxy never makes a statement 
heterodoxy cannot respond to. 
 Crucially, the positioning of Faustus’s fantasy of Helen before the Old Man’s 
fantasy of heaven can make the former appear original and the latter derivative. 
This weighting of the two fantasies is particularly tempting because Faustus’s 
invocation of Helen is more rhetorically ambitious and inventive. Moreover, if 
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Faustus’s vision does appear more attractive, or more imaginative, then the very 
orthodoxy of the Old Man means that this evaluation tends to denigrate orthodoxy 
per se. Another way to put this would be to say that the juxtaposition of Faustus’s 
speech to Helen and the Old Man’s taunting of the devils demands evaluation on 
both religious and artistic grounds, but the play uses aesthetic markers for different 
religious positions so that aesthetic judgments can bleed into religious ones and vice 
versa. This is a development from the superimposition of elements of an everyman 
figure on a reprobate protagonist that I have discussed in the Homiletic Tragedies. 
Where the Homiletic Tragedies always ultimately provide a clear hierarchy in which 
the godly is superior to the worldly, Marlowe’s play makes judgment harder. 
 The Old Man’s attempted intervention is complemented by Faustus’s 
encounter with the scholars, which draws heavily on a different strand of the ars 
moriendi tradition, but which again fails to help Faustus die well. Faustus’s meeting 
with the scholars reflects an understanding of death as a communal event, during 
which friends and neighbors gather round the dying individual to offer support and 
advice. Faustus’s damnation marks his encounter with the scholars as a failed ars 
moriendi, and one that closely resembles the debased death scenes at the end of the 
Homiletic Tragedies, which also typically have this communal format. Where 
Marlowe’s play differs from the earlier examples, though, is in not ascribing this 
failure entirely to Faustus or to the devils. In Enough is as Good as a Feast, Worldly 
Man is surrounded on his deathbed by vices, who work actively to pervert 
appropriate deathbed behavior. In The Conflict of Conscience, Philologus has good 
spiritual advisors, and his inability to pray is presented as a consequence of his 
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spiritual failings alone. In Doctor Faustus, by contrast, the community institutions 
that should support the moriens are portrayed as sincere, but inadequate. 
 Typically in ars moriendi texts, onlookers are required to take an active 
role in questioning the moriens on his creed, while he merely affirms his faith and 
avoids disputation.26 In his dialogue with the scholars, however, Faustus himself 
takes over the role of spiritual advisor, summing up the spiritual situation he finds 
himself in, and directing the conversation. As Stachniewski observes, the scene on 
one level is indicative of Faustus’s despair, which is evident from hyperbolic 
comments such as “Faustus’ offence can ne’er be pardoned: the serpent that 
tempted Eve may be saved, but not Faustus” (5.2.14-15), and Faustus’s general 
insistence on the enormity of his sin.27 Yet Faustus does not adopt a posture of pure 
abjection. He sets himself up as the intellectual authority in the conversation, 
remembering his achievements even while purportedly regretting them, and 
asserting his theological perceptions as definitive. He also claims a kind of moral 
authority over the scholars, showing concern for their physical and spiritual 
wellbeing when he advises them to leave him. Perhaps more surprisingly, the 
scholars are willing to cede an active role to Faustus, and themselves adopt the 
choral, reactive position more usually associated with the moriens. The fact that they 
decline to stay with him, instead praying in the next room, looks like a failure of 
courage, and proves to be of no help in the event. Faustus turns the conversation 
into a diabolical inversion of the model deathbed scene, in which the dying 
reprobate acts as spiritual advisor to survivors who take his instructions. Once 
again, Marlowe borrows the Homiletic Tragedy trick of depicting wicked behavior 
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as a parodic reworking of godly behavior, but does not provide an explicit and 
authoritative perspective within the play from which this behavior can be assessed 
as inferior and parodic. 
 Throughout the final act of Faustus, then, traditional models of communal 
death drawing on the Christian ars moriendi have been invoked only to be shown up 
as unsatisfactory. Once the scholars leave the stage, Faustus is alone, with the 
apparent opportunity to approach death in a new way. He certainly does offer up 
very different understandings of dying from anything that the play has shown 
earlier, referring to Hermetic, Pythagorean, Epicurean models of death alongside 
heretical suggestions of an existence in hell of limited duration. However, at no time 
does he alight upon a mode of dying that appears sustainable. If anything, the 
pattern of failed arts of dying established over the earlier part of the final act 
becomes more emphatic as a panicked Faustus cycles through different 
philosophies, in each case acknowledging their falseness or inapplicability to his 
situation. 
From a purely characterological perspective, Faustus’s various death 
fantasies must, like his responses to the Old Man and to the scholars, be taken as 
indications of despair and sinfulness. This sinfulness is evident both in his sense that 
he does not have time to repent and must be “damn’d perpetually” (5.2.60), and in 
his heterodox entertainment of pagan and heretical understandings of the nature of 
the soul and the afterlife. It would be hard to argue that any of the ideas Faustus 
entertains in the speech enable him to die better in a religious or even an aesthetic 
sense. The vacuum left by the failure of conventional artes moriendi in the first part 
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of the final act does not give Faustus an opportunity to approach his death in an 
affirmative manner; it simply clears a space in which he can fail to die well without 
any outside interference.  
What the soliloquy does not amount to, however, is a rejection of ars 
moriendi as a genre. As Faustus abandons each individual alternative model of 
death, he moves on to a new one, suggesting that he finds some value simply in the 
rehearsal of different practices of dying. To take one example: 
Why wert thou not a creature wanting soul? 
Or why is it immortal that thou hast? 
Ah, Pythagoras’ metempsychosis, were that true 
This soul should fly from me, and I be chang’d  
Unto some brutish beast, 
All beasts are happy, for when they die 
Their souls are soon dissolv’d in elements (5.2.97-103) 
Faustus scarcely makes an attempt to sustain his Pythagorean fantasies as valid. He 
begins with rhetorical questions demonstrating awareness that he is not a creature 
wanting an immortal soul, and acknowledges that metempsychosis is not true. His 
logic is associative and his terms are muddled. When he talks about his soul “fly[ing] 
from me,” “me” is presumably the body. But in the second half of the line, “I” is 
described as something to be transformed into a beast, presumably through the 
transmigration of a soul, so that “I” has to be the soul rather than the body. Then the 
Pythagorean framework is silently dropped, as the happiness of beasts is linked to 
the fact that their souls are mortal – something that Pythagoras believes precisely 
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not to be the case. What the speech dramatizes, then, is not a viable or consistent art 
of dying, but the act of continually producing arts of dying. Faustus here looks less 
like a moriens who tries seriously to approach dying as a practice, than like an 
author of multiple artes moriendi. His existence has become the continuous 
generation of ways to approach death. This activity is in one sense a doomed search 
for a viable means of dying that would bring Faustus’s subjective experience into 
line with a metaphysical order. At the same time, though, the fact that Faustus never 
arrives at a viable art of dying means his speech can be conceptualized as an act of 
resistance, as a marker of ways in which human experience is not subsumed by its 
metaphysical context. This resistance emerges precisely through the acts by which it 
tries to efface itself. 
Significantly, there are even suggestions that Faustus does not, in fact, die, 
but rather becomes caught up in an endless process of dying, so that this production 
of arts of dying could theoretically continue after Faustus is taken to hell. The play 
never explains precisely what happens after the devils come for Faustus. The term 
of the agreement that empowers Lucifer to “fetch or carry” Faustus’s “body and soul, 
flesh, blood, or goods” (2.1.109-10) cannot be definitively explicated so that it is 
clear which terms are cumulative and which are alternative. The ambiguity about 
what exactly the devils get from the bargain persists in the final act in Faustus’s fear 
that his soul “must live still to be plagu’d in hell” (5.2.104) and in his claim that 
Lucifer will bear him “quick to hell” (5.2.109). Faustus suggests that his death might 
not be a death at all, or at least that it is not absolutely distinct from life. While one 
could read these lines by themselves simply as evidence of Faustus’s state of denial, 
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they are echoed by the Chorus, who describes Faustus as “gone” rather than as 
“dead” (Epilogue, 4). When Faustus tells the scholars, “now I die eternally” (5.2.4), 
his primary reference is presumably to the Pauline characterization of damnation as 
spiritual death. But a possible secondary implication is that Faustus’s existence from 
this point forward will be an eternity of dying.28 The play asserts a heavenly order 
that determines Faustus’s fall, but even after this fall something of Faustus persists 
as a continually failing, but never ceasing, performance of dying.  
In this context, Faustus’s earlier assertion that “hell’s a fable” (2.1.28) 
assumes new significance and greater accuracy. His dying, and perhaps his afterlife, 
is a production of fabulous narratives of death. Furthermore, the metatheatrical 
sense in which Faustus is correct – since the only hell shown onstage is a fabulous 
one – ties his production of modes of dying to the aesthetic production of death and 
damnation represented by Marlowe’s tragedy. Perhaps the only form of ars moriendi 
that remains possible in a Calvinist context is one that lacks any value or 
significance beyond its own creation and performance. 
Other aspects of the framing of the final soliloquy, however, gesture toward 
the possibility of a more confident art of dying distinct from the homiletic tradition. 
Something very peculiar is going on with the time scheme of Faustus’s final speech. 
Faustus makes a bid for temporal dilation when he asks  
 That time may cease, and midnight never come! 
 Fair nature’s eye, rise, rise again, and make 
 Perpetual day, or let this hour be but a year, 
 A month, a week, a natural day, 
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 That Faustus may repent, and save his soul. (5.2.62-66) 29 
While Faustus wants time to slow, his speech formally enacts compression, as 
increasingly short time periods are substituted for perpetuity. Consequently, the 
speech simultaneously gestures toward dilation and contraction. Faustus’s 
evocation of contradictory temporal movements finds an analogue in the mismatch 
between stage time and real time. The movement of Faustus’s final hour as marked 
by the striking of the clock is quite obviously faster than that represented by the 
duration of any feasible actor’s performance of the speech. In effect, the 
dramatization of the final soliloquy evokes three different time schemes: the 
extended one of Faustus’s fantasies, the compressed one marked by the clock, and 
the real one experienced by the audience and players. 
 What reconciles these different temporalities is the arrival of midnight, 
which at once marks the end of the period Faustus hopes to extend, the end of the 
compressed hour, and, if not the end of time itself, then the end of the time devoted 
to the performance of the play. The structural importance of midnight is made still 
more pointed for readers (as opposed to viewers) of the A-text, by Marlowe’s ending 
tag Terminat hora diem, terminat Author opus [the hour ends the day, the author 
ends the work]. This line reaches forwards and backwards beyond the play as a 
performance into both the moment of its production and its textual afterlife, 
impossibly asserting that the narrative, the writing of the play, its performance, and 
its reading all end in a single terminus. 
As I argue above, the Homiletic Tragedies assert a hierarchical relationship 
between a human experiential perspective and a heavenly order at the moment of 
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death, as the reprobate’s behavior is marked as parodic, and subordinated to a 
divine standard. This subordination resolves difficulties generated by the 
adaptation of the traditional dramatic figure of the everyman to a Calvinist context, 
by affirming that the protagonist’s gestures towards godly behavior are more 
apparent than real. Because it reconciles inconsistent time schemes at the moment 
of Faustus’s damnation, midnight has a role in Faustus somewhat analogous to that 
of death in the earlier plays. Dramatic time schemes that cannot be made to line up 
because they move at different speeds coincide at a moment of ending so that the 
tensions between them disappear. Importantly, however, the reconciliation 
midnight achieves is less obviously hierarchical than those that occur at the end of 
the Homiletic Tragedies, especially in the printed A-text. The paratactic structure of 
“Terminat hora diem, terminat Author opus” implies a relation between the two 
clauses, while declining to specify it as causal. The author brings about the end of 
the hour just as much as the hour determines the end of the play. Faustus’s inability 
to slow time in the way that he desires perhaps marks his perspective as inferior, 
but the control asserted by the author in the Latin tag means that a subordination of 
Faustus does not necessarily translate into the subordination of human experience.  
There are, then, two distinct models of ending in Faustus’s final soliloquy: 
Faustus’s continuous production of failing artes moriendi without any necessary 
endpoint, and the depersonalized assertion of midnight as a terminus in which all 
time-schemes are reconciled. The former is obviously closer to the dramatization of 
an experiential perspective, while the latter looks more like an imposition of 
metaphysical order. In consequence, their coincidence seems to recapitulate the 
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dynamic I have traced in the Homiletic Tragedies in a register that gives more 
weight to human experience. Faustus, the bad author of unsustainable, ineffective 
artes moriendi, is subsumed by a Latin tag that allows authorial participation in a 
transcendent terminus. However, midnight in Faustus lacks any explicit link to the 
divine, and only brings about resolution through ending in a nominal sense. The 
ending tag asserts a purely formal control that bears no relation to the panicked, 
despairing content that fills up Faustus’s final hour. An aesthetically pleasing and 
meaningful dramatized art of dying that makes sense in a Calvinist context is 
consequently an aspiration gestured to beyond the stage and the text, rather than 
something actually seen in Faustus. 
IV. 
It is perhaps significant that during the final act of Faustus, traditional 
communal ars moriendi models, in which observers surround a moriens, are 
suppressed in favor of individuals trying to understand their endings in a writerly 
way. Figures of authors and readers start to assume greater potency relative to the 
figures of performers and observers, until the final bid for human participation in 
endings represented by the Latin tag exists only for readers and the author on the 
page, and has no analogue in performance. The shift of focus from performer to text-
based author in Faustus, moreover, echoes a historical movement of Calvinist 
homiletic authors away from drama into other formats. Though its date of 
composition is unclear, Faustus certainly belongs to the generation of plays written 
after the widespread alliance between Protestantism and theater that had produced 
the genre of Homiletic Tragedy had broken down, and after anti-theatrical 
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sentiment had become increasingly common among English Protestants. Strikingly, 
Paul White exemplifies this breakdown through the figure of William Wager, author 
of Enough is as Good as a Feast, who stopped writing plays after the 1570’s even as 
he remained “active in the Anglican ministry well into the 1580s.”30  
This background should caution us against reading Marlowe’s adaptations of 
Homiletic Tragedy simply as acts of demystification that gesture toward an 
emergent, secular theater. If Marlowe in Faustus implies dissatisfaction with the 
easily gained, hierarchizing conclusions of the Homiletic Tragedies, he is in a sense 
only mirroring dissatisfactions increasingly felt (though for different reasons) by 
former writers of the genre with the whole notion of Protestant drama. The 
Homiletic Tragedy had already been largely abandoned by its practitioners as a 
failed art of dying before Marlowe revived it. Rather than functioning as an orthodox 
or heterodox play, Faustus might be best read as a play about orthodoxy, and as a 
play interested in exploring why sustaining a Calvinist drama centered on a 
reprobate is so difficult. That Marlowe conducts this exploration by writing a 
Homiletic Tragedy suggests he sees value in the constraints the genre places upon 
human action, and the ways in which it shows reprobate behavior approaching and 
moving away from godly behavior, while always in some sense being irreparably 
damned. If anything, indeed, Marlowe’s development of this inherited model in 
Faustus suggests he takes its implications more seriously than his predecessors. He 
refuses simply to close down the experiential perspective of his central character, 
instead looking for a way to represent the dying reprobate’s subjective experience 
of activity in the face of death.  
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 Consequently Doctor Faustus, is itself a sort of dramatization of the bad 
death of the Calvinist drama of dying badly. Failure circulates pervasively, especially 
in the final act of the play, attaching to Faustus, the communal institutions that 
should support him as he dies, and the means by which death can be represented on 
stage. Faustus rejects the form of hierarchical resolution that emerges at the end of 
the Homiletic Tragedies, but does not have anything with which to replace it. The 
audience, readers, performers and author all participate, like Faustus, in a hopeless 
search for a satisfactory way to understand the end.  
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MOURNER, MORIENS OR MARTYR? MIMETIC DEATH AS POLITICAL STRATEGY 





In the last chapter, I noted the parodic relationship that dramatic 
representations of dying badly often have to good deaths and to the Passion, and 
argued that Marlowe exploits this resemblance in order to explore the possibilities 
for human agency in a Protestant belief system. Predestinarian theology opens up a 
gap between lived human experience and the heavenly determination of who is 
saved and who is damned. Though a belief that salvation through works is 
impossible can generate feelings of powerlessness and ultimately despair, 
Marlowe’s Faustus strives to locate a limited sphere in which human action might 
nevertheless be viable by cultivating a practice of dying badly. As part of this effort, 
Faustus blasphemously imitates postures of repentance and Christ-like self-
sacrifice. Significantly, his parodies occur before, and more frequently than, the good 
models upon which they are based. Parodies based on a missing original become 
separable from that original, even autonomous, and so tentatively suggest 
possibilities for human agency in the absence of God. 
In Richard II, Shakespeare conducts a more extensive exploration of the 
forms of agency made possible by imitative dying practices – especially those based 
on absent or occluded originals. As the play reveals, adducing and following 
examples is both a strategy for identifying replicable instances of a norm and a 
practice of selection that tends to focus on the noteworthy. Though the example is 
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frequently defined against the exception, in practice the distinction between the two 
scarcely holds. Moreover, examples occupy a middle place between narrative and 
precept. Though by definition they are introduced to illustrate a general rule, they 
frequently have a narrative gravity of their own that threatens to exceed and distort 
the point that they are cited to prove.1 Characters’ responses to exemplary deaths in 
Richard II illustrate a particularly fractious relationship to past models. While some 
sort of mimetic approach to Christ in death appears a necessary part of Christian 
devotion, Shakespeare frequently marks imitative practices as extreme and 
problematic within the play. Saints and martyrs are at once ideal mediators and 
models for good deaths in the tradition of Imitatio Christi and practitioners of 
potentially perverse corruptions of ars moriendi who can be aligned with suicide 
and with unchristian forms of desire.  
Moreover, this problematic has political and material consequences because 
imitative dying is understood as a historically situated practice. Characters in 
Richard II approach model deaths with an eye to their theological rationales and 
also to their psychological, social and political utility. By modeling approaches to 
death on past examples, they hope to control their own spiritual fates in accordance 
with historically particularized doctrinal beliefs while also intervening in the fate of 
the nation and the political sphere. Richard II displays greater historical sensibility 
than Doctor Faustus, drawing upon understandings of dying that represent a range 
of doctrinal and temporal positions and exploiting dissonances between them. The 
fourteenth century setting of Richard II and explicit references to Catholic beliefs 
and practices evoke a medieval religious and ritual culture that has no analogue in 
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Marlowe’s play. At the same time, though, Shakespeare is deeply interested in the 
consequences of the passing of such a culture for subsequent understandings of 
mimesis and constructions of political power. Protestant practices of dying 
therefore also become important for understanding Richard’s attempts to assert 
political relevance after his deposition. Finally, the play complicates any sense of a 
linear movement from one era to another by staging conflicts between different 
historical sensibilities and making productive use of anachronism. To understand 
these conflicts, the audience is required to inhabit anamorphic perspectives as they 
entertain different, incompatible understandings of mimetic dying. In doing so, they 
become complicit in potentially excessive or transgressive forms of imitation and in 
the political uses to which these may be put. 
In tracing how characters in Richard II use imitative practices of dying 
politically, I put pressure on accounts of the play that read it as a linear narrative of 
disenchantment or secularization.2 If the play does contain such a narrative, it also 
contains an account of how such narratives are constructed for specific political 
ends out of material that may run entirely counter to them and that may continue to 
haunt them in unwelcome ways. I draw attention to problems with how many 
accounts of the play, and of early modern drama more generally, have blurred 
differences between mourning and dying, or between memorialization and ars 
moriendi. These readings, I suggest, can be anachronistic and also tend to reduce 
relations to the past to nostalgia. In fact, in the play’s hauntings and imitative 
practices of dying, self and other converge in embodiments that blur distinctions 
between death and life, and past and present. Moreover, these impersonations have 
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an affinity with theatrical mimetic performance. By dramatizing such embodiments, 
Shakespeare encourages us to think about the mechanisms through which such 
imitative strategies function, and the factors that might allow them to have political 
traction inside and outside the theater.  
I. 
In Richard II, concern with imitative dying practices emerges gradually out of 
a background awareness of mortality. Richard starts to think seriously about death 
when he returns from Ireland and learns that his troops have dispersed, leaving him 
with no way to put down Bullingbrook’s rebellion. His reflections on his own 
mortality manifest the despair that leads him to assume the kingdom is already 
irretrievably lost and to anticipate, or even desire, his own end.3 However, they also 
lead him to locate a sort of autonomous agency in dying that might afford him some 
political influence. His speech therefore becomes a way to work through different 
understandings of dying as an existential inevitability, as a personal practice to be 
performed more or less willingly, or as a political fact with implications for how 
sovereignty is theorized.  
Richard imagines the approach to death in order to record his losses, but also 
to reckon up what remains to him: 
 Let’s choose executors and talk of wills. 
 And yet not so, for what can we bequeath 
 Save our deposèd bodies to the ground? 
 Our lands, our lives and all are Bullingbrook’s, 
 And nothing can we call our own but death, 
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 And that small model of the barren earth  
 Which serves as paste and cover to our bones.4 
His speech acknowledges a significant transfer of power from Richard’s party to 
Bullingbrook’s. Bullingbrook has won “Our lands, our lives and all,” and so assumed 
control of the persons and possessions that had previously been Richard’s. 
Additionally, Richard’s claim that he and the others cannot choose executors or talk 
of wills, since there is nothing left to bequeath, implies that the usurpation has the 
effect of removing Richard from the legal and economic systems through which 
ownership is understood. The speech, therefore, records a conveyance of 
sovereignty, of the power to shape the very forms through which political and 
economic power can be seen and exercised.  
Yet in the process of articulating this loss, Richard also identifies a residuum 
that he retains: “our deposèd bodies… death, /And that small model of the barren 
earth /That serves as paste and cover to our bones.” This remainder is more 
substantial than it might at first appear.  Andrew Gurr suggests that the primary 
meaning of “model” is “the outline of the body in the grave covering” after the flesh 
has decomposed.5 But the word can also be understood to refer to the body itself, 
modeled out of Adamic clay in God’s image. Richard exploits the overlap between 
these two senses. His speech is a reminder that living humans already carry their 
graves with them, in the form of the flesh that will return to dust and become part of 
the earth that covers their bones. Moreover, this image is not only an example of 
memento mori. Because it immediately follows the enumeration of the things 
Bullingbrook owns, it suggests a counterpoise; Bullingbrook may control our lives, 
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but our deaths remain a potentially significant sphere of autonomy. Richard can still 
belong to himself in and through death, and in this moment he understands dying in 
an expansive sense that allows him to assert ownership of his body and the time 
that remains to it.  
 Richard next considers the precedents for his position, looking for examples 
he can learn from: 
 For God’s sake let us sit upon the ground 
 And tell sad stories of the death of kings, 
 How some have been deposed, some slain in war, 
 Some haunted by the ghosts they have deposed, 
 Some poisoned by their wives, some sleeping killed, 
 All murdered.      (3.2.155-60) 
Again, Richard’s outburst primarily conveys a newfound awareness of the precarity 
of his situation, which he strives to place in perspective by considering the universal 
fact of mortality. He sees himself as a member of a larger class, characterized by its 
vulnerability.6  Not only are the kings he imagines passive victims, “All murdered,” 
but as Richard’s catalogue progresses, the ways in which they are murdered imply a 
progressively greater attenuation of agency even during their lifetimes. Kings 
involved in active political struggles (deposed or slain in war) are replaced by those 
who fail to control their domestic economies (poisoned by their wives) and finally 
by those exhibiting a form of life that resembles death in its insensibility (sleeping 
killed).7  The list moves inwards from the kingdom to the self, with each new 
instance revealing that the boundaries that are supposed to define sovereignty, 
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autonomous agency and safety will not hold. The inevitability of mortality at an 
existential level validates a pessimistic philosophy of kingship as purely 
epiphenomenal. 
Within this list, the kings “haunted by the ghosts they have deposed” stand 
out. On one level, they represent another reconfiguration of the scope of kingly 
autonomy; even rulers who appear to have triumphed politically find themselves 
vulnerable to hauntings that result in their deaths. But the image also anticipates the 
primary means by which Richard will ultimately attack Bullingbrook. The ghost of 
King Richard haunts Bullingbrook in a number of ways – during Richard’s life, 
through his destabilizing persistence even after his deposition, and after his death, 
as a rallying point for rebels through the rest of the second tetralogy. By evoking 
ghosts, Richard once again identifies the vulnerability that mortality exposes in 
kings, but then discovers a form of agency in that very weakness, in the fact that a 
ghost can be parasitic on the new monarch. The ghost-kings recall the universal 
experience of death and use this to achieve specific political ends. Significantly, their 
power is derived from the iterability of postures of dying and the opportunity this 
offers for embodied imitation. The Oxford English Dictionary lists this passage as the 
earliest example of haunting in the sense of “to be subject to the visits and 
molestation of disembodied spirits.”8 Older understandings of the word “haunt,” 
which may well still resonate in the speech, are “to resort to frequently or 
habitually; to frequent or be much about (a place)” and “to practice habitually, 
frequently or regularly.”9 Haunting taken in these senses merges the usurper with 
the king he has deposed by implying that the ghost is in some ways inhabiting the 
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new king or practicing at being the new king. Haunting appears to be successful in 
part because it is a strategy of occupying someone’s identity or of habitually 
impersonating them.  
 Furthermore, Richard goes on to suggest that such impersonation may have a 
more fundamental relationship to dying. Richard’s list of murdered kings culminates 
in the realization that he himself is haunted (as in inhabited and practiced) by a 
sovereign whose rights he has attempted to usurp – King Death: 
  For within the hollow crown 
 That rounds the mortal temples of a king 
 Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits 
 Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp, 
 Allowing him a breath, a little scene 
 To monarchise, be feared and kill with looks, 
 Infusing him with self and vain conceit 
 As if this flesh which walls about our life 
 Were brass impregnable, and humoured thus 
 Comes at the last and with a little pin 
 Bores through his castle wall and farewell king! (3.2.160-70) 
Richard here evokes two conventional personifications of Death—as monarch in 
triumph over humanity and as antic fool—and then considers how they relate to 
one another and to his own position.10 Zenon Luis-Martinez observes that one way 
of understanding the Death who resides within Richard’s mortal temples is as the 
skull existing under his skin. For Luis-Martinez, the confusing topography of the 
 76 
   
image, where “The King’s head and death’s head are coextensive opposites” is an 
instance of the play’s frequent recourse to anamorphic perspectives as figures for 
human powerlessness in the face of history, for the impossibility of rightly gazing on 
events in a manner that might make them controllable.11 Yet if the image 
encourages the audience to strobe between the king’s head and the skull, the tyrant 
and the martyr, for Richard, it also records an experience of habitation, or of him 
himself becoming an anamorphosis. Richard discovers himself to be Death. His 
language emphasizes permeability and mutual constitution over abrupt shifts of 
direction. The referent behind the pronouns governing “his state” and “his pomp” is 
ambiguous, reflecting the shared or shifting governance of Death-as-king and King-
as-death. Moreover, Death has apparently infused the king “with self and vain 
conceit.” Though the primary sense of the phrase is that Death’s temporary 
forbearance has allowed Richard to develop a vain belief in his own inviolability, it 
also suggests that Richard’s self has in some way been constituted through his 
permeation by death. The image stages a clash between understandings of dying as 
a political fact that a theory of sovereignty must accommodate and as an existential 
state. The image suggests the interpenetration of monarch and moriens that entails 
both (viewed rightly) the inevitable limitation to sovereign power, and (if eyed 
awry) an opportunity to exercise non-sovereign power through dying. 
But if Richard’s image implies there might be a political payoff to the practice 
of dying, it also indicates energies and desires involved in excess of any such 
political instrumentalization. In view of Richard’s later words and actions, it is 
striking that he refers to Death as an “antic.” Richard’s association of Death with the 
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figure of the fool evokes the parodic postures assumed by the skeletons in the dance 
of death. It is these scoffing Deaths whom Richard most typically imitates. At Flint 
Castle and during the deposition scene, he behaves foolishly for strategic reasons, 
attempting to destabilize Bullingbrook in part by mocking royal ceremony.12 But the 
image of Richard infused by Death the fool also marks his approach to dying as 
aberrant, as something that goes beyond a mournful recognition that death is 
inevitable to take “grinning” pleasure in the prospect. 
 All of which is to say that though Richard’s outburst in Act 3 Scene 2 does 
function as a despairing lamentation for what has been lost, it also fitfully gestures 
towards an embodied practice of dying conceived as a form of political resistance or 
as something to be desired for its own sake. At this point in the play, this practice is 
not Christianized. Richard’s lament reverses his earlier confidence in divine support. 
He begins his discussion of death with the command “Of comfort no man speak” 
(3.2.144). Though Richard is talking directly to Aumerle, who has been inquiring 
after the troops York might be able to provide, his rejection of comfort also 
forecloses on religious consolation. Instead of a transcendent providence, Richard 
discovers in mortality an immanent negative infinity already inside himself. The 
overall mood is that of the Trauerspiel.  
But over the course of the speech, Richard starts to think about dying as 
involving interpersonal relations, imitation or impersonation – and these 
conceptions can easily be refigured in Christian terms.  Later, Richard increasingly 
approaches death as a practice of Imitatio Christi through which he hopes to control 
both his spiritual and political fate. Richard associates himself with Christ as a 
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moriens, partly to garner sympathy as a victim of treacherous betrayal, but also to 
evoke a providentialist view of history that would seem to promise the punishment 
of Bullingbrook. Under such a providence, a good Christian death can bring about 
desirable political outcomes; Richard can identify and exploit a link between his 
person, heaven and the fate of the nation that survives Bullingbrook’s usurpation. 
Within the play, Carlisle provides the strongest example of such a retributive 
understanding of providentialist history when he prophesizes that as a result of 
Richard’s deposition, “Disorder, horror, fear and mutiny /Shall here inhabit, and this 
land be called /The field of Golgotha and dead men’s skulls” (4.1.142-44). Notably, 
the reference to Golgotha implies that providence takes effect because Richard as a 
suffering individual has a loosely typological relationship to Christ.  
This, at any rate, is the hope. However, the play as a whole is more skeptical 
about the compatibility of Richard’s spiritual practice and political agenda. As I have 
argued, Richard’s practice of mimetic dying first develops when he feels entirely 
abandoned by heaven and is thrown back on his degraded, mortal body as the only 
possible sphere of autonomous action. Though his imitations attempt to uncover a 
new link to the divine, his practice never conclusively rises above its origins in the 
purely earthy. Moreover, his association with Christ as moriens is potentially in 
conflict with his association with Christ as monarch. As Ernst Kantorwicz has 
famously argued, Richard’s imitation of Christ is bound up with his understanding of 
the nature of monarchy, with the conception of the double-bodied sovereign 
modeled on Christ’s dual nature as God and man.13 This sovereign analogy 
emphasizes Richard and Christ’s exceptionality as figures of the divine on earth, in a 
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way that is hard to reconcile with the humility necessary for a practice of ars 
moriendi. Consequently, Richard’s efforts to present himself as a type of Christ often 
look insincere in their concern with worldly things and blasphemous in their excess. 
Political and spiritual aspirations and private despair all rub against one another 
uneasily.  
Even Richard himself is well aware of the problem. He alternates apparently 
sincere attempts to model his behavior on Christ with intimations that he in fact 
considers himself to be a Judas – a traitor and a suicide – and also evokes the 
reprobate character of Marlowe’s Faustus. Deliberate impersonations of exemplary 
figures are balanced by unconscious, untimely impersonations of unwelcome others. 
These raise the question of who is producing whom. Are imitative deaths possible 
because a moriens is capable of mimicking an example, or because the dead (or 
heavenly, diabolical or authorial forces using the dead) make themselves felt 
through the living? Is the imitative death a site of spiritual agency that reaches into 
the political sphere, of the more or less conscious release of desires in excess of the 
model, or of the evacuation of the self now haunted by the other?   
II.  
In proposing to imitate the death of Christ or of other exemplary figures, 
Richard is engaging with a Christian practice that has a long, complex and 
contentious intellectual history. Christianity starts with a death that must be 
imitated yet that is impossible to imitate adequately. The Son of God’s sacrifice of 
himself for the sake of humanity replaces the old law with the new and founds the 
Church. The event of the Crucifixion marks a fundamental shift in the relationship 
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between the divine and the human. But if the foundational importance of Christ’s 
death is clear, the response that it demands from believers is less so. In several 
places, the Bible indicates that imitation is necessary. In the Gospel according to 
Mark, Christ tells his listeners “Whosoever will follow me, let him forsake himself, 
and take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life, shall lose it, 
but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the Gospel’s, he shall save it.”14 
Paul in the Letter to the Romans assures Christians “if we be planted with him to the 
similitude of his death, even so shall we be to the similitude of his resurrection.”15 In 
both instances, the identities of Christ and the imitator appear to converge at the 
moment of death, which through Christ becomes resurrection. Salvific Christian 
imitation of the Passion holds out the possibility that, contra Heidegger, death is 
relational; Christ can die for the good Christian so that in that good Christian’s dying, 
he or she is with Christ.16  
But to say that a Christian should imitate Christ is not to say how this 
imitation should be carried out. Since Christ is both man and God, the Passion is 
both a necessary model and a sacrifice of so great a magnitude that any human 
attempt to comprehend or appreciate it, much less to emulate it, will inevitably fall 
far short. On different occasions, Paul suggests different ways to proceed. In the 
First Letter to the Corinthians, he states, “Be ye followers of me, even as I am of 
Christ,” suggesting that Christ is best imitated through a uniquely spiritually 
privileged human mediator.17 In Ephesians, by contrast, he asks his readers to be 
“followers of God” directly.18 Jerome suggests that these contrary precepts may 
reflect different levels of spiritual development at Corinth and at Ephesus. While the 
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Corinthians “could not instantaneously become imitators of Christ,” the Ephesians 
already had revelations of “great mysteries” that enabled them to imitate God 
directly.19 Such an interpretation implies that though the requirement to imitate the 
Passion is universal, the proper way to do so may vary according to the 
circumstances of the imitating person in what becomes a complex negotiation 
between the individual, his or her social context, and the divine. 
 One historically significant strategy for imitating Christ is represented by the 
Catholic tradition of martyred saints, who strive to recreate the Crucifixion as 
literally as possible, but in doing so may display forms of desire and enjoyment that 
threaten to pervert their model. True martyrdom constitutes a theologically 
successful imitation of Christ when it results in entry into heaven.20 Martyrs 
resemble Christ in their willingness to die for faith and salvation, and frequently 
also in the circumstances of their deaths. The number of crucifixions recorded in the 
Golden Legend is striking. However, in functioning as imitations of the Passion, some 
martyrdoms may also exhibit unchristlike forms of desire and enjoyment. In the 
account of the Life of Saint Peter the Apostle in the Golden Legend, for example, 
Peter has a prophetic vision that leads him to anticipate his martyrdom:  
And when he came to the gate, as, Leo witnesseth, which is called Sancta 
Maria ad passus, he met Jesu Christ coming against him, and Peter said to 
him: Lord, whither goest thou? And he said to him: I go to Rome for to be 
crucified again, and Peter demanded him: Lord, shalt thou be crucified again, 
And he said: Yea, and Peter said then: Lord, I shall return again then for to be 
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crucified with thee. This said, our Lord ascended into heaven, Peter 
beholding it, which wept sore.21 
In this vision, Peter’s crucifixion is not demanded or even prophesized by Christ, but 
is first suggested and then actively pursued by Peter himself as a way of being “with 
thee,” as an act of emulation that will bring him to the God by whom he feels 
abandoned. Christ does not respond to Peter’s proposal or give it divine sanction. 
Instead he simply ascends to heaven, leaving Peter to weep for him alone. Peter’s 
tears recall the Gospel account of his bitter weeping after belatedly recognizing that, 
as prophesized, he has denied Jesus three times.22 The passage therefore invokes 
Peter at his most fallen. It marks his desire for Christ as human and, in evoking a 
previous denial, as self-divided. Imitative martyrdom in this instance is presented as 
a gambit to recover a lost object of love, but also recalls the rejection of that object. 
The episode suggests that the imitative impulse behind martyrdom may be a fallen 
one.  
Yet though the vision points out the fundamental gap between the frail, 
desiring human and the divine, it also holds out the hope that martyrdom could 
nevertheless be an occasion of equivalence and even union between God and 
humanity. Peter wishes to be with Christ not after his martyrdom, but during his 
martyrdom. And Christ does state that he is traveling to Rome “to be crucified 
again.” This mystical second crucifixion will at the least mirror Peter’s, and even 
could be understood as being Peter’s. Christ gets crucified again when Peter 
recreates him by reenacting the postures of the Crucifixion. Taken as a whole, the 
vision expresses both a fallen desire for the God who Peter feels has abandoned him, 
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and a fantasy that this abandonment can be overcome through martyrdom in which 
being with Christ becomes being as Christ. 
 Peter’s actual martyrdom, however, implies a different economy. His death is 
iconographically distinguished from Christ’s by his choice to be crucified on an 
upside-down Petrine cross: 
Peter said thus: Lord, I have desired much to follow thee, but to be crucified 
upright I have not usurped, thou art always rightful, high and sovereign, and 
we be sons of the first man which have the head inclined to the earth, of 
whom the fall signifieth the form of the generation human. Also we be born 
that we be seen inclined to the earth by effect, and the condition is changed 
for the world weeneth that such thing is good, which is evil and bad.23   
Peter’s words emphasize the absolute hierarchical distinction between himself and 
Christ, and the presumption that usurping the postures of the Crucifixion too exactly 
would entail. However, there is a sense in which Peter, by putting himself in a 
position more abject than Christ’s, looks as though he is attempting to outdo his 
model. The Crucifixion is meant to stand as an unsurpassable example of suffering, 
during which the Son of God willingly subjects himself to unprecedented 
degradation. By placing himself below Christ in an iconic display of abjection, Peter 
arguably attempts to go further than Christ, or indulges desires that are parasitic on 
the act of imitation but have nothing to do with it. He explicitly marks his inverted 
Crucifixion as a worldly falling off from Christ, and in doing so, opens up a space in 
which he can on some level take pleasure in this falling off.  
 84 
   
And in this, Peter is not alone. The lives of many Catholic martyrs end in 
displays of suffering that surpass the Passion in extremity, and moreover constitute 
excessive imitations of the misfortunes of other martyrs. For example, the Golden 
Legend suggests that Saint Bartholomew was crucified, flayed and beheaded “for to 
have greater torment.”24 And such torments can be extended almost indefinitely. 
Eamon Duffy cites Saint Erasmus as “the classic example here. One late medieval 
English account of his passion lists fifty-two separate tortures, from being scourged 
with brambles and boiled in oil to having his guts wound out with a windlass and 
the cavity so created filled with salt.”25 Martyrdom as it appears in medieval 
hagiography can start to look like a competitive masochistic and exhibitionist 
practice in which Christ is rapidly far outstripped.26 It functions as a practice of 
imitative dying that aims to bring the martyr to Christ, but it also provides 
opportunities to express desires that threaten to pervert or overwhelm the religious 
imitation. The hagiographies emphasize the exceptional status of martyrdom, and 
the ever more elaborate, tortured approaches to death found within them seem 
intended to reassert that exceptionality even as martyr narratives accumulate.  
In consequence, accounts of martyrdom would appear to stand at odds with 
the artes moriendi. The arts of dying are primarily addressed to those dying of 
natural causes in ordinary surroundings, while martyrdoms are violent executions 
typically occurring in unusual circumstances. Moreover, the arts of dying generally 
strive to reassure their readers by reducing dying to a set of conventional, 
normative postures, and insisting that the ordinary death, through its very 
conformity to established practice, can be spiritually significant. As a result, the 
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genre seems opposed to the drive toward excess and exception found in much 
hagiography. Nevertheless, martyrs do appear in Catholic artes moriendi, where 
they are frequently evoked alongside Christ as exemplars and mediators for 
morientes.27 And this creates a real potential for contradiction. Martyrs have an 
unstable place, both inside and outside of the tradition of dying well, since the 
intermediate position they are placed in, between the ordinary dying person and the 
divine, is scarcely consonant with their excessive qualities.  
Martyrs and other saints are evoked in artes moriendi for two reasons. They 
can act as intercessors and can also provide more immediately relevant and less 
terrifyingly awesome exemplars than Christ for sickening and dying sinners. The 
Crafte advises a moriens to pray “deuoutely to all the apostelys, martyres, 
confessours, and virgynes, & specially to the seynt, the whyche he loued and 
worschypped moste specyally in hys helthe that they well helpe hym than in ys laste 
and moste need.”28 As this quotation indicates, saintly assistance is frequently 
predicated on the identification of resemblances between the sick person and the 
saint. The Miracles of Henry VI, for example, discusses the miraculous vision of a 
sailor called Henry Walter, who, while suffering from gangrenous abdominal 
wounds, saw that “the holy martyr Erasmus (for whom he chanced to have a special 
devotion) lay near him, as if with the pain of his sufferings renewed, just as he is 
often represented in churches, being tortured [with disembowelment] by his 
executioners.”29  Saint Erasmus becomes an appropriate model and intercessor 
because of Walter’s prior devotion and analogous physical condition. Rather than 
striving to attain an impossible resemblance to Christ, Walter approaches Erasmus 
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as Erasmus is also approaching him. Thomas Lupset’s The Waye of Dyenge Well 
invokes Christian martyrs as exemplifying how faith in Christ can counter fear of 
death, and as precedents who should reassure ordinary believers confronting their 
mortality:  
Whan it was proclaimied that who so euer wold saye he was christened he 
shulde cruelly be put to deth, there passed no daye without a great number 
of them that boldly spoke tho wordes of the which shoulde folowe so 
blouddye a slaughter. This was a manifest token that fear of death hadde no 
maner of place with our blessed martirs… the cause of this myrthe in so 
piteous martyrdoms was that this blessed men knewe howe Christe nother 
could nor wolde deceiue them, but that for theyr lyttel regarding of this lyfe 
they shoulde opteyne an other lyfe, where their ioy shuld neuer haue nother 
change, nor decrease, nor ende.  
Therfore my good Walker, mystruste you not in Christe, whose 
doctryn the heuen and the erthe hath by innumerable miracles this many 
hundreth yeres approuyd and confyrmed to be trew.30 
However, it is clear that these examples are not in fact entirely reassuring or 
entirely amenable to conventional understandings of the good Christian approach to 
death. Saint Erasmus is invoked less to illustrate Christian patience than to reenact 
his pain as an iconic posture “as he is often represented in churches;” he models 
death as a celebration of physical sensation and display. The superficial similarity 
between him and Walter in fact points to a much more fundamental difference 
between the invisible, natural progress of gangrene and the spectacle of deliberate 
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torture. Lupset’s Waye of Dyenge Well similarly has difficulty explaining how to 
relate the exceptional instances of martyrdom to the ordinary circumstances of 
Christian death. Moreover, the book attempts to graft a classical Stoic understanding 
of the good death onto the Christian tradition. In the process, Lupset saints start to 
look problematically similar to pagan suicides.31 
After the Reformation, both confessions canvass more seriously the 
possibility that martyrdoms are excessive perversions, not ideal fulfillments, of 
Imitatio Christi that have no place in ars moriendi. Doctrinal disputes encourage 
debates about the relationship between martyrdom and sanctification. Both 
Catholics and Protestants label the heroes of the other side traitors, heretics and 
even suicides, so calling into question the status of martyrdom as an imitation of the 
Passion.32 Dying in a manner formally analogous to Christ or to previous martyrs is 
not enough. Some other marker of true faith is needed. Additionally, iconoclastic 
reformers frequently label the cults of the saints as idolatrous. The very 
intermediate position martyrs and other saints occupy between humanity and God, 
and their success at taking on some of the attributes of Christ in their deaths, makes 
their veneration suspicious.  
The case of Thomas Becket illustrates these changes particularly starkly. 
Becket’s cult at Canterbury was targeted early by Henry VIII for destruction because 
of Becket’s status as a symbol of ecclesiastical resistance to monarchical control 
over church government.33 A Royal Proclamation of 16 November 1538 redefined 
the political and religious significance of Becket’s murder, stating that “Thos. Becket, 
sometime abp. of Canterbury, shall no longer be named a saint, as he was really a 
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rebel who fled the realm to France and to the bp. of Rome to procure the abrogation 
of wholesome laws, and was slain upon a rescue made with resistance to those who 
counselled him to leave his stubbornness.”34 John Foxe repeats the claim that Becket 
is not a true martyr, and then goes on to criticize the manner in which he had been 
venerated. In particular he objects that: 
[An] Antheme or Collect lately collected & primered in hys prayse, is 
blasphemous, and derogateth from the prayse of him, to whome al prayse 
onely and honor is due, where it is sayd. 
Tu per Thomæ sanguinem quem pro te impendit, 
Fac nos Christe scandere quò Thomas ascendit. 
That is.  
For the bloud of Thomas, which he for thee did spend, 
Graunt vs (Christ) to climbe, where Tho. did ascend. 
Wherin is a double lye contayned: first, that he dyed for Christ. Secondly, that 
if he had so done, yet that his bloud could purchase heauen. Which thing, 
neyther Paul nor any of the apostles durst euer chalenge to themselues. For if 
any mans bloud could bring vs to heauen, then the bloud of Christ was shed 
in vayne.35 
 John Jewel cites the same collect as an example of Catholic idolaters seeking “not 
onely Intercession, but also Saluation in the Bloude of Thomas.”36 The archbishop 
comes to stand for a bad, “stubborn” corruption of true martyrdom, and is 
associated with the usurpation of sovereign power and heavenly privilege.37 Not 
only is Becket himself represented as a rebel, but the contemplation of his example 
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also appears to inspire rebellious thoughts against God in others. Becket’s 
presumption against Henry II is hooked to the analogous presumption of his cult 
against the heavenly authority and exclusive exemplary position of Christ. The 
suggestion that the archbishop’s martyrdom is exceptional, granting Becket a 
superior position in heaven, is in itself a sign that his veneration is external to 
appropriate Christian devotional practice. Significantly, the critique of Becket comes 
to focus particularly on his blood. What for the Catholics, at least in Foxe and Jewel’s 
accounts, had been a symbol of Becket’s saintliness and proximity to Christ is now 
merely an emission from the dying body that should put readers in mind of Becket’s 
fleshy humanity. Tormented postures of martydom are no longer exemplary icons of 
saintliness, but suspicious displays of the physical body and its “stubborn” desires.  
 Nevertheless, for Protestants, as for Catholics, models of the good death were 
still important. Imitation of Christ remained a necessary devotional practice, and 
human exemplary actions could be useful as inspiration.38 The difficulty was how to 
imitate appropriately. The 1580 translation of Thomas a Kempis’s Imitatio Christi by 
Thomas Rogers addresses these problems explicitly and carefully, perhaps because 
Rogers feels the need to justify recommending a Catholic text on holy examples for 
Protestant use.39 In an introductory epistle, Rogers discusses how to respond to 
Christ as an exemplar. He naturalizes mimetic behavior, saying “Who entereth into a 
due consideration of mans nature, shal easilie perceaue that most stranglie it is 
addicted vnto Imitation,” and then identifies two appropriate sorts of examples for 
imitation: “one to be folowed and that both necessarilie, and alwaies, which is our 
Sauior Christ; the other but sometime and in some things, as are good men and 
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women, whether they be aliue or dead.”40 Rogers first explains that the proper way 
to imitate other humans is to isolate their individual good characteristics or actions. 
This practice expands the exhortation in First Corinthians to follow Paul as he 
follows Christ into a more general principle of moral imitation.41  
But to say that Christians should follow human models only to follow Christ 
is to recall Christ as the superior and universal example, so Rogers next considers 
how one should go about imitating him:  
Therefore our Sauior is the example of vs to be folowed, and that alwaies, and 
necessarilie: alwaies, for that he was most perfectlie good; and necessarilie, 
because both himselfe, and his Apostles, haue commanded vs to do so. But 
here mistake me not, I beseech you. For albeit I saie our Sauior Christ is 
alwaies; yet do I not saie in al things: and though necessarilie to be folowed; 
yet not as he was God. For he fasted fourtie daies and fourtie nights… he 
restored sight to the blind; health to the sicke; to the dead life; and manie 
other miracles by the almightie power of his Godhead he wrought, which are 
vnimitable (as I maie saie) of mortal man. In somuch that they offend 
greatlie, whether they do it of superstition, as Papists; or of meere zeale, as 
did the God of Norweigh, who dare enterprise to imitate our Sauior in anie 
thing which he did miraculouslie as a God.42 
The final sentence of this passage makes clear that one of Rogers’ motivations is to 
stake out distinctions between his position, Catholic practice and the behavior of 
ascetic zealots.43 He does so by arguing his opponents have either misrecognized 
the distinction between Christ’s godlike and manlike behavior, or are responding to 
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that distinction inappropriately.44 This claim turns on a split within Christ between 
what he does as God and as man, which Rogers wants to present as clear and self-
evident, but which rapidly generates difficulties. Rogers describes the actions of God 
as “unimitable.” The word implies both that godlike behavior is impossible to 
imitate, and that it should not be imitated. The examples Rogers gives of raising the 
dead and curing the sick suggest the former sense, until we learn that Catholics and 
“the God of Norweigh” have in fact managed some sort of inappropriate imitation. 
Notably, the Catholic and ascetic excesses that Rogers condemns seem of a piece 
with the excessive aspects of martyrdom that I have been discussing. The behavior 
that is rejected as only appropriate to God is also the behavior that uses religious 
forms to release irreligious desires and energies; in inimitable behavior, the divine 
and the perverse touch.  
 Though Rogers does not discuss the problem, the Passion is the most difficult 
instance for asserting such distinctions between God and man. Christ’s death fully 
realizes his assumption of human mortality. However, it is not itself like the death of 
a human. Theologians from Augustine onward draw on John 10:18 (“No man taketh 
[my life] from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and have 
power to take it again”) to argue that Christ died voluntarily.45 He willingly took on 
human mortality, and even performed an act that, if it is understood as chosen, looks 
rather like a suicide, but is in fact the fulfillment of God’s plan rather than a 
despairing rejection of it .46 Moreover, Christ’s willingness to suffer degradation and 
death during the Passion ultimately lays the groundwork for his resurrection. His 
death, precisely because it recreates a human experience of abjection, refigures the 
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law governing relationships between the human and the divine in a manner that 
certainly cannot be imitated. Except that, as noted above, the scriptures insist that it 
must be, because it is what allows believing Christians to triumph over death 
through union with Christ. Though Protestant divines like Rogers imply that Christ, 
when carefully considered, can supply iterable examples for human conduct, and 
though the writers of artes moriendi implicitly agree when they advocate the 
imitation of Christ on the deathbed, imitation of the Passion threatens to recall the 
excessive postures of the Catholic martyrs or to become an outlet for desires 
incompatible with Christian patience in the face of death.  
My contention is that these debates about how to imitate holy examples in 
death resonate in Richard II. Differences between characters’ political objectives, 
along with their understandings of sovereignty and other forms of power, are 
mapped onto different Catholic and Protestant conceptions of which figures make 
appropriate models to imitate while dying and of how such imitations should be 
carried out. Richard strives to exploit a link between individual eschatology and 
universal eschatology, and hopes that by dying well in a manner that affirms divine 
involvement in human fate, he can align himself with a providentialist ordering of 
history through which Bullingbrook will be punished for his usurpation and he 
himself might even achieve some sort of resurrection. However, his evocations of 
suicides and martyrs also imply a perverse desire to die badly, and the play 
intimates that the habitation of such exemplary bad deaths may also have political 
consequences, creating revenants that persist to pollute the kingdom. Bullingbrook 
too is cognizant of good and bad past models in the arrangements he makes for 
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Richard’s deposition and assassination and is similarly concerned both with the 
spiritual and political ramifications of different forms of mimetic dying. The precise 
precedents characters evoke when the approach death resonate against one another 
in complex, untimely ways, which trouble critical narratives that read the play as 
depicting the supersession of a medieval worldview with a disenchanted 
renaissance one. Anachronisms and clashes between different, historically specific 
understandings of what an appropriate model would be figure the incompatibilities 
between characters’ heavenly and earthly objectives, and also the difficulty of 
separating the exemplary, the exceptional and the excessive. Moreover, 
anachronism in particular encourages the audience to consider its own stance with 
relation to the action and its own complicity in enabling or recognizing forms of 
mimetic dying with potentially transgressive spiritual or political consequences.  
III. 
Richard announces his project of strategic Christian ars moriendi when he 
ostentatiously exchanges the trappings of monarchy and the kingdom for the 
trappings of Catholic devotion and the grave:  
I’ll give my jewels for a set of beads, 
My gorgeous palace for a hermitage, 
My gay apparel for an almsman’s gown, 
My figured goblets for a dish of wood, 
My scepter for a palmer’s walking staff, 
My subjects for a pair of carvèd saints, 
And my large kingdom for a little grave, 
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A little, little grave, an obscure grave. (3.3.147-54) 
 The speech asserts a parallel between the symbolic, political and religious 
economies of sovereignty and of ars moriendi. Richard implies that just as 
ceremonial and symbolic objects emblematize the king’s control of the kingdom, so 
devotional objects emblematize the penitent’s orientation towards death. However, 
the practical and spiritual implications of this resemblance are ambiguous. Richard’s 
words take the form of a gesture of contemptus mundi but are almost certainly in 
bad faith. Rather than turning his mind from worldly concerns to heavenly ones, he 
intends to force Bullingbrook to acknowledge the extent of his ambitions, and the 
loss these will entail for Richard. The speech therefore seems like a cynical 
perversion of a dying well and raises the problem of whether a devotional practice 
can be compatible with a political agenda. 
Richard himself seems to recognize his behavior may in fact be a 
blasphemous inversion of a proper stance towards death in the alternative he 
suggests to the little grave:  
Or I’ll be buried in the king’s highway 
Some way of common trade, where subjects’ feet  
May hourly trample on their sovereign’s head; 
For on my heart they tread now whilst I live, 
And buried once, why not upon my head?   (3.3.155-59).  
The highway was traditionally the burial place for suicides. Barry Nass suggests 
Richard is obliquely acknowledging that the death he is cultivating for himself may 
be an action of despair. Acquiescing to Bullingbrook’s rule is a rejection of God’s gift 
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and destruction of the body politic akin to suicide.47 But this imagined bad death 
should not only be read for what it reveals about Richard’s perception of his 
spiritual state; Richard is also thinking about how a practice of dying badly might 
give him political traction. Suicides are buried on highways with stakes through 
their hearts because they (like murder victims) are seen as likely to return to haunt 
the living. The tread of passersby keeps the revenant under the ground.48 Richard’s 
complaint that his subjects trample on his heart conflates staking and burial and 
implies that he is already in the position of a ghost polluting Bullingbrook’s 
commonwealth, while his anticipation of them trampling on his head anticipates a 
world turned upside-down, a breakdown of political hierarchy in the wake of his 
death. The image draws out a parallel between king and malevolent spirit to balance 
the earlier parallel between king and heaven-bound penitent. Richard’s imagined 
degradation as a suicide indicates despair but also hints at energies released 
through dying badly that are exceptional and anatagonistic to the “way of common 
trade,” and so resemble sovereignty. 
 In these two contrary images, then, Richard lays out a field in which to 
understand his actions: on one axis he moves between identities of holy penitent 
and reprobate suicide, and on another, between postures of spiritual resignation 
and political action. And it is within this field that we need to understand his 
mimetic practices. The debates I outlined above over how to imitate Christ and 
other exemplary figures such as martyrs appropriately mean that strategies of 
impersonation can suggest any of these positions. In particular, and despite 
Shakespeare’s strong, explicit evocation of a Catholic religious framework, Richard’s 
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practice of Imitatio Christi is haunted by anxieties about appropriate forms of 
imitation that resemble the concerns of Protestant thinkers such as Thomas Rogers, 
more closely than they do pre-Reformation assumptions. The play continually 
suggests that Richard’s imitations are, in Rogers’ terms, impossible, superstitious or 
excessively zealous.  
Richard’s most sustained evocation of Christ occurs during his deposition. 
Richard’s stage management of the action in this scene and his invention of a ritual 
of abdication has met with wildly divergent critical responses. For Walter Pater and 
Kantorowicz, the abdication is a serious ceremony, an act that “leaves the spectator 
breathless. It is a scene of sacramental solemnity, since the ecclesiastical ritual of 
undoing the effects of consecration is not less solemn or of less weight than the 
ritual which has built up the sacramental dignity.”49 Kantorowicz sees the Christlike 
postures Richard adopts as significant expressions of the magnitude of the event of 
deconsecrating a king. Other critics, however, are inclined to read the scene as a 
falling away from true ritual. For Alexander Leggatt, Richard “does more than 
violate ceremony; he perverts it, even parodies it… He turns ceremony into a 
theatrical trick to make his audience feel uncomfortable, and so dramatizes their 
complicity.”50 Robert M. Schuler claims Richard’s coronation goes beyond parody to 
become a blasphemous, “demonic” inversion of true Christian ritual.51 In fact, 
Richard’s behavior deliberately encourages such divergent readings. Richard 
alternately seems to take the resemblance seriously and to treat it as a joke or a 
presumption. The strategies through which he manages his onstage audience bring 
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questions of how such imitations work, what desires they fulfill, and for whom they 
are performed, to the foreground.  
Richard’s explicit self-identification with Christ begins when he looks at the 
assembled peers and evokes Judas’s betrayal: 
  Yet I well remember 
 The favors of these men. Were they not mine? 
 Did they not sometime cry ‘All hail’ to me? 
 So Judas did to Christ, but he in twelve 
 Found truth in all but one, I in twelve thousand none. (4.1.167-71) 
On the surface, Richard’s understanding of his relation to the Passion is self-
aggrandizing, even blasphemous. Richard is not just imitating Christ. Like the 
martyred saints in the Golden Legend seen from a Protestant perspective, he seems 
to be trying to outdo Christ, insisting he has experienced a greater level of suffering 
and betrayal than the archetype of undeserved victimization. Moreover, Richard is 
doing so in order to absolve himself of responsibility for his weak rule, and to place 
the blame entirely on the nobles.  
But to identify this moment as instantiating bad, blasphemous or excessive 
identification with Christ is only to beg the question of what would make a practice 
of Imitatio Christi appropriate, and Richard does in fact implicitly ask this question 
and bring those observing him onstage to endorse his impersonation. He takes the 
occasion for the comparison from the appearance of “these men,” the peers around 
him who have become complicit in Bullingbook’s coup d’état. If he is inappropriately 
and excessively imitating Christ, he implies, it is only because they are 
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inappropriately and excessively imitating Judas. By alluding to his listeners, Richard 
suggests that the resemblance between himself and Christ is a collective creation, 
and any blame for its potentially blasphemous nature is dispersed. The listeners’ 
silence implies their acquiescence to this narrative, or at best shifts them into 
another category of compromised observers of the Passion – they are Pilates who 
“Have here delivered me to my sour cross /And water cannot wash away your sin” 
(4.1.239-41).  
In exploiting the silence of his auditors, Richard is being somewhat 
disingenuous, since he has assumed a rhetorical stance in this speech designed to 
shut out any other speaker. Richard characteristically asserts power by generating 
and drawing attention to embarrassing situations. Here and elsewhere, he proves 
himself a master at provoking increasing discomfort in his listeners, who find 
themselves unable to engage with him because they can neither admit nor reject the 
core assumptions upon which his words are predicated. In this instance, he makes 
an ostentatious show of calling for others to affirm or deny his speech when he says 
“God save the king! Will no man say Amen?” (4.1.172). But, as Richard must know, 
he is asking an impossible question, and one that condemns its hearers even if they 
ignore it. Because the identity of the true king is unclear, any attempt to respond is 
potentially either treasonous or blasphemous. At the same time, refusal to respond 
is also potentially treasonous or blasphemous. The silence of the peers gives Richard 
the authority to continue to be “both priest and clerk,” and to speak for and assign 
roles in a biblical reenactment to everyone present at his deposition (4.1.173). 
Earlier, I suggested that Richard’s understood himself an anamorophic object 
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through his conceit of death as the skull under the skin. Now, he creates a similarly 
paradoxical image, figuring himself both as the king to be saved and the thing the 
king must be saved from, but does so for an identified set of viewers. The peers must 
be both outside and inside of the tableau, distanced enough from Richard’s 
Christlike posture that their silent assent to it can appear objective, and near enough 
to be tainted by the association with Judas. In this they resemble viewers of an 
anamorphic image, who must impossibly occupy two perspectives, one head on and 
the other at such an oblique angle that they almost merge into the picture plane.52 
After comparing himself to Christ upon his entrance into Bullingbrook’s 
presence, and gaining at least silent acquiescence to the comparison, Richard can 
assume that his subsequent actions will continue to be read typologically in relation 
to the Passion. The most significant of these actions is his voluntary surrender of 
power. Many critics have argued that the abdication is incompatible with a political 
philosophy of divine right. In giving up his crown, Richard implicitly agrees that 
sovereign power is the property of those who “know the strong’st and surest way to 
get,” rather than something divinely ordained (3.3.200). Either there is no heavenly 
interest in the monarchy, or Richard is rejecting the divine trust placed in him in an 
act akin to a despairing suicide or a denial of God. The abdication would seem to 
confirm the failure of Richard’s attempts to present himself as an analogue of Christ, 
or even to constitute a willing turn away from Christ.  
However, the Passion also provides a precedent for Richard to give up his 
power in one sense while still retaining it in another. By creating his own deposition 
ceremony, he evokes Christ’s death as a voluntary action that enables his 
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resurrection. Thus, he imitates Christ in order to generate an art of dying, but one 
that pointedly makes him an exception to the usual practice of ars moriendi because 
it attempts to recreate the Godlike qualities of the model. Richard submits to 
humiliation and gives up his crown to Bullingbrook in a way that will enable him to 
reclaim it in some sense later on. His orchestration of the ceremony of abdication 
becomes a way of asserting a difference in kind between his own divinely 
sanctioned sovereign right and the power Bullingbrook derives from popularity and 
military force. Through it, Richard makes a claim that only a king can depose a king. 
He emphasizes his own agency, and calls on onlookers to recognize that agency as 
he relinquishes the crown:  
Now, mark me how I will undo myself. 
I give this heavy weight from off my head 
And this unwieldy scepter from my hand,  
The pride of kingly sway from out my heart. 
With mine own hands I give away my crown; 
With mine own tongue deny my sacred state; 
With mine own breath release all duteous oaths. (4.1.202-09) 
The repetition of first person pronouns keeps the focus squarely on Richard and his 
actions, and the opening call to “mark me” again asks the onstage audience to assent 
to Richard’s self-presentation. Though Richard can only see as far as the grave, 
ending his divestment of his kingly attributes with “And soon lie Richard in an 
earthy pit” (3.1.218), this prediction perhaps carries with it the hope of some 
political resurrection. Richard finds a way to imitate Christ’s Passion that suggests 
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he might retain political agency after his deposition, and manipulates the peers 
around him to provide collective assent to the analogies that he is drawing. 
Yet there are severe risks to Richard’s strategy. First, in aggregating to 
himself the authority to stage-manage the event, he arguably becomes morally 
responsible for every element of it, including the traitorous positions he assigns to 
the peers. His ability to speak for those around him in a way that prevents them 
from using their own voices means that the positions they occupy are ultimately 
attributable to him. As Richard puts it, “if I turn mine eyes upon my self /I find 
myself a traitor with the rest” (4.1.246-47). In ventriloquizing Judas, he may become 
Judas—not just a traitor, but also a suicide. Second, Richard addresses and then 
dismisses his human audience by asking them to consider the true significance of 
assenting to “God save the king.” But by problematizing what is usually an empty 
formula of support for the political status quo, Richard evokes God as the supposed 
guarantor of that status quo, and as an audience far less susceptible to manipulation. 
Richard himself cannot finally assert that God is on his side, but can only express the 
hope that he might be (“God save the king, although I be not he, /And yet Amen if 
heaven do think him me,” 4.1.174-75). The providentialist Christian history that 
Richard hopes to align himself with in order to assert political agency remains 
disconnected from the human action. And the attempt to mirror Christ’s voluntary 
death risks trespassing on the boundaries Rogers outlines between appropriate and 
inappropriate imitation. Richard’s strategy, consequently, leaves unanswered 
questions about how closely human and divine audiences align. Does his ability to 
force an embarrassed acquiescence to a politically expedient form of Imitatio Christi 
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mean that it has to be taken seriously as a religious performance? Or does its very 
political legibility ensure that Richard’s actions fail as a devotional practice? Richard 
himself is unsure. 
To the peers onstage and to God, moreover, we can add a third audience: the 
one watching the play. For this theater audience, Richard’s deliberate impersonation 
of Christ is offset by his unconscious, anachronistic impersonation of Marlowe’s 
Faustus, which suggests that Richard may be nursing a wish to die in a way that is 
neither spiritually nor politically efficacious. Richard picks up on Faustus’s language 
when he wishes that he “were a mockery king of snow /Standing before the sun of 
Bullingbrook, /To melt myself away in water drops” and when he comments on his 
face in the mirror by asking “Was this face the face /That every day under his 
household roof /Did keep ten thousand men?” (4.1.259-61, 80-82).53 Most 
damningly, the linguistic parallels might lead to the conclusion that Richard, like 
Faustus, is a reprobate. His attempts to imitate Christ’s Passion in order to achieve a 
politically and spiritually good death are actually blasphemous parodies that 
confirm his lack of grace. And his impersonation of a historically posterior reprobate 
of whose existence he cannot be personally aware either indicates a divine (and 
authorial) plan controlling his actions and operating at a level which he does not 
have access to, or Faustian desires for dissolution. While Richard may think he is 
imitating an exemplary model of dying, he is in fact inhabited – haunted – by 
another unwelcome moriens that he is unaware of. 
By the final act, Richard’s uncertainty about the right way to approach his 
imminent death increases his resemblance to Faustus. Though there are no explicit 
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verbal parallels to match those that occur during the deposition, Richard’s last 
soliloquy is structurally very similar to Faustus’s. Both speakers cycle inconclusively 
through different understandings of the relation between themselves and the world, 
with their various theories in each case turning out to be self-defeating. Faustus’s 
Epicurean and Pythagorean fantasies are matched by Richard’s “thoughts of things 
divine,” “Thoughts tending to ambition” and “Thoughts tending to content,” none of 
which are capable of easing him (5.5.12, 18, 23). Both, too, experience a discord 
between their own indefinitely circling and inconclusive patterns of thought and an 
external signifier of the passage of time – the clock for Faustus and an unseen 
musician for Richard. For each speaker, then, the soliloquy exhibits the impossibility 
of sustaining a coherent human narrative in the approach to death. Ultimately, both 
the inconclusive churning of his thoughts and the unwitting parallel to Faustus seem 
to mark Richard’s attempts to achieve an imitative good death modeled on Christ’s 
as failed.  
Shakespeare differs from Marlowe, though, in the way in which he 
historicizes and contextualizes this problematic by pointing up distinctions between 
Richard’s Medieval Catholic milieu and Faustus’s post-Reformation one. 
Consequently, Richard’s untimely and anachronistic evocation of Faustus actually 
cautions us against understanding the passage of time in too teleological a fashion 
and being too ready to conclude that Faustus reveals the truth of Richard. Just as 
Faustus’s position situates and qualifies Richard’s, so Richard’s might also situate 
and qualify Faustus’s. The practice of bodily evoking a prior figure in order to 
achieve heavenly or worldly goals is shown to have a history that encompasses 
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conventions of theatrical representation but exceeds them. It moreover implies that 
the prior examples being invoked have a certain autonomy, since they bring with 
them the context, a set of implicit values, associated with a particular moment in 
time. Like Richard’s onstage audience of peers, Shakespeare’s post-medieval 
offstage audience is also required to inhabit two dual perspectives: one that accepts 
the Medieval Catholic framework of Richard’s actions as part of a historical context 
and perhaps even attempts to inhabit it so as to better understand the play, and one 
that from the outside can either condemn Richard as a superstitious reprobate or 
mourn him in Benjaminian terms as a relic of a lost, enchanted world. In a way, this 
is true of any history play. But the anachronistic evocation of Faustus brings the 
problem to the fore and figures it in terms of strategies of impersonation with roots 
in different theological understandings of the relationship of a Christian imitator to 
his or her model. Richard II therefore implies that the problem of right relation to 
the past and right imitation of past example does not affect Richard alone. It also 
becomes a difficulty for members of the audience, who are reminded both of their 
situation within their own historical era and of the fact that they, like Richard, are 
required to relate to past examples in order to attempt to manage their temporal 
and spiritual fates. 
IV. 
Similarly productive clashes between temporalities emerge around Richard’s 
death. The death scene evokes unacknowledged accounts of Catholic martyrdoms, 
especially the murder of Thomas Becket, to suggest that anachronistic or untimely 
habitations of dubious exemplary models may be politically useful in a way that 
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more conventional ars moriendi could not be. Earlier, Richard’s practice of strategic 
imitative ars moriendi had foundered on the incompatibility between normative 
understandings of the examples inspiring an ordinary Christian’s approach to death 
and Richard’s insistence on his own exceptionality, or between understandings of 
Christ as an analogue for a human moriens and for a godlike sovereign. Richard’s 
behavior continually risks becoming aggrandizing or excessive, and pointing to 
worldly or fallen desires that undermine any attempt to use a practice of dying well 
to support a political project. In this context, untimely intimations of Faustus appear 
to confirm Richard’s proximity to the figure of the reprobate. However, saintly 
martyrs evoke a different economy, where power is derived precisely from 
untimeliness and exception. The depiction of Richard’s death relies on this economy 
and moreover implies that it persists even in the supposedly post-medieval, 
Protestant context in which Shakespeare is writing. Linear narratives of a 
progression from medieval ceremonial sacred kingship to something more modern 
are dependent on hidden recreations of earlier examples. Again, there is something 
anamorphic about the postures Richard adopts and the contradictory perspectives 
that viewers have to occupy in order to fully understand what he is doing. More than 
the adoption of any particular imitative moriens posture, or any attempt to use such 
a posture to affirm a stable providential link between the self, God and the world, 
what may be useful to Richard is precisely the untimely way in which premature or 
belated models of dying can be evoked. Moreover since this untimeliness can also 
easily discomfit the play’s audience, it raises questions the potency such a practice 
might have beyond the fictional world being dramatized. 
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Shakespeare probably derives his account of the king’s murder primarily 
from Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Ireland and Scotland.54 
As Lister Matheson observes, both the chronicle account of Richard’s death and 
Shakespeare’s adaptation of it bear a striking resemblance to the events 
surrounding Thomas Becket’s murder. Matheson does not clearly distinguish 
between Shakespeare’s and Holinshed’s accounts of Richard’s death, but notes the 
following general parallels: both Richard and Becket are assaulted by groups, offer 
some initial resistance, and, in the Chronicle and possibly in stage tradition, are 
finally killed by deathblows to the head (the anointed part of the body); both Henry 
II and Henry IV first provoke the assassinations through ambiguous rhetorical 
questions and then subsequently spurn the murderers, deny complicity and seek 
penance.55 However, in fact Shakespeare departs from Holinshed in a number of 
ways that serve to reinforce the parallel with Becket. Whereas Holinshed states that 
Richard had no opportunity to “call to God,” Shakespeare’s Richard has the time to 
narrate his death as a spiritual event with anticipated consequences for the peace of 
Henry IV’s reign.56 Additionally, kingly disavowal of the murder and penance 
assume a far more significant role in Shakespeare’s account than in Holinshed’s. The 
Chronicle does not discuss Henry IV’s reaction to Richard’s death or his treatment of 
Exton. Henry;s proposed crusade is only mentioned when he is on his own 
deathbed, and is not explicitly connected to any guilt he feels on account of his 
treatment of Richard.57 By contrast, Bullingbrook’s announcement of a crusade as a 
penitential response to the murder is given emphasis by its position as the final 
event in Shakespeare’s play.  
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 Like Richard’s earlier impersonations of Christ and Faustus during the 
deposition scene, the resemblance to Becket functions both as a strategic imitation 
from the perspective of the characters in the play, and as an untimely, excessive and 
doctrinally problematic allusion from the belated perspective of the Elizabethan 
theater audience. To treat the characters first, we can identify expedient reasons for 
both Bullingbrook and Richard to draw on the pattern of Becket’s death without 
acknowledging that that is what they are doing.58 For Bullingbrook, the precedent 
offers a model for getting rid of a dangerous political rival while maintaining 
distance from the actions of the assassins through verbal ambiguity and a public 
performance of penance after the event. His declaration, “Lords, I protest my soul is 
full of woe /That blood should sprinkle me to make me grow,” shows him not only 
to be reacting to the immediate event of Richard’s assassination, but furthermore to 
be aware of an audience who will judge his reactions (5.6.45-46). He displays a self-
consciousness that implies he has anticipated how his actions will be read as part of 
a narrative of martyrdom.  
Bullingbrook adopts the postures of Henry II when they are expedient while 
striving to alter some of the practical implications they had historically. First, he acts 
to avoid any institutionalized response to Richard’s death. Henry II’s penance 
involved a ritualized formal submission to an independent church. Moreover this 
penance was bound up with the king’s agreement to the expansions of ecclesiastical 
temporal power that Becket had been killed for advocating along with his 
acquiescence to the creation of the cult of Saint Thomas of Canterbury, which 
became a significant source of church wealth independent from the monarchy.59 In 
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Shakespeare’s account, Bullingbrook insists he regrets his part in Richard’s death 
and promises to embark on a pilgrimage or crusade to the Holy Land as penance. 
But this promise is not enforced by any formal church structure. Indeed, the 
representative of Church hierarchy on the stage at this point, the Bishop of Carlisle, 
who had previously linked Bullingbrook’s usurpation to a heavenly intervention 
promising destruction, has just been sentenced for that treasonous outburst and 
told to “Choose out some secret place, some reverend room, /More than thou hast, 
and with it joy thy life /So that thou livest in peace die free from strife.” (5.6.25-27). 
That is, Carlisle has just been removed from a public pastoral role to a private 
“reverend” sphere.  
The anticipation of Carlisle’s death as the termination of the sentence, 
moreover, encourages the Bishop to shift his attention away from apocalyptic world 
history towards a private approach to his personal end. Bullingbrook attempts to 
decouple personal eschatology from world eschatology, and personal acts of faith 
from any institutional or public display of faith. Bullingbrook’s own penance, in fact, 
becomes so personalized and so internalized that it never takes on any concrete 
form at all. The intention to embark on a crusade remains unrealized at the end of 
Henry IV part 2, when instead of being killed in battle in the Holy Land the king dies 
of natural causes in the Jerusalem chamber. Henry fulfills his commitment in a 
purely nominal manner and overwrites the promise of crusading martyrdom with 
the actuality of an unheroic, bedridden death that is far more compatible with the 
conventions of the ars moriendi tradition.60 The martyrdom of Thomas Becket 
provides Bullingbrook with a precedent for ridding himself of a political rival, but in 
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adopting this precedent, he strives to eliminate both the institutional religious 
structures and the charismatic charge that would enable a death to function as 
martyrdom. The ordinariness of his own end becomes an ironic marker of his 
success in this project. 
 The impersonation of a figure like Becket is also expedient for Richard, 
though for opposed reasons. Unexpectedly, Richard is able to successfully fulfill 
what should be contradictory chivalric and religious expectations for the good 
death. He acquits himself valiantly in the play’s only episode of violent action, and 
then in the moment of death presents himself as a saintly martyr: 
 That hand shall burn in never-quenching fire 
 That staggers thus my person. Exton, thy fierce hand 
 Hath with the king’s blood stained the king’s own land. 
 Mount, mount my soul. Thy seat is up on high 
 While my gross flesh sinks downward, here to die. (5.5.108-12) 
Richard ties his immediate spiritual fate and the fate of his killer to the fate of the 
kingdom. His observation that Exton “Hath with the king’s blood stained the king’s 
own land” builds on Carlisle’s prophesy to imply that civil unrest will follow as a 
heavenly punishment for the stain of regicide and usurpation. In doing so, it recalls 
Holinshed’s report of some of Becket’s last words: “I am readie to die for my God, 
and for the defense of his iustice and the libertie of the church; gladlie doo I imbrace 
death, so that the church may purchase peace and libertie by the shedding of my 
blood.”61 In both instances, the dying figure announces their habitation of a posture 
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of martyrdom and implies that the mechanical operation of falling blood will bring 
about political reorganization.  
However, Richard, like Bullingbrook, inhabits the precedent with 
modifications. These suggest that what is appealing and potent to him about 
martyrdom is precisely its transgressive, exceptional qualities, which place it both 
above and below ordinary postures of ars moriendi, and even make it difficult to 
distinguish from suicide. First, he is no more eager than Bullingbrook to link his 
martyrdom to the institutional church; his postures of faith are charismatic, entirely 
self-sustaining and aimed at asserting that his kingship gives him a unique link to 
the divine. Second, he understands his blood to have an action as potent as Becket’s, 
but almost opposite in effect. As I note above, Becket’s devotees expressed such 
strong beliefs in the healing powers of the saint’s blood that Protestant reformers 
accused them of idolatry. Richard’s blood, by contrast, is imagined as contaminating 
the kingdom with guilt for his death, and in doing so it evokes the revenants thought 
to emerge as a consequence of violent deaths and suicides. The staining effect of the 
blood allows Richard to resolve the difficulty he encountered earlier in assuming a 
practice of dying that was both politically effective and spiritually sincere. Now, 
Richard envisions a clean and absolute separation between the corrupt flesh, which 
sinks down to add to the pollution of Bullingbrook’s realm, and the soul that will 
ascend to a throne-like seat in heaven. Richard in his moment of death manages to 
slough off corruption, intimations of bad faith, and even suicidal or masochistic 
desires for death attaching to his fleshy existence, so that they become 
Bullingbrook’s problem and, by drawing a contrast with that very image of bodily 
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corruption, insists on the essential sanctity of his soul. He becomes a martyr both in 
the positive understanding endorsed by devotees of medieval cults of the saints, and 
in the negative superstitious and suicidal understanding that prevailed after the 
Reformation. Richard finally turns the problem of how to imitate exemplary deaths 
into its own solution, manipulating and deriving power from the contested status of 
martyrdom in relation to the ars moriendi tradition. 
Significantly, Shakespeare shows that Richard is able to disseminate this 
interpretation of his death successfully. His narrative of martyrdom is immediately 
accepted as true by his murderer, who suddenly regrets his actions and disavows 
them as the promptings of a devil (5.5.115-16), and it continues to have a purchase 
over the rest of the tetralogy. This trajectory culminates in Henry V’s description of 
the dead king’s reinterment on the eve of the Battle of Agincourt: 
I Richard’s body have interrèd new, 
And on it have bestowed more contrite tears 
Than from it issued forcèd drops of blood. 
Five hundred poor have I in yearly pay 
Who twice a day their withered hands hold up 
Toward heaven to pardon blood. And I have built 
Two chantries, where the sad and solemn priests 
Sing still for Richard’s soul.62 
The beadsmen and priests gathered round Richard’s tomb make it a center of 
religious activity structurally similar to a devotional cult. However, unlike devotees 
at a shrine who seek intercession through the blood of the saint, those praying for 
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Richard seek to prevent his blood from acting. Indeed, their behavior rather recalls 
the activity of the subjects Richard imagines trampling on him when he is buried in 
the king’s highway, engaged in continuous business to keep down a ghost. Henry V 
apparently accepts Richard’s own account of this significance of his death. More 
successfully than Bullingbrook, Richard has been able to smuggle a personal 
political agenda under the form of an imitative death based on the example of a 
martyr. This is because, unlike Bullingbrook, he is able to take advantage of 
martyrdom’s unstable position outside of standard forms of ars moriendi, rather 
than having to attempt to remove its charisma and bring it in line with ordinary 
approaches to death.  
 For an Elizabethan theater audience, questions about the significance or 
appropriateness of imitating Becket’s example are heightened by the change in the 
status of saints in general, and Becket in particular, after the Reformation. Matheson 
notes rather drily that “In the late sixteenth century, any reminiscences of Becket’s 
murder would have been highly charged politically and in terms of the characters of 
Bolingbroke and Richard,” but declines to explain precisely how this political charge 
would attach.63 It is easy to think of ways in which the recreation of the martyrdom 
of a Catholic saint looks simply subversive. Successive Tudor administrations 
orchestrated a concerted propaganda campaign against Becket, which involved, 
among other things, literally scratching his name from books and suppressing 
pageants depicting his life.64 Although it is impossible to tell how thoroughly these 
recodings infiltrated the popular consciousness, they certainly determined what 
was speakable about the archbishop.65 For a viewer with a perspective at all 
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analogous to Foxe’s, the parallel to Becket’s death arguably taints both monarchs by 
aligning Richard with a rebellious traitor and Bullingbrook with a king who 
capitulated to a Vatican power-grab. Insofar as either character inhabits the 
precedent of Becket’s murder deliberately, he actually might be worse than the 
original since he is choosing to reenact something that has already been marked as 
treasonous and problematically Roman Catholic. More dangerously, drawing 
attention to similarities between Becket and Richard, or Henry II and Henry IV, 
tends to taint Tudor mythographers’ appropriation of Richard’s deposition for a 
narrative justifying the accession of Henry VII. The parallel highlights the regularity 
with which iconic deaths have been used to achieve specific political ends over the 
course of history, and also how they can be refigured as political conditions change. 
Such recognition might encourage a skeptical attitude towards imitative practices of 
dying that can appear purely strategic, or emptied of positive religious significance 
after the Reformation.  
However, any wrongness attaching to Henry and Richard for reenacting 
Becket’s murder also attaches to Shakespeare and the Lord Chamberlain’s Men for 
staging that reenactment, and even to the disapproving audience itself for 
recognizing it. This contagion is worth investigating further. It suggests that the very 
impropriety of using the murder of Becket as a model for dying in the 1590’s invests 
it with a potency that can escape the action on stage. As I have already intimated, 
many critical accounts of Richard II draw strong oppositions between the medieval 
quality of Richard’s kingship and the more modern form of rule practiced by 
Bullingbrook. In some of these analyses, the lamenting tone of much of the drama 
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reflects an epochal sense of loss of a clear link to Providential history and effective 
eschatology. 66 But if Becket makes himself felt to the audience through Richard’s 
death less as the desired lost object of mourning than as the undesired practitioner 
of haunting, then this suggests a different sort of relationship to a Catholic religious 
past. The parallel implies an important structuring role for medieval understandings 
of imitative dying in the constitution of Bullingbrook’s modern, unceremonial state 
and in the Elizabethan polity that justifies itself in part through Richard’s death. This 
continuance is not just an instance of religious forms being either mourned, or 
strategically emptied out and secularized, because for part of the audience at least, 
the presence of Becket, and of Richard as Becket, may be unwelcome.  
A tradition of exceptional dying practiced by saintly martyrs, and condemned 
as self-aggrandizing or suicidal by Protestant reformers, persists in Richard’s death 
as an avatar of Becket. This persistence has an uncannily mournful quality (since, as 
in Benjamin’s account, it evokes underworld ghosts as inverted signifiers of the loss 
of true eschatology), but also holds open the possibility of a real encounter. It fits 
into a wider pattern of deliberate imitations giving way to undesired hauntings. In 
the shock of recognizing an unwelcome Catholic saint who should not be present 
embodied on stage, the theater audience has to consider what exactly it is 
recognizing. Where is the saint? And how exactly does his real historical death relate 
to the death of Christ, to the death of the character they see on stage, and to the 
performance of death enacted by the player? 
 Bullingbrook’s final address to Exton situates the chain of imitative deaths 
stretching from Christ through Becket to Richard within a larger and more recursive 
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history. When Bullingbrook tells Exton “With Cain go wander through the shades of 
night” (5.6.43), he completes a series of allusions to Genesis 4 stretching through the 
play from his complaint in the first scene that the Duke of Gloucester’s blood “like 
sacrificing Abel’s, cries /Even from the tongueless caverns of the earth /To me for 
justice and rough chastisement,” (1.1.104-06) to Richard’s insistence that his blood 
has stained the land.67 Notably, the immediate application of references to Cain and 
Abel changes over the course of the narrative. In Act One, Abel is Gloucester, while 
Cain is apparently Mowbray but probably really Richard himself as the sponsor of 
the murder with the blood relation to the victim. By Act Five, Abel has become 
Richard, while Cain is apparently Exton but probably really Bullingbrook. The 
potential for different deaths to evoke the same model with difference implies an 
open-ended process where the dead are embodied and revived through imitation to 
die again on different occasions. In a double movement, as the history depicted by 
the play moves forwards, the deaths it evokes come from an earlier time. Abel is 
both the example and the exception. He is the first human to die in the Bible, the 
model for all subsequent deaths, yet Christian authors frequently read him 
typologically to prefigure the Passion and the subsequent deaths of martyrs.68 His 
original death becomes anachronistically citational as subsequent Christianizing 
accretions overwrite, but do not quite erase, the original Jewish model. The allusion 
to Abel suggests that deaths are always mimetic, that the modes of imitative dying 
Richard and Bullingbroke appropriate for specific political purposes, along with the 
differences between medieval and renaissance imitative practices, are only 
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temporary manifestations in a much longer story typified by recursions and 
reworkings that continue indefinitely. 
V. 
At least one Elizabethan viewer of Richard II believed that the play’s patterns 
of personation stretched into the present. In the aftermath of the Essex rebellion, 
when the conspirators’ sponsorship of a performance of a play about Richard II that 
was probably Shakespeare’s came under scrutiny, the Queen is supposed to have 
objected, “I am Richard II. Know ye not that?”69 Though critics continue to debate 
the topicality of Richard II, Elizabeth’s assumption that an identity between a 
dramatic impersonation of a historical character and a living monarch was possible, 
and that this identity could be intended to effect political change, or even bring 
about the end of the rule or life of the monarch through merging her with a prior 
example, is significant in itself for what it suggests about Elizabethan sovereignty 
and theater. 
The dramatic dimensions of Elizabeth’s monarchical persona have been 
extensively studied.70 One aspect of her theatrical self-presentation was her explicit 
association with iconic alter-egos drawn from history and myth—the Queen of the 
Fairies, Cynthia, Boudicca. Another, largely hidden but arguably more important, 
was the reconstitution of elements of the cult of the Virgin Mary around the Virgin 
Queen. Richard II explores the ramifications of just these sorts of strategic 
personations, both those that are speakable and those that are not, and uncovers 
links between them and devotional strategies of imitation and impersonation. These 
parallels, I think, should encourage us to qualify some of the ways in which 
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Elizabethan monarchical power has been discussed as performative, or described as 
a secular appropriation of religious concepts and postures. Though there is certainly 
a performative dimension to the arts of dying and the imitations of martyrdom I 
have discussed in this chapter, this should not be taken to suggest that they are 
mere mimicry or distanced, mournful representation of something hopelessly lost. 
The potency characters find in these practices lies precisely in the possibility that 
through them they really are achieving a substantive relationship with their models. 
The haunting, anachronistic, problematically Catholic, or arguably blasphemous 
ways in which those examples sometimes get inhabited do not necessarily foreclose 
on this relationship. Rather, the very fact that some allusions are discomforting 
gives them a charge that escapes the immediate context of the historical moment 
being depicted, and figures for the audience the type of union with past models that 
characters are hoping to create. For Elizabeth, the opportunity to be Cynthia or 
Boudicca may carry with it the risk of being Richard II. Monarchical impersonation 
is effective not because it empties out religious forms and turns them into occasions 
for purely secular display, but because it remains live, in dialogue with religious 
practices of imitation that assume the links between the living Queen and the 
imitated dead are not only illusion or presentation. 
These considerations also suggest different ways to think about theatrical 
playing. A critique of the theater, originating in Plato and revived by anti-theatrical 
Puritan tracts, claims that mimesis leads players to take on the qualities and 
characters of the objects being imitated. Playing can therefore have a negative moral 
effect on the person playing a bad character.71  Richard II shows characters testing 
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out similar lines of thinking and assuming that embodiment of examples will have 
moral and social consequences. But in doing so, they explore a full range of positive 
and negative possibilities. They consider models from Christ through saints and 
sinners to Judas, and variously understand impersonation as the merging of 
identities and as a practice that asserts difference between the mimic and the model. 
Moreover, by drawing attention to the place of dramatic mimesis within a wider 
field of spiritual and political imitative practices, Richard II encourages a 
reconsideration of the potency of representational acting. Rather than reducing the 
imitative efforts of the characters to mere performances analogous to playing, we 
might consider raising the significance we accord to playing as something that is 
modeled in part on a practice of Imitatio Christi, and that, like Imitatio Christi, aims 
to generate effects in the world through achieving a substantive union between the 
imitator and the imitated.  
The place of various imitative practices of dying in a larger tradition of ars 
moriendi changes between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. But the 
representation of these changes in Richard II demonstrates the continuing vitality of 
homiletic traditions and the importance of their concerns into late sixteenth century 
and within spheres such as the theater commonly thought of as secular in their 
outlook. The productively anachronistic and untimely ways in which Shakespeare, 
for one, draws on various embodied models for dying well or badly implies that 
change is not only marked by rejection or mournful nostalgia for what is lost but 
also by awareness of scarcely acknowledgeable continuities. Moreover, continuities 
can allow playwrights to rework traditional models in unexpected contexts so as to 
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respond to social and political changes. In the next chapter, I shall look further at 
some of these opportunities by considering how Ben Jonson’s Volpone attempts to 
decouple a practice of dying from the biological process of dying in order to shore 
up an autonomous identity in the face of community encroachment. 
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“THIS IS CALLED MORTIFYING OF A FOX:” VOLPONE, COMMUNITY THEATER, 





Why does Volpone pretend to be dying? In a way, the answer is obvious: he 
wants to make a profit. From the beginning of the play, Volpone is marked as 
avaricious; his first action is to worship his gold as a saint. When he counterfeits 
dying, he evokes a long tradition of literary misers who extract gifts from Legacy 
Hunters and promise them inheritances in return.1 So far, so conventional. However, 
Volpone himself cautions us against explaining his motivation so simply. Both he 
and Mosca note the ready availability of other means to make money, which stand in 
distinction to the particularity of their practice. Volpone insists that he gains “No 
common way,”  while Mosca specifically distinguishes Volpone’s scam from the 
actions of usurers, who “devour /Soft prodigals” or “tear forth the fathers of poor 
families /Out of their beds, and coffin them, alive /In some kind, clasping prison, 
where their bones /May be forthcoming when the flesh is rotten.”2  In distinction to 
a common way understood as trading in the actual or simulated death of others, 
Volpone chooses to trade in the death of the self.3 Therefore Volpone, in his own 
presentation at least, exemplifies avarice of a specific and unusual form, cultivated 
for a specific and unusual purpose. His behavior, I argue, constitutes an attempt to 
use economic mechanisms to reshape conventional relationships between the 
individual and the community. His success in exploiting his own death for material 
gain reveals tensions and fault lines within traditional models of sociality. And 
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Jonson’s play then considers what alternative forms of social organization could 
accommodate such venture and speculation.  
Volpone’s actions are motivated by a radically anti-social sensibility. He 
demonstrates a desire to undercut established understandings of communal 
existence because he associates assumption into community with assumption into 
non-being and ultimately with death. His words and actions reflect an 
understanding of community obligations as a threat to individual identity. To avoid 
these obligations, Volpone perverts traditional understandings of the deathbed as a 
communal endeavor, and of inheritance as the perpetuation of dynastic identity. By 
imitating a dying man, he takes the very situation he fears and refigures it as a 
willed act through which he can affirm separation and autonomy, and his 
acquisition of money becomes a marker of the success of this project. Volpone 
rejects community in order to profit privately, but he also profits privately in order 
to reject the community.  
The court scenes where the fraud is finally unmasked and Volpone and the 
legacy hunters are punished, depict an attempt by the state to harness the 
destructive forces unleashed by Volpone’s exploitation of his death. By the end of 
the play, Volpone’s fate has been determined through a judicial process based on 
assumptions about the relationship between the individual, property and society 
fundamentally different to those underpinning the traditional deathbed community. 
The Avocatori hand down judgments concerned with the identification of 
miscreants’ social statuses, and inflict punishments that will force them to conform 
to pre-existing norms. The project of dying as an individual, in a way that inhabits a 
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communal model of the deathbed, but also resists and invalidates its judgments so 
as to claim personal ownership of that death, has been rendered impossible. Instead, 
an impersonal authority imposes generalized standards that ratify, and are ratified 
by, centralized institutions.  
However, these institutions do not seek simply to neutralize Volpone’s 
earlier challenge to commonality, but instead aim to extend and exploit it. The court 
confiscates Volpone’s “substance” to support the public Hospital of the Incurabili, 
and Volpone himself is confined in a prison in an indefinite posture of 
“mortification.” His dying comes under state control. Ultimately, the nexus between 
property, individuality and dying which Volpone strives to exploit in the deathbed 
scenes, along with the responses of the Avocatori, figure some distinctive aspects of 
an emergent modern public sphere.  Volpone may start by denying that he 
participates in the common way, by the end of the play, his actions have come to 
emblematize of the style of thinking that will inaugurate new public forms of 
political, social and economic organization.4 At the same time, though, Volpone 
relies on practices and assumptions from the traditional deathbed to ground his 
fraud, and these persist in modified form even in the final settlement. This 
persistence should encourage us to reassess both the role of traditional devotional 
practices in constituting modernity, and the extent to which religious practices 
condition ostensibly secular understandings of individual and collective agency. 
Volpone describes his behavior as “playing,” and could therefore be seen as 
unmasking the ars moriendi as mere performance, as a type of histrionic self-
fashioning that has no necessary spiritual content and is easily impersonated. 
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However, as I show, Jonson actually uses the similarity between the art of dying and 
the art of acting to think critically about the nature of human action, and about the 
distinction between being and doing when activity is reduced to a barely perceptible 
level. The play is less concerned with condemning morally dubious mimetic 
deception than with exploring the nature of a selfhood that understands itself 
through its ability to mimetically deceive. Volpone’s fraud should therefore 
encourage us to complicate ways in which Jonson has been characterized as “anti-
theatrical.”5 Within the play’s depiction of counterfeited dying and enforced 
mortification, an ethical critique of Volpone’s deception and avarice exists alongside 
a more exploratory investigation of the nature of dramatic performance, and of how 
the embodied impersonation of the actor, the author’s words and the judgment of 
the audience come together in the commercial theater. 
I. 
To appreciate the anti-social nature of Volpone’s fraud, it is necessary to 
understand what the good, communal deathbed was supposed to look like. A well-
established theological and devotional tradition asserts that a shared experience of 
Christian death generates communal bonds and communal benefits. As I mentioned 
in the previous chapter, for Paul, the Christian community is founded on the dying 
body of Christ since the crucifixion overwrites the inevitability of sin’s leading to 
death under the law with a new understanding of dying that promises eternal life to 
those who have faith (“For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life, 
through Jesus Christ our Lord.”6 When he calls for Christians to be “planted with 
[Christ] to the similitude of his death,” so that can also share “the similitude of his 
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resurrection,” Paul suggests a community that is joined together by witnessing and 
participating in a shared experience of dying well.7 Similarly, Augustine uses the 
unique relation that Christians have to death on account of grace as a way of 
defining the membership of the City of God,8 and characterizes his fellow Christians 
as those who are “consortium mortalitatis meae” [partners in mortality with me].9  
John Donne’s Devotions upon Emergent Occasions indicates how a theological 
association between dying and community influenced representations and 
understandings of the deathbed in the early seventeenth century. In Expostulation 
17, Donne, lying on his sickbed and hearing a bell tolling for an unknown man, 
praises God for making “him for whom this bell tolls, now in this dimnesse of his 
sight, to become a superintendent, an overseer, a Bishop, to as many as heare his 
voice, in this bell.”10 The process of dying as a Christian becomes an inspiration and 
object of contemplation for other nearby Christians as a community is brought into 
being spontaneously by the sonic field of the bell. Moreover, Donne’s 
characterization of the dying man as a “Bishop” implies the existence of a continuum 
between the spontaneous gatherings that happen to assemble around the moriens, 
the formal organization of the established Church and the mystical community of all 
Christians. In Meditation 18, Donne ascribes a place in heaven to the dead man, even 
though he has no knowledge of his character or circumstances, on the basis of his 
“owne Charity; I ask that; & that tels me, He is gone to everlasting rest, and joy, and 
glory: I owe him a good opinion; it is but thankfull charity in mee, because I received 
benefit and instruction from him when his Bell told: and I, being made the fitter to 
pray, by that disposition, wherein I was assisted by his occasion, did pray for him.”11 
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The bell establishes reciprocal postures of care and responsibility. The dying man is 
enabled by God to serve as an informal spiritual leader, while Donne (as an ordained 
minister, an actual leader within the church) prays in return. The interaction 
between Donne and the unknown man is transactional in character, since each gives 
something to the other. But although Donne feels obligated to offer a return for the 
benefits he has received, he does not appear to deplete his own resources by 
praying for his neighbor. This is not a contractual exchange in which both sides gain 
something and lose something, nor does there seem to be any scarcity in the 
economy brought into being by the bell. Rather, the coming together of Donne and 
the dying man around the occasion of the bell tolling creates spiritual value that did 
not previously exist. 
This theological tradition of associating dying and community aligns with 
contemporary expectations of how the deathbed should function in practice. In his 
discussion of medieval attitudes to dying, Eamon Duffy describes the deathbed as “a 
communal effort, in which living friends and relatives and dead patrons and 
intercessors join hands to assist.”12 Though, as I have discussed, the patrons and 
intercessors drop away in a Protestant context, the sense that dying is something 
family and friends do together remains. Early modern artes moriendi, and other 
texts discussing expected or actual behavior in the face of death, generally assume, 
or try to simulate, the presence of attendants at the deathbed.13 In this homiletic 
tradition, as in Donne’s Devotions, the deathbed community is often understood as 
extending benefits to witnesses as well as the moriens.14 Thomas Becon’s extremely 
popular 1561 puritan text The Sicke Mans Salve makes this reciprocity explicit.15 The 
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Salve takes the form of a dialogue and opens with a gathering of neighbors, who 
discuss the sickness of their friend, Epaphroditus, and set out to visit him as an act 
of charity, “one of those workes which being done in the fayth of Christ shal be 
rewarded at the last day in the face of the whole world.”16 The text depicts these 
attendants comforting Epaphroditus and helping him to resist temptation through 
scriptural example and personalized advice based on their prior knowledge of his 
character. Concurrently, they also use Epaphroditus’s experiences as occasions for 
spiritual reflection on the brevity of life and the vanity of human aspirations. The 
Salve concludes with Epaphroditus’s death, and one onlooker’s observation “A 
Christen and godly end made hee. God geve us all grace to make the like.”17 
Epaphroditus’s deathbed serves to strengthen bonds within a community of 
believers by instantiating a model of godly behavior that they can aspire to mimic on 
their own deathbeds. In this way, the Salve imagines a spiritual economy similar to 
that instigated by Donne’s bell, but locates it in the long-standing, informal, personal 
relations within an actual group of like-minded Christians.  
The impression that the deathbed generates value for all concerned is 
maintained even when Becon discusses actual economic transactions. One of the 
obligations typically laid upon the moriens, especially in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century artes moriendi, is to disengage from earthly things by settling disputes and 
debts, and by disposing of worldly possessions and offices.18 In the context of a 
Christian will, the transfer of property is supposed to function as a contingent 
marker for a more important transfer of trust and care, for an exhortation to the 
beneficiary to mirror the moriens in godliness, and for a denial of the significance of 
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the very thing being handed over.19 All this is evident in Becon’s Salve when 
Epaphroditus makes the following provisions for his wife: 
Yea, forasmuch as God hath blessed me with worldly substance, & she is mine 
own fleshe, and whatsoever provideth not for hys hath denied the fayth, and 
is worse then an infidel, I bequeth and geve unto her for terme of her life this 
house wherein I now dwel, with the appertenaunces, and all the housholde 
stuffe contained therin [1 Tim 5]… Let this suffise for my wives portion, 
whom I doubt not God wyll take into his protection, & so provide for her in 
the time of her short pilgrimage that she shall want no good thing. Only I 
crave this at her hand, that she be diligent in training up my children in the 
feare & doctrine of the Lord. So shall God be unto her an husband, & to her 
children a father.20 
Epaphroditus is disposing of a significant amount of property, but is doubly 
insulated from having any economic intentionality with regard to it. First, his 
religious obligation to care for his dependents is rendered equivalent to the entire 
practice of faith and so loses all specificity as an actual financial transaction. Second, 
his claim that God will provide denies that wife’s material support is actually in 
question here. Instead, the bequest becomes aligned with the assumption of 
Epaphroditus’s bereaved family into a universal Christian community through union 
with God.  
We can identify a similar understanding of deathbed and will as affirming 
and strengthening community in avowedly secular contexts.21 One prominent area 
of legal contention during this period was the creation of perpetuities. Perpetuities 
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are conditional clauses in property conveyances used by landowners to control the 
ownership and use of their land, and also the behavior of their heirs, beyond their 
own deaths. Typically the motive behind early modern perpetuities was dynastic. 
Landowners sought to ensure that the title of head of the family and the property 
attaching to the family remained together in the hands of someone worthy of 
inheriting their status.22 As in Epaphroditus’s will, material property was 
understood to function as a signifier for expressions of love and for the perpetuation 
of a family identity. 
However, when real money is involved, it is easy to see how these 
understandings of the communal deathbed could prove inadequate. Epaphroditus 
risks looking simply hypocritical when he outlines a settlement for his daughters 
saying, “If they be godly brought up, I doubt not, but if they live, God will 
aboundantly provide for them. Notwithstanding I geue unto ech of them 200 
poundes of good and lawfull money to be paid in the day of their marriage.”23 
Perpetuities emerge as an issue precisely because they were so frequently litigated 
by plaintiffs seeking to decouple family identity and the material property being 
used to signify its perpetuation. Moreover, the terms in which the law reports 
discuss these disputes indicate that at least some contemporary commentators 
linked the issue of perpetuities to fundamental political and economic questions 
about the place of property in society. Edward Coke, one of the most prominent 
opponents of perpetuities, celebrates the judgment in Mary Portington’s Case, in 
which a class of perpetuities was invalidated, by saying “the commonwealth 
rejoiced, that fettered freeholds and inheritances were set at liberty, and many and 
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manifold inconveniences to the head and all the members of the commonwealth 
thereby avoided.”24 Coke advocates making real property more easily alienable with 
the consequence that it could more easily become an object of business deals and 
speculation.25 
But although Coke here is easy to align with a proto-liberal sensibility, and 
although the limitations upon perpetuities did increase over time, this trend cannot 
be understood as a simple, linear movement from status to contract, or from 
feudalism to a market economy.26 Coke made his name in Shelley’s Case, where a 
complex family settlement that would have created a perpetuity was invalidated on 
the grounds that a clause that devised property to a person “and his heirs” was 
equivalent to devising it in fee-simple, or without any restrictions.27 Coke 
champions an ideal of unfettered freeholds and argues for the invalidation of 
complex family settlements, but he does so by exploiting an ambiguity in the 
concept of an heir. In Coke’s interpretation, a person’s heirs are simultaneously to 
be chosen entirely at his own discretion and equivalent to himself. To name an heir 
is both to institute a contractual relation and to effect a transfer of status founded on 
an intimacy that almost rises to identity. The different understandings of 
inheritance we find superimposed in the religious understanding of the communal 
deathbed have an analogue even in the purely secular context of the law reports.  
II. 
Jonson appears suspicious of common understandings of communal 
deathbeds and the arts of dying. Twice, the playwright refers to The Sicke Mans Salve 
in a manner that suggests he is uncomfortable with how it imagines and sustains 
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group identity. In Epicene, while the School of Ladies is looking for a text to read to 
Morose that might alleviate his afflictions, Lady Haughty recalls that her maid 
Trusty’s “father and mother were both mad, when they put her to me… And one of 
them, I know not which, was cur'd with the Sick Man's Salve; and the other with 
Green's Groat's-worth of Wit.”28 As evidence of the text’s efficacy, she calls on Trusty, 
who confirms that every night her parents “read themselves asleep on those 
books.”29 Jonson alludes to The Sicke Man’s Salve again in Eastward Ho, when the 
newly penitent Quicksilver is described by his jailor as able to “tell you almost all 
the stories of the Book of Martyrs, and speak you all the Sick Man's Salve without 
book.”30  
There are a number of commonalities between how the Salve functions in 
Epicene and in Eastward Ho. First, in each of the two plays, the Salve is paired with 
another popular text advocating moral reformation (and in the case of Eastward Ho, 
with another text canonical for reform-minded Protestants). Rather than paying 
attention to the specific content of Becon’s dialogue, or the advice it gives about how 
to die, Jonson focuses on the role that reading it has in signaling membership in a 
devout community defined through familiarity with a particular set of texts. 
Moreover he intimates that the integration of individuals into such communities 
through texts can be constrictive and coercive. Trusty’s parents are undergoing 
treatment for insanity; Quicksilver is confined and threatened with execution and 
therefore has externally imposed reasons to enact repentance. Second, in both 
instances, Jonson credits the Salve with heavily ironized, but real, redemptive 
powers – only in a social register rather than the spiritual one assumed by Becon. 
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Trusty’s parents are actually cured of madness, if only by the soporific nature of the 
tracts they read and a quasi-magical understanding of the book as a totemic object. 
Quicksilver’s repentance, if suspiciously self-interested and easily arrived at, is 
sustained until the end of the play and does finally win him mercy and a stay of 
execution. The efficacy of the tract is in some sense real, and tied to the way in 
which it enables those who read it to act like members of recognizable puritan 
groups. Finally, the utility of the Salve is linked to imperfect mimicry. By falling 
asleep, Trusty’s parents enact the loss of consciousness of dying. Quicksilver, 
speaking the words of The Sicke Man’s Salve “without book,” turns Becon’s dialogic 
work into an actual piece of theater. As a result, questions about the nature and 
value of religious communities created through particular texts shade into questions 
about the nature and value of artistic, and especially dramatic, production. 
Dennis Kezar draws on these examples to argue that Jonson distrusts the 
artes moriendi for encouraging forms of insincere self-fashioning that are exemplary 
of “the pervasive histrionics of his culture,” and that his skeptical allusions to the 
Salve reflect his more general suspicion of theatricality and socially constructed 
identity.31 While I think that Kezar is right to note that Jonson’s references to the 
practices of dying show a concern with the hypocritical performance of death, he is 
misleading in the way in which he ties this to the fashioning of the self. The 
constrictive uses to which the Salve is put in Epicene and Eastward Ho imply that 
hypocrisy is visible at a more general social level, as the moriens is attenuated and 
forcibly subsumed into a community that controls what its death can look like and 
what it can signify. There may be intimations of a purely personal insincerity, 
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especially in the case of Quicksilver, but the dominant use of the Salve is as a form of 
social control or as a way of signaling submission to a particular communal 
perspective. This impression is intensified by the fact that the instances of 
Quicksilver and Trusty’s parents drawing on the Salve are reported rather than 
seen. There are no selves onstage; the characters’ performances of dying exist only 
as publically expressed approval of their conformity. 
Allusions to Becon in the London comedies primarily support a satire of 
Puritan pietistic affectation. Jonson is most interested showing in how particular, 
identifiable social groups use conventional notions of the good death to exert social 
control. These particular satirical targets, and the precise cultural practices of dying 
appropriate to this London milieu, have little relevance in the Venetian setting of 
Volpone.32 Instead, Jonson in this play explores a more constitutive aspect of the 
Christian model of a good death – the notion that the deathbed generates social and 
spiritual value through the affirmation of communal bonds – and in doing so, 
suggests that the link made in Epicene and Eastward Ho between dissolution of the 
self into the social and into nonbeing is not purely contingent. There may be deeper 
reasons why the deathbed appears such an effective site of social control.  
Volpone’s private recreation evokes a fantasy in which death and community 
are linked together, and rejecting one is equivalent to rejecting the other. His 
preferred companions are a dwarf, a eunuch and a hermaphroditic fool, whose sung 
interludes are generically related to the anti-masque, and so to an impulse towards 
anti-sociality. The three are alike only in being definitionally unalike, all marked 
physically as abnormal and so united by their status as grotesques.33 Mosca tells 
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Corvino that all three are Volpone’s disinherited bastards, “begot on beggars 
/Gypsies, and Jews, and blackmoors, when he was drunk/ …but he has giv’n ‘em 
nothing” (1.5.44-49). His claim brings the trio into a wider class of the excluded 
existing within and against European, Christian society, and in particular links them 
to nearly contemporaneous Shakespearean representations of Venetian social 
others in The Merchant of Venice and Othello. Two of the three are presumably 
sterile, and when Nano and Castrato sing that “Your fool he is your great man’s 
dearling, /And your lady’s sport and pleasure; tongue and bauble are his treasure” 
(1.2.71-3), their relationship to Volpone takes on an erotic dimension.34 As a 
consequence, Nano, Androgyno and Castrone are associated not just with social, 
economic and religious exclusion, but also with non-reproductive modes of 
existence and with relations between generations that stand in direct opposition to 
the notion of a legacy as a way of cementing a dynastic lineage or a family identity. 
They oppose biological change and death by at once incestuously superimposing 
generational positions and denying passage between generations through 
inheritance. They are a paradoxical, impossible community of everything that is 
anti-communal, and through them anti-sociality becomes associated with the 
evasion of death.  
On their first appearance, Nano and Androgyno perform for Volpone’s 
entertainment an interlude, modeled on Lucian’s The Cock, that recounts the 
metempsychosis of Pythagoras’s soul through a variety of humans and animals until 
it comes to rest in Androgyno’s body. In the interlude, as in The Cock, the soul moves 
through a number of religious and philosophical groups defined by their beliefs and 
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their adherence to behavioral and dietary restrictions, and then breaks these 
restrictions in its subsequent incarnations.35 The soul’s survival and persistence 
across time is directly associated with its transcendence of communal identities – 
and the mechanism that allows such persistence and such transcendence to occur is 
drama. The interlude is carefully set off as a play within the play, and Volpone 
responds to it as a “very, very pretty” fantasy (1.2.63). His behavior in the first half 
of the play shows him attempting to bring that fantasy into reality through 
manipulation of his deathbed.  
Volpone’s initial description of his position indicates that, for him, the 
communal deathbed emblematizes the near relation between forms of collective 
existence and death: 
I have no wife, no parent, child, ally  
 To give my substance to; but whom I make 
 Must be my heir: and this makes men observe me.  
 This draws new clients, daily, to my house, 
 Women and men, of every sex and age,  
 That bring me presents, send me plate, coin, jewels, 
 With hope that when I die (which they expect 
 Each greedy minute) it shall then return  
 Tenfold upon them; whilst some, covetous 
 Above the rest, seek to engross me whole, 
 And counterwork the one unto the other, 
Contend in gifts, as they would seem in love:  
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All which I suffer, playing with their hopes, 
And am content to coin ’em into profit,  
And look upon their kindness, and take more, 
And look on that; still bearing them in hand,  
Letting the cherry knock against their lips, 
And draw it by their mouths, and back again. (1.1.73-90) 
Volpone opens by describing a hypothetical set of natural inheritors defined 
through objective, pre-existing and intimate relations to the dying person, and then 
contrasts them to the heir that he will “make.” He emphasizes his right to choose 
where his property will go independently from existing ties of family and friendship. 
But by focusing on the title “heir” rather than the action of economic transfer, he 
acknowledges that writing a will is commonly understood as a transfer of status. In 
this context, his description of his wealth as “my substance” is important because it 
suggests the consequences such a transfer has for the original owner. The phrase 
recalls the Roman legal sense of the word substantia, signifying “the entire property 
of a person… or… an inheritance as a whole,” and so carries a primary sense of 
Volpone’s material possessions. 36  Yet it also suggests Volpone’s actual physical 
body, and so indicates that naming an heir is paradigmatically the ratification of a 
familial sharing of substance in the form of biological inheritance. Additionally, the 
word evokes the Eucharist and therefore the Pauline notion of community based on 
participation in the Passion. Though Volpone stresses his autonomy in choosing an 
heir, it nevertheless appears that by bequeathing his substance, he will lock himself 
into a particular set of interpersonal relations which entail that his self is not 
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entirely his own, but part of a lineage and a Christian community. Volpone’s claim 
that the legacy hunters “seek to engross me whole” further elides the distinction 
between his money and his person, and, with a suggestion of cannibalism that again 
could be taken as implicitly eucharistic, indicates the degree to which naming an 
heir and participating in a communal deathbed threaten him with a loss of self.37 
Volpone’s lack of a natural heir throws open the question of how communal 
and familial associations can be created. Instead of a wife, parent, child or ally, 
Volpone is visited by an indiscriminate collection of “Women and men, of every sex 
and age,” all of whom hope to become his heir through “their kindness” (1.1.87) – 
that is, through an expression of care that models itself on relations between kin and 
on Christian conceptions of charity. Yet the Legacy Hunters’ gifts show they 
ultimately share Volpone’s complex understanding of his substance and wish to 
exploit the slippages between the word’s various connotations. By presenting 
offerings to Volpone, they hope to be brought into a relationship of virtual kinship as 
his heir. Their kindness, however, is no more than a cover for an investment that 
they expect to “return /Tenfold.” Significantly, the phrase recalls Matthew 19:29, 
“And whosoever shall forsake houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or 
wife, or children, or lands, for my Name’s sake, he shall receive a hundredfold more, 
and shall inherit everlasting life.” By taking the scriptural precedent literally 
(several legacy hunters do disavow family members for Volpone’s sake), they in a 
sense do the opposite of Epaphroditus. Where Becon’s sick man metaphorizes his 
bequests as signs of his faith and of the extension of Christian community to his 
family and friends, Volpone and the legacy hunters materialize biblical precedent as 
 143 
   
economic exchange. They undermine the notion of the good death, not by overtly 
rejecting it, but by applying the precepts appropriate to it in strictly earthly terms 
under conditions of scarcity. 
The legacy hunters’ actions can also help us to understand where this 
scarcity comes from. The reasoning behind their gifts has been extensively 
discussed by Katherine Eisaman Maus. Maus contrasts Seneca’s insistence in De 
beneficiis that the material gift is a mere signifier for the more important gift-giving 
intention with Marcel Mauss’s claim that in archaic gift-giving societies, gifts entail 
an obligation to reciprocate. She argues that Volpone is exploiting “gift-giving’s big 
loophole: the giving of gifts seems to necessitate a response, but there is apparently 
no way to compel that response to occur.”38 The Legacy Hunters can delude 
themselves that Volpone has an inescapable obligation to make a return – but to 
attempt to raise that obligation to the formality of contract would be to stop the gift 
from functioning as a symbol of love.  
But what Maus does not consider is what happens when these unequal gift 
exchanges between two people are located in a larger economic and social context.39 
Volpone emphasizes the number of people who come to see him and discusses their 
relations to each other. By giving gifts, the legacy hunters do not only woo Volpone; 
they also “counterwork the one unto another,” and their aggregate effect needs to be 
considered. The insistent expressions of love they offer to Volpone may reflect 
characterizations of the communal good deathbed as a shared experience where all 
work together and all gain together. However, the material benefits that are also 
being transferred at Volpone’s bedside, and that are Volpone and the Legacy 
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Hunters’ true focus, flow differently, in a way that reflects (and, yet again, literalizes 
by interpreting in material terms) the despairing underside of a practice of imitatio 
Christi: Christ’s sacrifice creates an unpayable debt that demands servicing through 
imitative reciprocation but that can never be discharged.40  
We learn from Mosca that Volpone knows “the use of riches” (1.1.62) and 
spends his gains freely, so that the gifts the Legacy Hunters make to him never 
accrue into an investment for the eventual heir, but are instead wasted. Rather than 
being bound together as at a traditional deathbed by the opportunity for limitless 
benefits, the Legacy Hunters are united in a community of gift-givers by limitless 
obligations. Their recognition of one another as competitors is precisely what keeps 
their obligations open-ended; they need to keep giving so as not to be outdone. 
Volpone emphasizes the tantalizing nature of his practice when he describes “still 
bearing them in hand /Letting the cherry knock against their lips /And draw it by 
their mouths, and back again” (1.1.88-90). Yet Volpone himself, however much he 
tries to elide the fact by emphasizing his control of the fraud, is caught in the same 
pattern. The Legacy Hunters are attracted to him for a reason. His mortality is 
inescapable, and ultimately his substance will have to be passed on to somebody. 
Maus’s reading of the dynamic of the gifts in Volpone, as intimating obligation 
without becoming contract, holds true for each individual gift but needs to be 
qualified by recognition of a wider gift economy in which obligations entirely eclipse 
benefits. 
In view of this dynamic, a more suggestive model than Seneca’s and Mauss’s 
for the Legacy Hunters’ gifts and the situation of Volpone’s deathbed can be found in 
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Roberto Esposito’s work on community. In order to define what community is, 
Esposito unpacks the etymology of the Latin word communitas, and notes that 
munus refers to a particular sort of obligation, “the gift that one gives because one 
must give… only the gift that one gives, not what one receives.”41 Rather than a res 
publica – that is, a public thing that individuals own collectively – Esposito presents 
community as an unfillable void that threatens an individual’s sense of self because 
there is no clear limit to the extent or nature of the munus. Members owe the 
community not only defined goods or services, but even their very being as 
individuals.42 The open-ended nature of this obligation means that ultimately, “the 
communitas carries within it a gift of death.”43  
Volpone’s account of the communal deathbed, where assumption into the 
community and assumption into nonbeing are made equivalent, emblematizes a 
very similar understanding.  Moreover, it raises questions about how exactly the 
existential and material obligations Esposito discusses relate to each other, if and 
when they can be separated, and which has priority. I see Volpone’s counterfeit as 
an attempt to neutralize the threat the deathbed represents – as what Esposito 
would call an immunitarian response through which Volpone seeks dispensation 
from his debts to others. In Volpone’s speech, as in Epaphroditus’s will in The Sicke 
Man’s Salve, the flow of economic goods tracks the flow of more figurative and 
existential conceptions of the munus. When Volpone describes the legacy hunters, as 
I have shown, he evokes the Christian deathbed and familial inheritance ironically, 
and suggests that they are covers for economic self-interest. The transfer of 
property is what matters and everything else is just obfuscation. However, in trying 
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to separate himself from the community, Volpone in effect follows Epaphroditus in 
treating money as a signifier for other obligations. Volpone’s reaction to the interest 
the Legacy Hunters show in him is to try to privatize his death, to take the very thing 
that threatens to destroy his self and refigure it as a willed action undertaken for his 
own exclusive gain. Volpone undermines the deathbed community by profiting from 
it in order to satisfy his own avarice. But at the same time, he cultivates avarice as a 
way of separating himself from the community.  
After laying out the reasons for the Legacy Hunters’ interest in him and the 
nature of their attentions, Volpone remarks “All which I suffer, playing with their 
hopes, /And am content to coin ’em into profit” (1.1.85-86). To suffer is to be in a 
passive state, subject to the predations of external forces. However, Volpone 
immediately recasts this suffering as “playing,” and so as something that is under his 
control and reflecting his own skillfulness. By understanding what looks like 
passivity as a form of activity, he justifies coining the Legacy Hunters into profit for 
himself. It is worth thinking carefully about exactly what this activity is. The word 
“playing” signals that his behavior has something to do with acting.  
To say that Volpone resembles an actor is not to say anything new. A number 
of critics have discussed the character’s histrionic nature.44 Often these readings 
align with Jonah Barish’s diagnosis of Jonson’s “anti-theatricality,” and assume that 
this dimension of Volpone’s character grounds an ethical critique of mimesis, where 
the protean figure of the actor is suspicious because it lacks a core moral self.45 This 
reading is very plausible in the scenes involving Celia, where Volpone’s interest in 
impersonation is aligned with his interest in sexual assault.46 However, I want to 
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focus on the fact that Volpone’s most longstanding imitation of the dying man sits 
oddly with this analysis and implies a more complex attitude to dramatic 
impersonation. Through Volpone’s fraud, Jonson draws an analogy between arts of 
dying and arts of acting, but his main interest is not in unmasking histrionic 
counterfeit. In fact, the parallel points more emphatically to two quite different 
things. First, thinking about what people are doing when they are dying helps us 
think about what actors are doing onstage. And, second, the thing that actors are 
doing can be understood as an immunitarian activity that substantiates a core, 
inviolable self. This sort of immunitarian activity, moreover, may be portable to 
other contexts. Understanding dying as an actorly practice signifies not so much 
denying the existence of biological limitations to human agency, as looking for ways 
to understand and exercise human agency through biological limitations. As a result, 
Volpone’s fraud anticipates later understandings of possessive individualism – that 
is, beliefs that personal security and individual rights are grounded in ownership of 
the body and of material property accrued through its actions.47  
Barish identifies two core complaints behind Jonson’s anti-theatrical 
pronouncements: first, dramatic action promotes spectacle over words, and second, 
mimesis is hard to distinguish from lying.48 But the impersonation of someone 
moribund, precisely because it is so minimal, can stand for acting in the purest sense 
– a sort of zero degree acting – in a way that complicates these objections. To start 
with spectacle: through Volpone’s imitation of dying man, Jonson creates a form of 
performance that in one sense is purely spectacular, since it is largely non-verbal, 
but in another sense, because of its minimalism, explores the limits of how far a 
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performance can efface itself while still functioning as a performance. We see this 
when Corvino, who has been discussing Volpone’s imminent demise with Mosca, 
worries that Volpone may have overheard them. Mosca demonstrates his patron’s 
insensibility and nearness to death by shouting insults in Volpone’s ear: 
Would you would once close 
 Those filthy eyes of yours, that flow with slime 
 Like two frog-pits, and those same hanging cheeks, 
 Covered with hide instead of skin—[To Corvino.] Nay, help sir— 
That look like frozen dishclouts set on end! (1.5.56-60) 
Though the primary function of Mosca’s words is to reassure Corvino, they also 
obliquely compliment Volpone on the success of his spectacular impersonation, his 
achievement of suitably filthy eyes and hanging cheeks. Simultaneously, though, the 
speech underscores the degree to which Volpone’s ability to maintain his body in a 
posture of inactivity is crucial to the fraud.  Mosca’s words are effective only if 
Volpone sustains them by not reacting. From one point of view, it does not matter 
what Mosca actually says, because the purpose of his words is to demonstrate that 
Volpone is insensible. In consequence, they draw attention to the self-control that 
Volpone is exerting by refusing to react to provocation and to the fact that his 
posture of inactivity is a piece of acting. When discussing his fraud, Volpone 
frequently emphasizes the effort it takes him to impersonate inactivity. As soon as 
another Legacy Hunter, Corbaccio, leaves his bedside, Volpone exclaims “O, I shall 
burst! /Let out my sides,” so indicating the difficulty with which he has maintained 
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his posture (1.4.133-34). Pretending to die, for Volpone, involves putting on a 
spectacle of the unspectacular.49 
Equally, Volpone’s performance of dying is initially purely duplicitous. But it 
always has the potential to become reality, not because Volpone might choose to 
abandon mimesis, but because he might unwillingly be made to conform to what he 
has been representing– and his onstage and offstage audiences might not even 
recognize a change had taken place. This emerges from Volpone’s account of his first 
appearance in court when his prone, seemingly insensible, body is brought before 
the judges as evidence that he could not have assaulted Celia. For the theater 
audience, this performance of incapacity looks almost identical to Volpone’s earlier 
performance for Corvino. Yet on his return to his house, Volpone observes that 
“’Fore God, my left leg ‘gan to have the cramp, /And I appre’nded straight some 
power had struck me with a dead palsy” (5.1.5-7). We belatedly learn that some 
aspects of Volpone’s performance had an entirely non-mimetic significance for him. 
We have not only been watching an imitation of a sick man, but someone who might 
be becoming sick.  
In view of all this, I suggest that Volpone’s impersonated art of dying 
represents the full positive and negative potential of embodied, actorly, theatrical 
performance distinct from poetic text or authorial voice, and it is the nature of this 
performance that allows it to function as an immunitary response. The actorly effort 
involved in maintaining his bodily substance in a posture that is inactive, yet 
mimetic, is Volpone’s self-justification for coining the legacy hunters. In a sense, he 
conceives of it as a form of work that entitles him to profit. Moreover, the cultivation 
 150 
   
of inactivity also functions to immunize him from the community because it affirms 
that he has control over this substance and can prevent the community’s 
encroachment upon it. A practise of dying modeled on acting (or vice versa) 
becomes less concerned with feigning a new identity than with affirming an agential 
self that is able to feign identities. To say this is not to deny that Jonson has an 
ethical critique of Volpone’s avarice and duplicity. But alongside that critique exists 
a more speculative investigation of the practices that enable his avarice and 
duplicity.  
Esposito in Communitas considers the sustained cultivation of immunity to 
be a particular feature of the modern era.50 And following his lead, we might read 
Volpone’s rejection of tradition in the form of Christian and familial deathbed 
communities as an indication of his alignment with modernity. I have already noted 
that Volpone’s fraud depends on an understanding of possessive individualism, and 
on a continuum between his person and his economic substance. If we focus on 
Volpone’s recasting of the deathbed community in an exclusively economic light, it 
is tempting to link him to emergent understandings of ownership as a safeguard of 
personal integrity.51 Volpone, perhaps, embodies an unusually early manifestation 
of just such a capitalistic sensibility. 
However, my discussion of Volpone’s counterfeit has also demonstrated the 
extent to which his attack on the notion of the good death at the communal 
deathbed continues to inhabit the practices of the good death at the communal 
deathbed – not just through cynical, parodic imitation, but through the 
appropriation of representational and behavioral strategies appropriate to it. 
 151 
   
Volpone begins by subordinating other understandings of deathbed behavior to the 
flow of money, in a way that implies his project is one of demystification, and that 
the only material reality in play is an economic one. Yet in carrying out the 
counterfeit, he appropriates the conception of dying as an effortful action, along 
with the sense that different forms of spiritual, familial and economic inheritance 
can be made to track and signify one another, to justify his profit from the legacy 
hunters. This behavior reveals a far deeper homology with practices of dying well, 
and renders the question of which register of discourse he is attempting to control 
more open. In consequence, Volpone should encourage us to be more cautious about 
linking given postures to modernity as such. The plays shows traditional religious 
attitudes persisting in dialogue with secular ones, rather than giving ground to 
secular modernity, or being reappropriated for secular purposes. 
III. 
The ending of the play affirms the open-ended nature of this dialogue by 
showing devotional practices, economic activities, and secular institutions 
continuing to respond to and reshape one another. The Avocatori discover the fraud 
and hand down punishments to Volpone and the other miscreants for their 
perversion of deathbed forms. In doing so, they replace the traditional deathbed 
community with centralized, status-based and institutional forms of control. Yet 
their settlement reconfigures Volpone’s counterfeit for their own advantage, just as 
his counterfeit reconfigured the traditional communal deathbed. In this process, the 
art of dying well is never entirely superseded, but persists in a modified form.  
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On the surface, Volpone succeeds in manipulating the court during his first 
encounter with it just as comprehensively as he manipulated the Legacy Hunters, 
and by using very similar tactics. The Avocatori are inclined to credit Voltore’s 
account of events because of the pointed display of Volpone’s inactive body, and 
because the Legacy Hunters, who are again placed in a position of having to donate 
competitively to a shared purpose when they offer their testimony. Mosca’s 
comments on the contribution of Voltore – the would-be inheritor who has the 
largest part in the scene and whose “mercenary tongue” (4.5.95) has the most 
evident economic value – emphasize again that the obligations the Legacy Hunters 
are placed under, and the effort they put into fulfilling them, foreclose on any hope 
of return:  
 Now, so truth help me, I must needs say this, sir,  
 And out of conscience, for your advocate: 
 He’s taken pains, in faith, sir, and deserved, 
 In my poor judgement (I speak it under favour, 
 Not to contrary you, sir), very richly— 
 Well—to be cozened. (5.2.42-47) 
The speech is obviously ironic in tone. Mosca’s circumlocutory style, apparently 
revealing his anxiety about speaking truth to power, is simply a set-up for the punch 
line. However, the joke acknowledges a usually unspoken reality. Words and 
phrases with religious connotations (“truth,” “conscience,” “in faith”) recall the basis 
of Volpone’s relation to Voltore in a supposedly Christian community, and so remind 
us of the communal obligations that Volpone is positioning himself against. 
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Consequently, there is a sense in which Mosca’s insistence that Voltore must be 
cozened because of his pains needs to be taken seriously. Volpone’s understanding 
of his separation from any community entails that the more a legacy hunter donates 
to him, the more emphatically Volpone must deny any obligation and must fail to 
reciprocate. Mosca’s words provide a formal account of the principles on which the 
con is built, and suggest that he views the court episode as, in his words, their 
“masterpiece” – an intensification of his and Volpone’s usual practice but entirely 
amenable to it. 
 However, as I noted above, Volpone’s private comments about his 
appearance in court indicate that he does not share Mosca’s sense that nothing has 
changed. The experience has rattled him. His cramp has caused him to doubt his 
ability to maintain mimetic self-difference between his posture and his reality. He 
explains the unpleasant effect the court has had on him by saying “I ne’er was in 
dislike with my disguise /Till this fled moment. Here ’twas good, in private; /But in 
your public—cave whilst I breathe” (5.1.3-4). The key source of Volpone’s 
discomfort is having to appear in a new environment. By emerging into public, 
Volpone exposes himself to a greater level of scrutiny and a larger community than 
in the bedroom scene.52  But, more than that, he also meets with an importantly 
different type of social order, one that stresses fixed institutional and social roles 
over the private and informal cultivation of personal relationships. In the public 
court, power becomes associated with professional and official identity. The 
Avocatori are not named, and even Voltore appears in a new guise as a highly 
competent advocate speaking a professionalized language. Instead of performing for 
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an informal gathering of acquaintances, Volpone is required to expose himself to the 
scrutiny of persons in an official capacity, and the relationship he bears to his 
associates alters under this pressure. Most notably, he starts to collaborate with the 
legacy hunters, from whom he had earlier tried to separate himself, as all come 
together to offer an account of events that will incriminate Celia and Bonario. The 
two levels of hypocrisy Volpone had maintained at his deathbed collapse into a 
single plot to deceive in which the distinction between knaves and gulls is elided. 
Volpone’s earlier manipulation of the community of the deathbed had relied on his 
control of shifting relationships between different economic, religious, social and 
legal discourses, which could be made to signify one another in more or less direct 
ways. In his account of the public court, these different discourses come together in 
a totalizing manner that is not susceptible to control. In Volpone’s fear that his 
cramp is the work of “some power,” the public authority of the court becomes 
aligned with divine sanction and with the inevitability of biological decay. 
Whichever way he looks, his agency is diminished. 
The end of the play justifies Volpone’s apprehension of the court and his 
belief that appearance in public marks a different and less controllable form of 
existence. Volpone’s fears lead directly to his disastrous decision to declare himself 
dead, and this decision leads equally directly to his subsequent uncasing. The 
Avocatori end up in full possession of the facts of the case, and respond by punishing 
the wrongdoers and setting the innocent free. Echoing the association Volpone 
made earlier between public scrutiny and divine justice, the court implies its 
decision is sanctioned by heaven. The first Avocatore exclaims, “The knot is now 
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undone by miracle!” while Bonario notes that “Heaven could not long let such gross 
crimes be hid” (5.12.95-98). The court also associates itself specifically with 
religiously inspired control of the dying when it confines Corbaccio “To the 
monastery of San’ Spirito; /Where, since thou knew’st not how to live well here, 
/Thou shalt be learned to die well” (5.12.131-33). Moreover, this association 
between earthly and heavenly justice may be more than self-aggrandizement. 
Volpone’s punishment forces him to assume a position very like the dead palsy he 
worried about immediately after the first court appearance.53 He will be forced to 
“lie in prison, cramped with irons, /Till thou be’st sick and lame indeed” (5.12.123-
24).  As in his earlier account of his fears, biological vulnerability manifesting itself 
through cramping, the public sphere, and divine justice all work together here to 
constrict and confine Volpone. At the least, there is a consonance between the 
specific manifestation of his fear of heaven and the reality of institutional 
punishment that starts to look like a cosmic irony.  
On the surface, the Avocatori appear to reject Volpone’s bid for autonomy 
through parody and to reinstitute a more conventional good death of the sort that 
Corbaccio will be taught at the monastery of San Spirito. The court demonstrates a 
desire for stable, established social orders in which there is no distinction between 
seeming and being. Their punishments strive to confirm and stabilize social 
hierarchies and the group identities that will support these hierarchies. Volpone and 
especially Mosca, who has “abused the court, /And habit of a gentleman of Venice, 
/Being a fellow of no birth or blood,” are punished for impersonations that confuse 
their class positions (5.12.110-12). The fact that their punishments are 
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differentiated by status, so that the Mosca can be sent to the galleys while Volpone, 
“By blood and rank a gentleman, canst not fall /Under like censure,” suggests that 
the stability of such hierarchies is so important to the Avocatori as to constrict the 
form that justice can take. Voltore, similarly, is guilty of a causing a scandal to 
“worthy men of [his] profession” and consequently is “banished from their 
fellowship” (5.12.127-28). His crime and his punishment are understood in terms of 
his conformity to a professional group with a defined role in Venetian society.  
Yet the essentially conservative nature of the values the Avocatori purport to 
be upholding should not disguise important differences between the expectations of 
the good communal deathbed that Volpone exploits in the earlier part of the play 
and the understandings of community implicit in the judgments of the court. As 
Volpone recognizes, what we see here is a movement from the private sphere to the 
public. Because Volpone can successfully counterfeit a moriens, and in doing so 
reveals weaknesses in the informal deathbed community supposed to help him 
achieve a good death, the court looks for a different mechanism to impose practices 
of dying on him and Corbaccio. The Avocatori make no attempt to revive the sense of 
a community that could assemble spontaneously on the basis of shared personal 
knowledge and a desire for mutual care. Instead, they turn to institutions. They 
deliver their judgments as official figures, and link their judicial authority to a wider 
matrix of state and church power when they hand control of the miscreants over to 
the Hospital of the Incurabili, an unnamed prison and the Monastery of San Spirito. 
Personalized, mutually beneficial communities of the deathbed are replaced by 
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anonymous institutions that have the power to cramp, to confine and ultimately to 
mortify Volpone and Corbaccio.54  
To say that the Avocatori possess the authority to force characters to 
conform to fixed identities through a managed practice of dying, and that the play 
even holds open the possibility that this authority is divinely sanctioned, is not to 
say that the Avocatori are themselves valorized as characters. In their deference to 
Mosca when he is still the presumptive heir, they display exactly the same venality 
as the legacy hunters. However, their personal limitations do not compromise the 
effectiveness and validity of the justice they deliver. Indeed, the fact that 
institutional judgment is compatible with personal moral limitations and economic 
self-interest may be exactly what ratifies their authority, and also what links their 
judgment to a broader political philosophy encapsulated in the myth of the Venetian 
republic. The capacity of prescribed political procedure to overcome personal 
interest is a recurring theme in Contarini’s account of the government of Venice.55 
This ability to contain self-interest distinguishes the public, institutional control 
exerted through the court from the moral frameworks created by smaller, 
spontaneous communities that Volpone shows to be so easy to corrupt. 
The Avocatori characterize as criminal Volpone’s treatment of his own death 
as a commodity rather than a spiritual event or the legal transfer of a lineage. But 
instead of reaffirming either traditional spiritual community or the patrilineal 
family, the court implicitly concurs that death has an alienable material value when 
it expropriates Volpone’s “substance” for the benefit of the “hospital of the 
Incurabili” (5.12.119-20). Importantly, the Avocatori use the same word as Volpone 
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himself did in his earlier account of his fraud, and draw on the same confusion 
between his body and his wealth. They then use that substance to replicate the 
postures Volpone adopted on his deathbed. However, where Volpone hoped to 
assert individuality, the Avocatori refigured his behavior in de-individuated, 
institutionalized terms. The money that Volpone has accrued from his imposture is 
to be transferred to a state-endorsed institution dedicated to the management of the 
chronically ill. Contarini lists the Incurabili as one of the “Hospitals within the Citie” 
without describing it in more detail.56 In fact, the hospital was founded in 1522 to 
care for women, primarily (though not exclusively) those suffering from syphilis. 
Though it was not initially sponsored by the state, regulations dating from 1521 
compelled begging incurabili either to enter the hospital or suffer banishment from 
the city.57 Whether Jonson knew more about the hospital than its name is 
uncertain.58 He might, however, have been inspired to evoke a hospital by the 
existence of parallel institutional structures in London. William Ingram notes that 
by the 1570’s, London hospitals had come under the control of the City, which 
supported them in part through fines levied on unauthorized dramatic 
performances.59 At the least, Jonson encourages the audience to recognize a 
resemblance between Volpone’s earlier assumed position of a moriens and the 
positions of the hospital’s patients. In effect, the Avocatori have punished Volpone 
by taking the fruits of his counterfeit, and using them to generate and support more 
declining bodies (his, Corbaccio’s, the incurabili) out of the context of spontaneous 
deathbed communities and under the auspices of the Venetian city authority.  
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The name given to these institutionalized bodies, incurabili, reflects an 
understanding of them strikingly different from conventional representations of the 
moriens on the traditional deathbed, but perhaps more in line with the some of the 
ways Volpone conceives of his own practice as something that grants him 
separation from communal models of care. Rather than defining persons heading 
towards death (morientes), the word incurabili places emphasis on the failure of 
those it designates to progress; they are characterized by the fact that they will not 
become healthy, that they will maintain an indefinite state of unwellness. At the 
same time, if we focus on cura as a term for care with pastoral connotations, we 
could also describe incurabili as those who cannot be cared for. Incurabili stand in 
contradistinction to the moriens at the good Christian deathbed, who becomes a 
focus source of for earthly and heavenly care. Incurabili, like Volpone, are those who 
linger indefinitely in a state of sickness, and because of that lingering become 
confined to institutions, separated from traditional forms of community. 
This resemblance between the Incurabili and Volpone suggests that 
Volpone’s sentence is not just an ironically apt punishment or a convenient way to 
fill state coffers, but is in fact an intervention in a deeper dispute about whether the 
body is, or should be, a site of individual security or institutional power. It is very 
tempting to see judgment of the Avocatori as exemplifying the rise of biopolitics and 
of new forms of governmentality based on the identification and enforcement of 
norms for different social groupings and the forms of discipline specifically focused 
on the health of the body. In particular, it would seem to support Esposito’s 
insistence that the notion of the body politic is not just a metaphor, but speaks to a 
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real co-implication of politics and health.60 Volpone’s status as a magnifico who 
engages in fraud and attempts to undermine social institutions such as marriage, the 
family and inheritance represents a threat the Venetian republic must immunize 
itself against. The Avocatori carry out this immunization by aligning Volpone with a 
group (the incurabili) who have been already marked as physically unhealthy, and 
who have been separated from the city in the institution of the hospital. Yet the way 
in which the Avocatori do so, by simultaneously turning Volpone into someone “sick 
and lame indeed” and relying on his substance as a source of funding for the 
separation of the incurabili, perhaps is indicative of the aporia Esposito notes at the 
heart of his immunitarian strategies. Inoculation requires exposure to infectious 
material; ultimately communitas and immunitas will always presuppose one 
another. 
Volpone’s own response to the sentence, however, attempts to assert agency 
through recourse to figurative language, in a way that suggests some limitations to 
Esposito’s model. On being told that his goods will be seized and he will be confined 
until his illness is real, Volpone observes that “This is called mortifying of a Fox” 
(5.12.125). The multivalent pun on the word “mortifying” evokes, among other 
things, spiritual discipline in preparation for death, a judicially imposed death 
sentence, the process through which rotting flesh decays either before or after 
death, and the tenderizing of meat for consumption.61 Volpone is simultaneously 
alluding to understandings of dying as an event, and as a process that may culminate 
in death, begin after death, or continue through death in a way that denies special 
significance of the moment of death.62 Additionally, he is presenting himself both as 
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an individual with a social and spiritual identity, and as mere matter. Volpone 
through this pun emphasizes the multiplicitly of ways in which his position can be 
described. As in his earlier parody of deathbed behavior, we see an over-layering of 
different sacred, secular and biomedical accounts of dying. Unlike in the earlier 
scenes, though, Volpone here is not attempting to use any particular mode of 
discourse as a cover for another. By highlighting ambiguity about what death is, he 
creates ambiguity about how it captures him. The pun retains an openness, in a way 
that perhaps leaves some space for resistance. Volpone may not be as susceptible to 
insertion into the monitory narrative of the Avocatori as they would hope. He 
resembles Faustus at the end of Marlowe’s play, who, I have argued, shows up 
precisely through his attempted self-effacement, through the fact that none of the 
models of dying he rehearses can provide an adequate script for his death so that 
dying becomes an endless rehearsal of narratives of dying. Perhaps, also, the pun 
suggests that Esposito’s insistence that the body politic and immunity are not just 
metaphors risks passing over an important field of interaction between individuals, 
communities and the state. Esposito emphasizes the totalizing effect of the 
structural equivalence between different immunitarian strategies. Volpone, by 
contrast, retains personal agency in the face of annihilation precisely through 
inhabiting a linguistic and conceptual slippage between different understandings of 
approaches to death. 
IV. 
My discussion to this point has focused on what Volpone is doing on his 
deathbed. I have analyzed the affinities between arts of dying and of acting so as to 
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characterize economies at work behind various social and spiritual practices with 
the hope of tracing the continued influence of arts of dying in supposedly secular 
contexts. However, a metatheatrical turn at the end of the play indicates that 
Jonson’s focus is dual. He wants dying to stand in for acting as much as he wants 
acting to stand in for dying. The epilogue raises questions about what playing of the 
sort that we see in Volpone’s deathbed does to literary communities. What is the 
challenge made to communities of authors, readers and auditors by a practice like 
Volpone’s, and the assumption it encodes that material economies are not 
subordinate to immaterial ones? Can critical and readerly charity survive in the 
commercial theater dependent on such actorly pracitices? What would be the 
literary equivalent of an institutional settlement that would acknowledge, and 
perhaps try to immunize against, the realities of scarcity and of dissolution? 
 Jonson’s prefatory Epistle to Volpone expresses the hope that an appealing 
form of literary community can emerge around the play. Discussing the 
denouement, Jonson claims: 
And though my catastrophe may in the strict rigor of comic law meet with 
censure… I desire the learned and charitable critic to have so much faith in 
me to think it was done of industry; for with what ease I could have varied it 
nearer his scale but that I fear to boast my own faculty, I could here insert. 
But my special aim being to put the snaffle in their mouths that cry out we 
never punish vice in our interludes &c., I took the more liberty; though not 
without some lines of example drawn even in the ancients themselves, the 
goings out of whose comedies are not always joyful, but ofttimes the bawds, 
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the servants, the rivals, yea and the masters are mulcted; and fitly, it being 
the office of a comic poet to imitate justice and instruct to life, as well as 
purity of language or stir up gentle affections. (Epistle 100-12) 
In this appeal to “the learned and charitable critic,” Jonson evokes a community that 
functions along similar lines to the good communal deathbed. Good critics will 
recognize both the rationale behind the catastrophe and Jonson’s control over it 
through their excellence in learning and their charity – that is, through their faith in 
Jonson and willingness based on a charitable understanding of human relations to 
assume that his motives are good. The play is thus an occasion for good critics and 
an industrious playwright to identify, praise and support one another through 
display of their respective virtues. Literary criticism, literary production and charity 
are aligned.  
Though this allusion to charitable critics in the Epistle is passing, it conforms 
to a pattern that occurs repeatedly within Jonson’s lyric poetry. Stanley Fish has 
demonstrated that many of Jonson’s poems in praise of individuals strive to create a 
“community of the same” by asserting that the praiseworthy subject, readers and 
author all share values that are further magnified through the occasion of the poem. 
Significantly, there is no scarcity within these communities, even when the poems 
are in fact celebrating a relationship based on patronage. Fish shows that for Jonson, 
the poetic recognition of identity in itself produces value in a manner that sidesteps 
a zero-sum understanding; the virtues of the both the addressee and the poet 
continuously magnify one another in a manner that makes the poet’s receipt of 
patronage appear a benefit as great to the patron as to the recipient.63 Evidently, 
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Fish’s communities of the same resemble the idealized communal deathbeds I 
discussed earlier in the ways in which they affirm pre-existing moral codes and 
values, strengthen existing bonds within a community, and in doing both those 
things generate value.  
 Within the Epistle, however, the learned and charitable critic is placed in 
opposition to another group, those “that cry out we never punish vice in our 
interludes.” If Jonson hopes to identify a circle constituted by charitable recognition, 
it only shows up in contrast to an opposing circle of antagonists.64 Moreover, a 
linguistic shift over the course of the passage I have quoted implies that Jonson 
struggles to define such a charitable community within the theater as opposed to 
against it. In Jonson’s presentation, the objectors define the works they dislike as 
“interludes;” they conceive of them as performances. Jonson, however, in his 
response emphasizes the textual nature of his practice. Ancient “lines of example” – 
that is, precedents that exist textually – justify his treatment of vice, and in following 
these examples he is acting as a “comic poet” rather than as a creator of plays, and 
certainly rather than as someone responsible for plays in performance. Though he 
holds out hope for the possibility of a positive literary community around Volpone, 
Jonson does not explain how such a community could emerge within the space of 
the theater, as opposed to through the text. Even the appeal to learned and 
charitable critics exists as paratext rather than on stage.65 Consequently, it remains 
unclear from the Epistle how these hypothetical critical communities relate to the 
assembly of author, paid actors and paying auditors at the playhouse.  
 165 
   
The epilogue spoken by Volpone does address these matters more explicitly. 
The speech questions what sort of community or public the theater is, and how it 
relates to judgments of the character of Volpone and his pretense of dying. If acting 
and dying are akin, what sort of theatrical institution could enable an audience to 
condemn the dying for profit represented, while celebrating the acting for profit 
necessary to the representation? The epilogue asks if the audience assents to the 
judgment of the Avocatori: 
The seasoning of a play is the applause. 
Now, though the Fox be punished by the laws, 
He yet doth hope there is no suffering due 
For any fact which he hath done ’gainst you. 
If there be, censure him; here he doubtful stands; 
If not, fare jovially, and clap your hands.  (Epilogue 1-6) 
By using the third person, the speech emphasizes differences between the actor 
speaking and the character he is embodying. We move out of the world of 
representation into what Robert Weimann would label presentation, as Volpone the 
character transforms himself into an actor addressing the audience directly on 
behalf of Volpone the drama.66 Though this metatheatrical register is characteristic 
of epilogues, what is distinctive about Volpone’s speech is how it (in contrast to the 
Epistle) points up differences between ethical and aesthetic judgments of the action. 
Volpone alludes to the legal judgment against him, and he labels himself “the Fox” as 
he did in his discussion of his mortifying. These echoes refer the audience back to 
the court’s sentencing, and ask it to consider how its own position relates to that of 
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the Avocatori. The epilogue encourages us to question the degree to which the 
criminal or moral laws demanding Volpone’s punishment and determining the 
specific mortifying form that punishment should take can be aligned with aesthetic 
judgments.  In drawing together the judgment of the Avocatori, Volpone’s 
characterization of that judgment as “mortifying of a fox,” and the call for audience 
judgment in the epilogue, Jonson asks us to consider how the earlier analogy 
between acting and dying is manifested within a wider, institutional context. A 
consideration of the resemblances between acting and dying is replaced by a 
consideration of the resemblances between theater and mortification.  
Moreover, theater does not only resemble Volpone’s mortification in having 
an institutional character. The epilogue additionally suggests that drama results in 
postures of paralysis that, like Volpone’s pun, are undetermined and maybe 
undeterminable. Volpone’s final speech is cast in a subjunctive mode.67 It does not 
assert that Volpone escapes the laws or audience condemnation; it asks the 
audience to decide whether Volpone escapes the laws, and also to consider the 
ethical implications of joining Jonson in moral censure of Volpone’s crimes while 
enjoying and paying for the performance he has enabled. And what this results in, 
like the court case, is a mortified, and mortifying, state of suspension encompassing 
author, actor and spectators. The speech emphasizes the bodily constraint the end 
of the play puts on the lead actor who “doubtful stands” in front of the audience, and 
then links it through rhyme to the bodily constraint of the auditors during the play, 
who will shortly be released to move freely and, if they choose, to “clap [their] 
hands.” An account of how the organization of the theater relates to the judgment of 
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the Avocatori is deferred, and also made contingent upon the specific exigencies of a 
particular audience and a particular performance. In this way, Jonson deals with 
troubling questions about whether he, as an author economically reliant on actors 
and paying theatergoers, is somehow implicated in the anti-social aspects of 
Volpone’s fraud – not by evading them, but by asking for answers that will never 
seem definitive. Meanwhile, he leaves his protagonist standing, waiting to see what 
sort of critical community will emerge around him. 
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The ars moriendi tradition assumes that death has an active component; we 
are doing something when we are dying. I have been arguing that the treatment of 
this notion in devotional writing has a significant role in shaping early modern 
notions of individuality, community and agency. Marlowe, Shakespeare and Jonson 
all draw upon the conventions of the arts of dying in order to theorize possibilities 
for human action in various spiritual, social, political and theatrical contexts. In 
making my argument, I have challenged critics who tend to downplay the 
importance of the medieval religious heritage to later thought, or who emphasize 
what is lost, and nostalgically mourned, after the Reformation. Instead, I have traced 
important lines of continuity from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and 
argued that even when Renaissance authors demonstrate awareness of historical 
difference between, for example, the presence of saints at the Catholic deathbed and 
their absence from the Protestant one, they often perceive that they gain as much 
from the ability to situate and contextualize different traditions as they lose from 
the destruction of a religious totality. Ultimately, I have suggested, the homiletic 
tradition of the arts of dying constitutes one important point of origin for modern 
conceptions of the individualized self, the modes of action proper to it, and its place 
within wider forms of social organization. Social formations that have often been 
characterized as new and linked to the emergence of capitalism, or the renewed 
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influence of Classical ideas (in particular the Stoic tradition), might also have 
significant analogues in past devotional practice. 
At least initially, this influence travels in two directions. Just as Christian 
homiletic understandings of the good death offer useful analogies for dramatic 
writers, so theatrical death scenes also have an impact upon homiletic presentations 
of the good death. My discussion of Doctor Faustus indicates how the early histories 
of drama and of homiletic writing about dying are bound up with one another. I 
have also already noted in passing that homiletic prose authors frequently had 
recourse to dramatic dialogic formats both to model the proper interactions 
between onlookers and the moriens, and to represent conflicts between the moriens 
and the devil.1 But I have paid less attention to how the relationship between 
theater and ars moriendi changes over time. From the 1580’s onwards, just as the 
theater’s economic and cultural prominence increased, prominent religious writers 
(including writers of ars moriendi texts such as William Perkins) increasingly 
started to condemn it as immoral.2 By 1606, the Act to Restrain Abuses of Players 
had banned the naming of God and the Trinity onstage, apparently under the 
assumption that dramatic references to religious themes could only be 
blasphemous. It is worth thinking about why devotional and theatrical traditions 
diverge, whether the divergence is equally felt on both sides, and if it speaks to an 
actual incompatibility. The dramatic representation of the good deathbed is a 
particularly interesting test case for investigating these problems. Allusions to 
devotional practices such as ars moriendi within the supposedly secular theater 
might indicate a possibility for rapprochement between homiletic prose and drama. 
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Or alternatively, theater may ultimately render practices of dying mere performance 
in a way that threatens the basis of ars moriendi as a genre.  
To explore these questions, I look to a late example of revenge drama, Cyril 
Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy. The play dramatizes the conflict between 
D’Amville, an atheist whose lack of faith inspires him to murder his brother in order 
to acquire his estate, and Charlemont, his patient Christian nephew, who responds 
to his uncle’s actions by refusing to take revenge and waiting for providence to 
intervene. It represents the proper Christian approach to death in a manner that 
harks back to the homiletic tragedies and the longer morality play tradition, but is 
also highly attuned to the dramatic precedents and conventions for depicting dying 
that will condition an audience’s perception of good and bad deaths on stage.  
Through juxtaposing distinct dramatic modes, Tourneur, I suggest, 
investigates whether the very portability of good Christian deaths for figuring wider 
forms of agency has emptied them of their original spiritual content, and if theater 
might inevitably lead to such emptying. In striving to represent a good Christian 
approach to dying as sincerely as possible, while simultaneously exploiting 
conventions of dying for their theatrical effect, the play becomes a limit case that can 
help explain the rise of dramatic representations of ars moriendi along with the 
reasons why they gradually get abandoned or secularized. The very interest that 
playwrights show in the arts of dying for figuring different modes of action 
threatens to evacuate dramatic depictions of dying of spiritual content. Drama 
becomes incompatible with devotion not because it parodies or discounts devotion 
but because it takes the theoretical assumptions upon which devotion rests too 
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seriously and makes too widespread and frequent use of them. Where repetition of 
a religious ritual tends to strengthen that ritual, so that dying in line with the advice 
of the ars moriendi like thousands of Christians before him becomes a way for a 
moriens to participate meaningfully in Christian community, Tourneur’s play 
suggests that theatrical repetition inevitably threatens to destabilize or eliminate 
meaning, rendering stage deaths parodic or void of narrative significance. Although 
it explicitly makes a case for Christian patience against atheism, The Atheist’s 
Tragedy in fact lays bare and exploits a tendency to nihilistic iteration underpinning 
the theater. 
I. 
As background to my discussion of practices of dying, I first need to say 
something about repetition in The Atheist’s Tragedy more generally. Tourneur’s play 
is highly aware of its own literary context. As commentators have noted, it 
constantly cites and reworks older texts, drawing in particular on Doctor Faustus, 
Hamlet and George Chapman’s Bussy plays.3 Some of Tourneur’s adaptations show 
him engaging critically with the conceptions of character, or of appropriate moral 
frameworks for action, employed by his models. D’Amville’s freethinking naturalism 
updates Faustus’s heretical magic for a new intellectual climate; Charlemont’s 
patience Christianizes and challenges both Hamlet’s vacillation and Clermont’s 
pagan stoicism. But even more striking are borrowings of iconic images, scenarios, 
and speeches, which Tourneur takes out of context and iterates to peculiar and 
distinctive effect. Where Hamlet presents the ghost of the father, The Atheist’s 
Tragedy presents the ghost of the father, a comedy puritan disguised as the ghost of 
 177 
   
the father, the son disguised as the ghost of the father, and a cloud mistaken for the 
ghost of the father. The play then multiplies explanations for these ghosts beyond 
Hamlet’s alternatives of spirit of health and goblin damned, canvassing additional 
possibilities that they are misunderstood material phenomena, “mere imaginary 
fables,” or stock types that can be adopted as convenient disguises when necessary.4 
Tourneur does the same thing with the graveyard scene, quadrupling Hamlet’s 
contemplation of Yorrick’s skull, as Languebeau, D’Amville, Charlemont and 
Castabella all encounter unexpected death’s heads or corpses that spur them to 
ponder mortality. And again, they do so from a wider range of perspectives than are 
found in Hamlet and while simultaneously engaging in activities as various as 
consensual sex, attempted rape, homicide and sleep. 
Paul Cantor characterizes Tourneur’s debt to Shakespeare by saying that for 
him, “Hamlet evidently consisted of one striking coup de theatre after another, and 
when he went to imitate it, he captured only parts and not the whole, giving us in 
effect Hamlet with everything except the Prince of Denmark.”5 Rather than 
dismissing the play on these grounds, I want to consider the capturing of parts as a 
deliberate compositional strategy. The play reveals the various ways in which iconic 
aspects of Hamlet might function independently, and in the process suggests that 
repetition has two significant effects. First, the repeated appearances of ghosts 
cheapen the examples being imitated. In performance, differences between the 
costuming of real and fake ghosts would presumably be minimal, and without any 
such clear distinction, Languebeau’s ghost disguise threatens to retroactively 
contaminate the gravitas of his original. Over the course of the play the ghosts 
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appear in increasingly less impressive guises. The actual ghost of Montferrers, is 
replaced by Languebeau’s cynical adoption of a ghost costume, and then by 
D’Amville’s delusional belief that a cloud might be a ghost. Tourneur is adapting a 
powerful dramatic response to mortality, and is interested in demonstrating the 
number of resonances his example has. However, he is also aware that this 
procedure may risk emptying out the original.  
Second, the various manifestations of ghosts and pseudo-ghosts in the play 
link iteration, especially when associated with the devaluing of content, to 
established theatrical practices. Languebeau is inspired to disguise himself because 
“There’s a talk, thou know’st, that the ghost of old Montferrers walks,” and draws on 
dramatic conventions about what a ghost costume should look like in order to do so 
(4.3.58-59). When even characters within the play recognize that the original 
appearance of the ghost of the dead father provides a useful model for 
impersonation, the audience is given powerful encouragement to consider 
Tourneur’s own reliance on past dramatic examples. In part, this is a comic strategy. 
It is tempting to imagine The Atheist’s Tragedy forming part of some lost Jacobean 
equivalent to the Scary Movie franchise, isolating and parodying memorable 
moments from other, successful dramas. But along with emptying out Hamlet, the 
play also evacuates itself through recursion. As The Atheist’s Tragedy progresses, 
comic parody threatens to gives way to an exhaustion of meaning.  
In adopting this compositional technique, Tourneur is conforming to a 
certain version of Baroque aesthetics. For Walter Benjamin, the Baroque is 
characterized by profound skepticism toward the possibility of transcendent 
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meaning – especially meaning that could encompass heaven and earth in a way that 
would sustain an eschatology.6 Baroque authors respond to this absence by 
mourning a now ruined past that could imagine a symbolic totality. In this context, 
“The highly significant fragment, the remnant, is, in fact, the finest material in 
baroque creation. For it is common practice in the literature of the baroque to pile 
up fragments ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal, and, in the unremitting 
expectation of a miracle, to take the repetition of stereotypes for a process of 
intensification.”7 Fragments are the remaining traces of a ruined worldview. 
Baroque artists hopelessly scrutinize and rework them in a futile effort to recover 
their lost coherence, but in doing so merely confirm the deadness of what they are 
inspecting.  
In general terms, Benjamin’s framework could be applied to almost any 
seventeenth century tragedy. But Tourneur’s distinctive way of inhabiting it is to 
consider the similarities and differences between fragments as material and 
dramatic phenomena. His repetitions of the contemplation of Yorrick’s skull are 
simultaneously instances where characters take material fragments as occasions for 
allegorical moralization, and instances where characters themselves become 
literary fragments and so occasions for the audience’s allegorical moralization. 
Tourneur builds a Trauerspiel out of the disarticulated parts of other Trauerspiele. 
Hamlet is one ruined system he wants to contemplate mournfully through its 
detritus. In adopting this strategy, Tourneur links the perceived loss of cosmic 
totality to the development of dramatic forms, but he does so in a self-divided way. 
He alternately implies that there is something significant to be recovered from 
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disconnected elements of Hamlet and that procedures of dramatic writing and 
imitation in themselves tend to make any link to the transcendent harder to 
imagine. The elements of earlier plays he is most interested in assembling are 
fragmentary intimations of mortality such as ghosts and skulls. In such dramatic 
reworkings of memento mori, anxieties about the possibility of sustaining 
eschatology intersect with anxieties about the consequences of textual imitation. 
Material remnants of dying become continuous with narratives of dying in a process 
that might enable a play like The Atheist’s Tragedy to depict the good death, but that 
is perhaps likelier to render ars moriendi purely dramatic.  
The question I want to consider in the rest of this chapter is whether the 
play’s depictions of embodied approaches to death also conform to this pattern of 
repeating and devaluing fragments. Alongside literary allusions, the play piles up 
corpses. And in many ways, the proliferation of bodies, like the proliferation of 
textual echoes, tends to cast doubt on the possibility of fixed or transcendent 
meaning in death, and render problematic the idea of a clear, imitable model for ars 
moriendi that could always remain sufficiently meaningful to offer a pathway to 
heaven. Some of the deaths in the play exemplify the citational composition method 
I have been discussing. Levidulcia, for example, commits suicide so as not to outlive 
her shame in an ironic, debased imitation of Lucretia that casts doubt on the 
original.8 But even when deaths do not have a clear prior literary analogue, the play 
frequently de-emphasizes dying as a singular, meaningful event by stressing the 
susceptibility of its postures to interested repetition and reinterpretation.  
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This tendency is evident from the first depiction of a character’s mortality 
within the play: Borachio’s lying account of Charlemont’s death in battle. In order to 
provide a false report of Charlemont’s end, Borachio disguises himself as a soldier 
returning from the siege of Ostend and gives a largely accurate narrative of a 
historical military action, at which Tourneur may have been present, in which 
Spanish forces suffered a reversal at the hands of the Dutch and the English.9 As a 
prelude to the later staged deaths, the play juxtaposes historically accurate accounts 
of deaths that have a reality outside the stage with a purely fabricated narrative of 
an exemplary death, implicitly raising questions about where dramatizations of 
dying lie on a continuum between real and imaginary:  
Their front, beleaguered ’twixt the water and 
The town, seeing the flood was grown too deep 
The force of all their spirits, like the last  
Expiring gasp of a strong-hearted man, 
Upon the hazard of one charge, but were 
Oppressed and fell. The rest that could not swim 
Were only drowned, but those that thought to ’scape 
By swimming were by murderers that flankered 
The level of the flood both drowned and slain.   (2.1.59-68)  
In this account, deaths proliferate and, in the process, their material causes and 
ethical significance become less readable. As the bodies accumulate, categories of 
death bleed into one another. Soldiers suffer overkill, “both drowned and slain,” and 
the individual deaths are together understood to constitute a general death, “the last 
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/Expiring gasp of a strong-hearted man.” Deaths are devalued as singular events and 
instead contribute to an environment of mortality. Moreover, they at once conform 
to a strong moral narrative and provide grounds for questioning it. Borachio 
describes the death of “enemy” Spanish Catholic troops at the hands the Protestant 
forces for whom Charlemont has been fighting. The characters listening to him, 
along with the presumptively Protestant theater audience, have reason to approve 
this slaughter. However, the defenders of the town standing by to protect the banks 
of the channel are described as “murderers,” and in general the speech strives to 
evoke pathos for those who die in the flood.  
Borachio recounts these real historical deaths at Ostend in order to lend 
verisimilitude to his false claim that Charlemont has been killed: 
 Walking next day upon the fatal shore, 
 Among the slaughtered bodies of their men 
 Which the full-stomached sea had cast upon 
 The sand, it was m’unhappy chance to light 
 Upon a face, whose favour when it lived 
 My astonished mind informed me I had seen. 
 He lay in’s armour as if that had been  
 His coffin, and the weeping sea, like one 
 Whose milder temper doth lament the death 
 Of him whom in his rage he slew, runs up 
 The shore, embraces him, kisses his cheek, 
 Goes back again, and forces up the sands 
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 To bury him, and ev’ry time it parts  
 Sheds tears upon him…   (2.1.71-74) 
For Borachio’s onstage listeners, the “slaughtered bodies of their men,” the truly 
dead, surround Charlemont and lend credence to the story of his death. But the 
audience knows that Charlemont is still alive, so for them the procedure has the 
reverse effect. Borachio’s lies about Charlemont make the genuine deaths seem less 
significant. Dying threatens to become pure narrative convention, like the stage 
ghosts I discussed earlier. The fact that characters know what a narrativized death is 
supposed to look like, and are able to employ this awareness instrumentally, 
threatens to empty out the category. 
However, this image of Charlemont lying on the shore also associates him 
and his approach to death with the resistance of these kinds of empty iteration. 
Borachio describes the sea’s repeated passage over the body. The sea re-enacts the 
drowning of Charlemont again and again, and so figures another iterating 
mechanism through which the meaning of the original event is altered. Yet in this 
instance the mechanism is shown to be imperfect. The sea is unable to subsume 
Charlemont entirely and eventually ebbs away. Neither is it able to reinterpret the 
event of his death to the extent that Borachio imagines it desires and erase its 
earlier violence; its rage is replaced by a mournful tenderness, but this remorse 
cannot bring the man back to life.  
More generally, the question of whether dying is mere empty convention 
becomes focused on the character of Charlemont. In Borachio’s account, 
Charlemont’s imagined dead body takes on some of the characteristics of a person 
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still undergoing a process of dying. The eroticism of the sea’s action recalls 
Marlowe’s “Hero and Leander” and so evokes a dilation of the approach to death 
that strives to postpone the event.10 Conversely, the living Charlemont takes on 
some of the qualities of a corpse or a revenant when he reappears to D’Amville who 
expediently mistakes him for a ghost. From the moment his death is announced, 
Charlemont occupies a littoral zone, understandable as both dead object and dying 
person. He composes part of the mournful detritus that Benjamin discusses, and 
that I have been arguing Tourneur links to literary citation, and also stands as an 
individual who can look upon that detritus and attempt to use it as inspiration to 
perform an art of dying well. Through the depiction of Charlemont’s orientation 
toward death as it stands in contrast to the deaths of Rousard and D’Amville, 
Tourneur explores whether the stage is capable of sustaining a meaningful 
embodied approach to dying, or whether dramatized approaches to death are as 
iterable as skulls and ghosts and equally susceptible to impoverished and 
impoverishing reworking. 
II. 
Tourneur grounds the intellectual and moral opposition between Charlemont 
and D’Amville in their different attitudes to dying. Though the incompatibility 
between the two characters’ worldviews is total, their encounters with and stances 
towards death become increasingly important in defining their beliefs, and finally in 
effecting the hierarchical resolution through which Charlemont’s understanding is 
validated and D’Amville’s is discredited. Charlemont’s faith is both articulated and 
tested by the appearance of the ghost of his father, who orders him to “Attend with 
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patience the success of things, /But leave revenge unto the King of kings” (2.6.22-
23). The Ghost outlines the patient response Charlemont’s Christian beliefs should 
entail, but as a representation of a wrong done to Charlemont’s family, also 
constitutes his strongest provocation to reject those beliefs. Analogously, 
D’Amville’s moral philosophy is articulated as a response to his conviction that 
“death casts up /Our total sum of joy and happiness,” which causes him to focus 
exclusively on gaining wealth and perpetuating a familial legacy as the closest 
material analogue he can imagine to an afterlife (1.1.16-17). His ability to sustain 
this outlook is similarly tested (and found wanting) by the near-simultaneous 
deaths of his two sons, which lead him to reject nature as “simple or malicious” and 
to conclude that “there is some power above /Her that controls her force” (5.1.101-
04).11 In both instances, death inspires the characters to advance an ethical 
philosophy, but nevertheless remains the primary challenge to that philosophy. 
Tourneur associates D’Amville with the belief that deaths are merely another 
set of theatrical postures to be iterated. This is first evident when D’Amville and 
Borachio glory in how successfully they have exploited probability and mechanical 
causation to murder Montferrers. D’Amville gloats: 
Aye, mark the plot. Not any circumstance 
That stood within the reach of the design, 
Of persons, dispositions, matter, time, 
Or place, but by this brain of mine was made 
An instrumental help; yet nothing from  
Th’induction to th’accomplishment seemed forced 
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Or done o’ purpose, but by accident.  (2.4.105-111) 
The characters’ ingenuity is expressed on two levels. First, they have been able to 
kill Montferrers because they have successfully identified and manipulated the 
predictable ways in which he and other characters would react to news of 
Charlemont’s death. They have successfully reduced those around them to 
“instrumental help.” Second, they have arranged events so as to imply an entirely 
different causal chain, so anticipating how others will read the death for its 
narrative plausibility, its conformity to expectation. Both instances for 
congratulation are grounded in the assumption that events leading up to death 
follow regular and predictable patterns that can be imitated and repeated. The 
speech creates an association between the techniques of the citational playwright 
and of the intrigant. 
And this citationality also characterizes D’Amville’s approach to his own 
death. When the play dramatizes the insufficiency of D’Amville’s perspective by 
revealing his lack of control over events, it does so in part by transforming him from 
an agent managing iteration, to an unconscious occasion of iteration. D’Amville’s 
despair in the graveyard evokes Faustus’s plea in his final soliloquy that the stars 
will “Now draw up Faustus like a foggy mist /Into the entrails of yon laboring cloud, 
/That when you vomit forth into the air /My limbs may issue from your smoky 
mouths, /So that my soul may but ascend to heaven.”12 Overcome with guilt for his 
part in the murder of his brother, D’Amville expresses a desire for annihilation: “O 
were my body circumvolved /Within that cloud, that when the thunder tears /His 
passage open, it might scatter me /To nothing in the air” (4.3.248-51). Indeed, he 
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repeats the conceit twice since he first mistakes that same cloud for the ghost of his 
brother:  
O behold!  
Yonder’s the ghost of old Montferrers in  
A long white sheet, climbing yond lofty mountain  
To complain to Heav’n of me. Montferrers!  
’Pox o’ fearfulness. ’Tis nothing but  
A fair white cloud”     (4.3.230-34).  
D’Amville here imagines the ghost following the same trajectory, ascending to 
heaven and then abruptly dissolving into a mere natural phenomenon. His own 
imitation of Faustus, therefore, is marked as secondary and derivative to his 
brother’s even within the context of the play.  
Moreover, Tourneur again exploits the deflating effect of importing dramatic 
elements into new settings and repeating them in order to diminish D’Amville. In 
Doctor Faustus these lines form part of their speaker’s desperate search for a belief 
system that will allow him to escape hell, which ends with the appearance of 
Mephastophilis to lead Faustus offstage. The soliloquy and the denouement of 
Marlowe’s play are an integrated whole that links Faustus’s final posture of 
despairing philosophizing to his damnation. In The Atheist’s Tragedy, unlike in 
Faustus, D’Amville’s speech does not build into a sustained approach to death, but 
rather is followed by a wrenching change of direction. D’Amville is abruptly cut off 
by the entry of Languebeau and the watch. The atheist then confuses the puritan, 
who is presumably wearing dark colors, with “Black Beelzebub /And all his hell 
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hounds” (4.3.252-53). Languebeau himself is an entirely prosaic figure, a jarring 
intrusion from the milieu of city comedy into the tragedy, and his exchange with 
D’Amville also renders the atheist and his despairing mental distraction (which the 
Faustus allusion had lent a momentary gravitas to) comic. Moreover, this comedy is 
predicated upon audience expectation that a Faustus analogue should be led 
offstage by devils. Tourneur acknowledges a generic imperative, and shows how it 
has a deflating effect when replicated in a different context. Again, iteration is 
associated with theatricality and the replicable nature of conventions of theatrical 
impersonation, since D’Amville’s mistake is based on confusion of the stock Puritan 
costume for the stock devil one. The atheistic approach to death seems of a piece 
with citational dramatic technique, and both apparently stand in opposition to the 
possibility of a meaningful spiritual practice of dying well. 
The question is whether Charlemont can offer anything better. At the least, 
he tries to do something different. His patience places him at odds with the revenge 
tragedy tradition and the forms of literary repetition that Tourneur has been 
exploring. Where, as I have noted, other characters consciously or unconsciously 
invoke earlier plays, Charlemont pointedly refuses to reenact Hamlet, rejecting the 
notion that he has an obligation to revenge his father. “The peace of conscience” 
makes living and dying a matter of indifference to him (5.2.159). As he is preparing 
for execution, he casts his calm demeanor as a valiant form of action: 
Thus, like a warlike navy on the sea, 
Bound through the stormy troubles of this life 
And now arrived upon the armèd coast, 
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In expectation of the victory  
Whose honour lies beyond this exigent, 
Through mortal danger, with an active spirit, 
Thus I aspire to undergo my death.  (5.2.122-29) 
Charlemont here asserts that accepting death is heroic, and he does so, like the ars 
moriendi authors by identifying an “active spirit” underlying passive postures of 
weakness and resignation in the face of death.13 
Yet Charlemont’s approach is also subject to iteration. Castabella mirrors his 
aspiration to die patiently by leaping up onto the scaffold after him. In an orthodox 
Christian reading, this repetition marks Charlemont’s action not so much a matter of 
unusual individual heroism as the natural consequence of faith and virtue and 
therefore as exemplifying an ars moriendi to which all Christians might aspire. 
Furthermore, the mirrored action creates Christian community; Charlemont and 
Castabella, the couple who were prevented from marrying in life, will be united with 
each other and with Christ in death. Here, in theory, is repetition working to 
reinforce ritual rather than to render it empty. Yet, in dramatic terms, Castabella’s 
loving, pious mirroring does not seem so easily separable from the other forms of 
repetition I have been discussing, and there is potentially even something comic 
about the successive leaps. Significantly, Castabella also accounts for their actions, 
but in terms slightly different to those used by Charlemont: 
   Our lives cut off 
In our young prime of years are like green herbs 
Wherewith we strew the hearses of our friends; 
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For as their virtue gathered when th’are green 
Before they wither or corrupt, is best, 
So we in virtue are the best for death 
While yet we have not lived to such an age 
That the increasing canker of our sins 
Hath spread too far upon us.  (5.2.131-39) 
By drawing an explicit contrast between virtue and sin, Castabella emphasizes the 
Christian framework for her behavior more strongly than Charlemont had. Yet her 
image makes it harder for their deaths to be seen as active or heroic. The pair 
become herbs, funereal objects that seem likely to be subject to just the same forms 
of mournful contemplation and reworking that I had been discussing earlier. Even if 
Tourneur is sincerely attempting to differentiate between worldly patterns of 
theatrical repetition and the godly repetition of ars moriendi, it is unclear what could 
render that distinction absolute. It is difficult to draw a firm line between parodic 
variation on Hamlet and oppositional rejection of Hamlet or to imagine what 
Charlemont could do within a revenge tragedy to place himself entirely outside the 
logic of revenge tragedy. 
Complicating matters, the play adds a third option. Alongside atheistic and 
Christian forms of repetition in dying, the play depicts the merely biological death, 
and associates it with a third form of repetition, the iteration of cries of pain. This 
comes across most strongly in the depiction of the death of Rousard. Both atheist 
and Christian characters attempt to explain the death philosophically. It becomes 
the occasion for the Doctor and D’Amville to debate material and divine causation. 
 191 
   
However, the intrusion of Rousard’s cries into this dialogue also mark the debate as 
beside the point and suggests an embodied approach to death that is independent 
from either material or Christian rationalization.  
In the death of Rousard, Tourneur spotlights the process of dying, stripped of 
individuating circumstance or details. We know that Rousard is suffering a sickness, 
but not what that sickness is, and there are no other actors promoting or retarding 
his death to complicate what we are looking at.14 This is dying as pure biological 
process. Rousard’s death is expressed through cries, which appear in the text as the 
syllable “O.” There are a few different ways in which we might understand these. In 
The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry identifies an antagonism between pain and 
communication since pain frays the connection between the sufferer and the world:  
For the person whose pain it is, it is ‘effortlessly’ grasped… while for the 
person outside the sufferer’s body, what is ‘effortless’ is not grasping it… 
Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, 
bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the 
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.” 15  
For Scarry, the progress of pain is a destructive and regressive phenomenon, 
something that is opposed in particular to aesthetic creation. In this model, 
Rousard’s groans are preverbal markers of the fact that he is no longer a member of 
the language-based social community the play is depicting.16 He cannot be 
performing emptying repetition because he is already emptied of narrative 
meaning. 
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 By contrast, ars moriendi authors at least canvass the possibility that groans 
may have significance, though the nature of that significance is unclear. Jeremy 
Taylor, for instance, insists that nonverbal sounds of themselves are not necessarily 
instances of impatience, saying: 
Sighes and groans, sorrow and prayers, humble complaints, and dolorous 
expressions are the sad accents of a sick mans language; for it is not to be 
expected that a sick man should act a part of patience with a countenance 
like an Orator, or grave like a Dramatick person. It were well if all men could 
bear an exteriour decencie in their sicknesse, and regulate their voice, their 
face, their discourse and all their circumstances by the measures, and 
proportions of comlinesse and satisfaction to all the standers by. But this 
would better please them than assist him; the sick man would do more good 
to others, than he would receive to himself.17 
The outcries of the sick are appropriate to the position of the sick, and the very 
distastefulness that they may have to bystanders is indicative of the dying person’s 
growing separation from ordinary modes of expression. The moriens is now 
addressing himself primarily to God, who will understand and pity his position. The 
lack of meaning these sounds have for bystanders may in itself be a marker of their 
true communicative efficacy. Yet there are also limits to the allowances that can be 
made for the vocalizations of the dying. Taylor insists it is important to avoid 
“peevishnesse… This sins against civility, and that necessary decency, which must be 
used toward the ministers and assistants.”18 Taylor’s view would imply that 
Rousard’s groans could constitute a deliberate, embodied practice of dying either 
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well or badly, though not necessarily one that onlookers will be able to comprehend. 
Interestingly, Taylor characterizes the noises of the dying in part by opposing them 
to dramatic forms of speech. Though he and Scarry disagree on whether non-verbal 
sounds are communicative, they concur that they are not aesthetic. 
In fact, Rousard’s approach to death has both communicative and 
noncommunicative dimensions, and slips between something that might be better 
understood in Scarry’s terms and in Taylor’s. The formal relationship between his 
cries and the verbal dialogue is significant. At times Rousard’s “O”s are necessary to 
the scansion of the verse: 
D’AMVILLE Go call a surgeon. 
ROUSARD (within)  O. 
D’AMVILLE     What groan was that? (5.1.52) 
At other times they interrupt the verse form.    
D’AMVILLE How does my elder son? The sound came from  
His chamber. 
SERVANT He went sick to bed, my lord. 
ROUSARD (within) O. 
D’AMVILLE The cries of mandrakes never touched the ear 
With more sad horror than this voice does mine.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
O bury not the pride of that great action 
Under the fall and ruin of itself.  (5.1.53-57, 82-83) 
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Rousard’s varying position inside and outside of the verse, alternatively completing 
lines and breaking them, reflects the uncertain status of his cries as both verbal 
signifiers of pain existing alongside other signifiers and nonverbal background 
noises that have no place in the dialogue. The cries are also partially brought into 
contact with dialogue when other characters (and in this scene, significantly, 
exclusively D’Amville) make use of the same syllable “O” as an exclamation.19 These 
points of contact, however, never rise to a complete integration of the two modes of 
expression. D’Amville states that his son’s groans resemble “The cries of 
mandrakes” and that “His gasping sighs are like the falling noise /Of some great 
building when the groundwork breaks. On these two pillars stood the stately frame 
/And architecture of my lofty house” (5.1.56,75-78). His reactions demonstrate his 
affection for his son, or at least for the dynastic ambition that he represents, but also 
express alienation or revulsion from him insofar as he has now become an emblem 
of death, like a mandrake or a crashing building. Death lays bare and affirms 
interpersonal relations but also inspires a disavowal of the dying person, who death 
starts to transform into something less appealing. 
Just as they have an uneasy relation to dialogue, so death cries are also 
shown to be at odds with progressive narrative. Rousard’s death is associated with 
ostentatious gestures of unveiling that can ultimately say nothing about the 
biological event. When the scene begins, Rousard is “within,” and his groans from 
offstage are spatially separated from the onstage action. However, soon his bed is 
moved onstage and then, at D’Amville’s request, the curtains are pulled back to 
reveal the person lying there. This is a performance of revelation. Rousard is 
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pointedly brought forward to be the focus of attention. However, this procedure 
does not enlighten either characters or audience about what he is doing when he is 
dying. Rousard continues to cry out as before, and his final death groan looks no 
different on the page from his earlier ones. His actual death is met initially with a 
bare verbal confirmation. The doctor and the servants together pronounce “He’s 
dead,” interrupting D’Amville’s meditation on whether nature can save his sons. 
Superficially, the choral statement appears redundant. It does no more than name 
what has just occurred on stage. Death seems to have rather clumsily arrested 
narrative. In actuality, though, a confirmation is necessary because of the way in 
which the death has been dramatized through cries. Without it, there would be no 
way to recognize the death groan as final. Rousard’s cries represent both 
progression towards death and static repetition that emphasizes the difficulty of 
understanding why and how the end occurs at the precise moment it does. 
Rousard’s repeated “O” therefore adds a further wrinkle to the different 
functions repetition has in generically self-conscious theater and in ritualized 
practices of dying. Earlier, I suggested that the multiplication of ghosts and skulls 
demonstrates the portability of prior literary examples and the extent to which they 
can be expediently refashioned. In a way, death cries would seem to be another 
instance of this. The crying of “O” to signal a death is perhaps even better 
established theatrical convention that the others I had previously been discussing (a 
fact that challenges both Scarry and Taylor’s assumption that groans are 
antipathetic to literature). “O” can certainly become a joke, as when Francis 
Beaumont parodies theatrical death in The Knight of the Burning Pestle, by having 
 196 
   
Rafe’s last speech end “Oh, oh, oh, etc.”20 But, in fact, I think that the repetition of “O” 
functions differently to (though no less theatrically than) these earlier repetitions 
because, as Scarry argues, there remains something anti-communicative about it. 
“O” registers an absence. If it speaks anything, it speaks a lack of meaning, and 
marks death as that about which nothing can be said. It therefore cannot be easily 
be instrumentalized or repurposed to meet characters immediate needs or to reflect 
their specific points of view in the same way that I have been arguing ghosts and 
skulls or verbalized approaches to death can.21  
Therefore, rather than functioning as an occasion for theater to empty an 
established image of content through repetition, Rousard’s “O” suggests theater may 
be repetitious and empty of content in its very nature. The death groan of “O” is an 
opportunity for player to evoke the experiences of a character through sound 
independent of any particular verbal content and to exhibit the range of his ability in 
the process. Consequently, it represents acting as embodied performance, removed 
from any particular plot and from the text of a playwright. But the conventional 
nature of “O” as a death groan also encapsulates the limitation of acting as a practice 
of imitation, since it points to the differences between representing dying and dying 
in fact. One thing an actor can never do onstage is actually die. Superficially, the 
death of Rousard is presented as occasion against which to test Christian and 
atheistic understandings of mortality. But in fact, it threatens to overshadow the 
debate and reveal a third distinct way to understand dying, which intimates that 
theater is not a site of devotional ritual reenactment, nor of debasing, parodic 
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iteration, but instead a bare repetition of postures and sounds standing in for 
something unnarratable. 
III. 
These three modes of representing the approach to death are brought 
together in the final catastrophe, when the opposition between D’Amville and 
Charlemont resolves into a single unified action conclusively affirming a hierarchical 
relationship between their respective belief systems. If the accident can be said to 
have an immediate material cause, it is that D’Amville has been driven to distraction 
by Charlemont’s patience in the face of execution and loses control of his body.22 
Charlemont’s practice of Christian ars moriendi of itself destroys his enemy and 
appears almost sufficient to win him an earthly redemption from death. D’Amville’s 
attempt to avoid death through inflicting it on another is refigured as a cautionary 
example of a reprobate’s mors improvisa. Indeed, D’Amville even registers the fact 
that his stance is becoming a debased reflection of his nephew’s when he tells 
Charlemont that “at the reflection of /Thy courage my cold fearful blood takes fire, 
/And I begin to emulate thy death” (5.2.217-19). What looks like good Christian 
dying turns out to be a means of living, while what looks like a worldly mastery or 
denial of death turns out to be a bad way to die. The denouement of the play harks 
back to the model of the homiletic tragedies, where death functions as a conclusive 
affirmation of the superiority of a Godly perspective to an ungodly one.23 The swing 
of the axe with which D’Amville hopes to kill Charlemont rebounds (literally) upon 
him and signals a greater providential pattern governing the drama.  
 198 
   
Like D’Amville’s murder of Montferrers, the atheist’s death needs to be read 
on a mechanical causal level, and also as revealing a deeper intentional narrative.24 
The action is pointedly improbable and almost entirely resists any logical 
explanation. But through this improbability, it strongly affirms another type of 
causation – divine intervention – and with it, the assumption that death can be 
narrativized. Robert Ornstein and G.F. Waller both note that the event evokes an 
exemplary historical precedent.25 Tourneur could be recalling Christopher 
Marlowe’s death by a self-inflicted knife wound, cited in Thomas Beard’s The 
Theater of God’s Judgments as an instance of marvelously appropriate divine 
punishment of an atheist, where “the justice of God [did] most notably appeare, in 
that he compelled his own hand which had written those blasphemies, to be the 
instrument to punish him, and that in his braine, which had devised the same.”26 As 
an analogue of Marlowe’s end, D’Amville’s death is legible and iterable. Yet legibility 
and iterability are precisely the qualities that D’Amville has been able to manipulate, 
and that the play as a whole has associated with the emptying out of examples and 
with skepticism of a universal eschatology. In consequence, the earlier part of The 
Atheist’s Tragedy stands potentially at odds with the denouement, and casts doubt 
on the conclusive nature of the ending, or the ability of providentialistic narrative to 
separate itself entirely from citational practices that have become associated with 
atheism. 
Moreover, once more, the play uses a nonverbal cry to open up an evaluative 
space between the actions that bring about D’Amville’s death and the moral that can 
be drawn from it. And again this cry casts dying as meaningless and non-narrative 
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and so threatens to overshadow both the scarcely believable providential outcome 
and the relativistic, open-ended patterns of dramatic imitation and iteration that 
threaten to render it ironic. Tourneur’s printed script fractures D’Amville’s fatal 
accident into three overlapping textual representations: 
D’AMVILLE I ha’ the trick on ’t, nephew. You shall see  
How eas’ly I can put you out of pain. O! 
As he raises up the axe, [D’Amville] strikes out his own brains. [He] 
staggers off the scaffold 
 EXECUTIONER In lifting up the axe, I think h’as knocked 
 His brains out.    (5.2.238-41)  
D’Amville’s taunting of Charlemont is interrupted by the exclamation “O!” 
presumably a cry of pain and shock at the wound he has inflicted on himself. The 
“O!” is the most immediate reflection of the deathblow, a non-voluntary response to 
the injury. By itself, it offers no indication of what has occurred even at a 
physiological level, and certainly does not provide enough information for the 
reader to interpret the death as a moral example. The stage direction then 
supplements and interprets the “O!” by providing a mechanical explanation for what 
has occurred. For a reader, what is disorienting about this presentation is that the 
audible response precedes the action that causes it. The single action of D’Amville’s 
axe stroke, which is supposed to unite and reverse the fates of the play’s primary 
antagonists, is split into a sonic manifestation of the immediate embodied 
experience of the action, which does not interpret it, and an externalized mechanical 
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explanation of the same event. The death itself falls unrepresentably into the space 
between the cry and the stage direction.  
For a theater audience watching the play, the stage direction would 
presumably be enacted in tandem with the dialogue, so that this precise bifurcation 
would not be apparent. However, the Executioner’s response would nevertheless 
have almost the same splitting effect. The Executioner provides an incredulous 
verbal narration of the event that has just occurred. As in the case of Rousard’s 
death, verbal confirmation may be necessary in part because of the difficulty of 
staging D’Amville’s action in any convincing way. Words validate the audience’s 
perception of what has taken place. But the fact that such validation is required 
draws attention to the implausibility and uncertain meaning of the event. 
Importantly, the Executioner’s incredulity is directed not towards the moral 
significance of the axe stroke as an indication of the presence of the divine in the 
world, but towards the mechanical action itself. What exactly just happened?  
Immediately after the Executioner’s comments, characters representing the 
entire moral spectrum of the play – from D’Amville himself, to the imperfect human 
Judges who have cooperated in the execution, to Charlemont – unite to affirm the 
spiritual significance of D’Amville’s mortal injury. The characters, at least, overcome 
any embarrassment or disbelief occasioned by the potential absurdity of the event 
by subordinating the physical order of occurrences entirely to their metaphysical 
significance. They remove D’Amville’s demise from a biological register into an 
emblematic one, where the very implausibility of what has happened validates its 
status as divine intervention.27 But before the play arrives at the providentialist 
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reading of D’Amville’s condemnation in the theater of God’s judgment, it presents a 
moment of doubt, an awareness that there is something unnarratable about the fact 
of death and that perhaps that may be the most significant thing theater can say 
about mortality. 
The Atheist’s Tragedy is not the last play chronologically to draw on the 
conventions and assumptions of the ars moriendi tradition. But it does represent an 
attempt to test some of the dramatic possibilities implicit in that tradition, and so 
may help us understand some of the reasons for the ultimate divergence between 
devotional prose writing and drama. I have tracked contrary impulses within the 
text. On the one hand, Tourneur seeks to revive elements of the didactic drama of 
the 1570’s and 80’s by staging a clear moral distinction between good and bad 
approaches to death and by conclusively affirming the former at the expense of the 
latter. On the other hand, his citational method of composition shows him to be 
keenly aware of, and indeed interested in exploiting for dramatic effect, the ways in 
which repetition and imitation of exemplary narratives in different contexts 
threatens to empty them of content. The denouement apparently stands as an 
emphatic affirmation of the orthodox values against D’Amville’s atheistic beliefs. 
However, it is hard to see how the event of D’Amville’s death can ultimately escape 
this citational logic he had earlier exploited. In this context, the very orthodoxy with 
which the play affirms providence starts to look sensationalist and parodic. The 
Atheist’s Tragedy, therefore, represents a sort of limit case for dramatic 
appropriations of good deaths, at once striving to dramatize a Christian ars moriendi 
sincerely, and showing how the very seriousness with which representations of the 
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good death have been taken in the theater, and their portability for discussing wider 
social, theological and political questions, threatens to undermine their utility as 
examples. If there are any moments in the play that resist the sense that iteration, 
even sincere and respectful iteration, tends to cheapen the models upon which it is 
based, it is representations of dying through the nonverbal syllable “O,” which only 
seems to become more recalcitrant the more it is repeated in different contexts. 
Dying groans within the play conform to neither a materialist nor a providentialist 
narrative, but rather imply skepticism about the possibility of narrativizing death at 
all. The Atheist’s Tragedy implies that this is the direction towards which all 
theatrical ars moriendi tends. 
1 For example, see the dialogue between the moriens and the devil in Erasmus’s Preparatione to 
Deathe (62-63) and the whole of Thomas Becon’s The Sicke Mans Salve. 
 
2 See discussions of antitheatricality in Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice and Peter Lake and 
Michael C. Questier, The Anti-Christ's lewd hat. William Perkins discusses players’ (and others’) 
abuses of sumptuary laws in The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience (Cambridge: 1608), III.4. 
His ars moriendi text is the 1595 A Salve for a Sicke Man (in The English Ars Moriendi).  
 
3 On the Hamlet references, see Paul A. Cantor "Cyril Tourneur." Jacobean and Caroline Dramatists, ed. 
Fredson Bowers, Dictionary of Literary Biography, Vol. 58 (Detroit: Gale Research, 1987). On Doctor 
Faustus, see Katherine Eisaman Maus, ed. Four Revenge Tragedies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995) 417n. On the influence of Chapman, see Clifford Leech "The Atheist's Tragedy as a Dramatic 
Comment on Chapman's Bussy Plays, The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 52, no. 4 (1953): 
525-530. 
 
4 Cyril Tourner, The Atheist’s Tragedy in Four Revenge Tragedies, ed. Katherine Eisaman Maus 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 4.3.273-74. All subsequent references will be given in the 
text. 
 
5 Cantor, n.p. Note that Cantor is operating under the assumption that Tourneur also wrote The 
Revenger’s Tragedy, and this assessment refers to both plays. 
 
6 Anja Müller-Wood links The Atheist’s Tragedy to Walter Benjamin’s understanding of allegory, 
arguing that the play exhibits a characteristically baroque pessimism that objects found in the world 
are capable of sustaining fixed or transcendent meanings. She suggests that for Tourneur, this 
pessimism is particularly attached to anxieties about the purposes of rhetoric, and skepticism of the 
possibility of a transparent language. See Anja Müller-Wood, The Theatre of Civilized Excess: New 
Perspectives on Jacobean Tragedy (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007) 90-92. 
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7 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 178. 
 
8 See William E. Gruber “Building a Scene: The Text and its Representation in The Atheist’s Tragedy” 
Comparative Drama 19 (1985): 193-208, for a reading of Levidulcia’s death in relation to patriarchy. 
The defamiliarization Guber sees occurring in the moment of Levidulcia’s death is somewhat akin to 
the reading I will give of Montferrers and Rousard. The precise understanding of shame that 
Levidulcia evokes reflects Augustine’s skeptical take on her suicide in The City of God (I.19). 
 
9 See Willem Schrickx, “Cyril Tourneur, War Correspondent, Spy and Author of "Extremities Urging 
Sir Francis Vere to the Anti-Parle," Neophilologus, 78, no. 2 (1994): 315-27. 
 
10 See Troni Grande’s reading of the poem in Marlovian Tragedy: The Play of Dilation (Lewisburg, PA: 
Bucknell University Press, 1999), 25-43. 
 
11 Martin Fotherby suggests that a fear of death (along with fear of sleep and fear of thunder) is 
particularly characteristic of atheists. Atheomastix clearing foure truthes, against atheists and infidels: 
1. That, there is a God. 2. That, there is but one God. 3. That, Iehouah, our God, is that one God. 4. That, 
the Holy Scripture is the Word of that God. All of them proued, by naturall reasons, and secular 
authorities; for the reducing of infidels: and, by Scriptures, and Fathers, for the confirming of Christians. 
(London, 1622), 131. 
 
12 Doctor Faustus, 5.2.85-89. 
 
13 See for example Erasmus, “Sondry be the formes of tntations by whiche God trieth his men of 
warre, but the most greuous tentation of all is death. For than in good ernest, we must fight hande to 
hande, nor there is no skipping away, but on both sides, with all our myghte and power, the maystrie 
must be tried” (Preparatione to Deathe, 52).   
 
14 Maus argues that some of Rousard’s symptoms suggest his complaint is syphilis (407n).  
 
15 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 4. 
 
16 “Preverbal” is Scarry’s word, and implies a single axis on which linguistic progression and 
regression can be located. Since I am interested in tracking the incommensurability between 
language and cries of pain within the play I have preferred “nonverbal” throughout.  
 
17 Jeremy Taylor, Holy Dying, 71. Admittedly Taylor’s 1650 text postdates The Atheist’s Tragedy by 
several decades. However, Perkins makes essentially the same point in1595: “it may be alledged that 
in the pangs of death men want their senses & convenient utterance, and therefore they are vnable to 
pray. Ans. The very sighes, sobs, and grones of a repentant and beleeuing heart are praiers before 
God, euen as effectuall as if they were uttered by the best voice in the world. Praier stands in the 
affection of the hart. The voice is but an outward messenger thereof (A Salve for a Sicke Man, 158). 
 
18 Taylor, 73. 
 
19 A number of critics have considered the implications of sonic resonances between verbal and 
nonverbal interjections in drama. Joel Feinman observes a pattern of O sounds in Othello which he 
equates with Lacan’s objet a in “The Sound of O in Othello” in The Subjectivity Effect in Western 
Literary Tradition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 143-64. Bruce N. Smith surveys the 
acoustic landscape of Early Modern England more generally, arguing for continual circulation 
between verbal and nonverbal forms of sound and the production of meaning across the different 
registers in The Acoustic World of Early Modern England (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999). 
Nicole Loraux discusses ancient Greek drama but comes closest to identifying the dynamic I am 
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interested in. In The Mourning Voice: An Essay on Greek Tragedy, trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), she identifies how syllables traditionally used in mourning 
rituals emerge within tragic dialogue and enable a hidden grieving that cannot be expressed in 
Athenian masculine military culture to be articulated. 
 
20 Francis Beaumont, The Knight of the Burning Pestle, (London: A&C Black, 2002) 5.335. 
 
21 The closest approximations to such a repurposing that I have been able to identify are the repeated 
O’s uttered by Beatrice-Joanna while she is in the closet with De Flores in Thomas Middleton’s The 
Changeling (in Five Plays, ed. Brian Loughrey and Neil Taylor [London: Penguin, 1988] 5.3.139-40). 
Until she emerges, bleeding to death, the audience is uncertain whether her cries signify injury or a 
sexual encounter. Death groans do not so much prove susceptible to deflating refiguring as they 
suggest that biological death might be merely one way in which an annihilating encounter with the 
real (that could only be registered nonverbally) could manifest.   
 
22 Peter B. Murray, rather desperately, suggests that D’Amville misses his swing because of the 
alcohol in the glass of wine he drinks. See Peter B. Murray, A Study of Cyril Tourneur (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). 
 
23 Huston Diehl offers a slightly different link between The Atheist’s Tragedy and homiletic tragedy, 
arguing that the homiletic tragedies provide a precedent for seeing an analogy between trial scenes 
and the last judgment in “‘Reduce Thy Understanding to thine Eye:’ Seeing and Interpreting in The 
Atheist’s Tragedy,” Studies in Philology, 78 (1981): 56. 
 
24 Compare Diehl’s argument that the play teaches a practice of Christian reading of the world. 
 
25 Robert Ornstein, “The Atheist’s Tragedy,” Notes and Queries, (1955): 284-85; G.F. Waller, “Time, 
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History, Literature and the Arts, 23 (1972): 59.  
 
26 Thomas Beard, The theatre of Gods iudgements: or, a collection of histories out of sacred, 
ecclesiasticall, and prophane authours concerning the admirable iudgements of God vpon the 
transgressours of his commandements. (London, 1597), 148.  
 
27 See R.J. Kaufmann, “Theodicy, Tragedy and the Psalmist: Tourneur’s Atheist’s Tragedy” Comparative 
Drama, 3, (1969): 260. 
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